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Abstract
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM
by
Consuelo Preti
Adviser: Professor Jerry A. Fodor

Semantic externalism is the view that meaning and
mental content are determined by relations to the world of
objects and properties outside the physical boundaries of
the subject of mental states. What you mean by your words what you're thinking when you're thinking about something is essentially constituted by the world at large. It has
become customary to formulate externalism in terms of socalled twin earth cases - cases where (some kinds of)
content do not supervene on inner states, but this
formulation can be shown to be too limited to be of any
great use in characterizing a theory of mind. A more general
formulation of externalism is defended in chapter 1, one
that characterizes all content.
That externalism has untoward consequences for beliefdesire psychology is a familiar point, but, given the
predominance of twin earth formulations, the problem of
content's explanatory role is often construed as the problem
of content's failing to supervene. In chapter 2 we argue
that this is a mistake. Externalism in its most general
iv

formulation has consequences for all content in explanation,
not just content that fails to supervene on inner states. If
content is externalistically individuated, then content is
redundant in causal explanation. In chapter 2 we examine the
redundancy problem and consider the options for its
solution.
Part one of chapter 3 concerns the further - unnoticed
- consequence of externalism that requires a reconsideration
of Davidson's charge that Fregean semantic theories fail the
test of 'semantic innocence.' If meaning is partly
determined by reference, then what an expression refers to
in an opaque context, is, ultimately, its reference. Part
two of chapter 3 concerns the consequences of externalism
for analytic truth. If meaning is partly determined by
reference, a question arises as to what becomes of the
classical philosophical distinction between analytic and
synthetic truth; between 'truth in virtue of meaning alone'
and 'truth in virtue of meaning and the world.' Chapter 3
concludes with an account of analytic truth from the
perspective of semantic externalism.

v
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CHAPTER 1
EXTERNALISM: FORMULATING A THEORY OF MIND
If my darling were once to decide
Not to stop at my eyes,
But to jump, like Alice, with floating skirt
into my head,
She would find no tables and chairs,
No mahogany claw-footed sideboards,
No undisturbed embers . . .
Philip Larkin, "If My Darling"

1.

Introduction

In what follows, I will be formulating and defending a
certain thesis about the individuation of mental states, one
that claims that mental states are determined by relations
between the subject of those states and the world beyond the
subject.
The underlying substantive issue concerns the nature
of mind. The traditional view, whose paradigm is the
Cartesian model, claims that the existence and identity
conditions of mental states are independent of the existence
and identity conditions of the items that are the objects of
those states; there is no necessary correspondence - let
alone individuation relation - between states of affairs and
mental states. In direct opposition to this is the view that
claims that mental content is related to states of affairs
1

so thoroughly that, to put it vividly, a psychological
subject should not be thought to instantiate certain states
in the absence of the objects of those states.1 The mind is
thus no longer to be thought of an autonomous, worldindependent entity.
We can call these two general views about the nature
of mind internalism and externalism, and understand them to
conflict in the following way (McGinn, 1989, 9):
. . . mind and world are not, according
to externalism, metaphysically
independent categories, sliding smoothly
past each other. To regard them so is to
commit oneself to an 'untenable
dualism,' to marking a metaphysical
boundary that does not exist.
Internalism, for its part, insists upon
such a duality, drawing a sharp line
between mind and world. . . .
What we are concerned with in this chapter is a
formulation of externalism that best captures the idea that
there is a genuinely constitutive relation between the mind
and the extra-mental world (suitably delineated), and just
what kind of relation this might turn out to be.
Judging by the literature, at least two things might
be meant by externalism2; and one formulation, we will
argue, is too limited to adequately capture a robust notion
of externalism. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to
first, distinguishing two formulations of externalism; and
second, to make good on the claim that only one of these
formulations supports any general or widespread condition
for content.
2

A brief introduction to the alternative formulations
is in order. One employs the familiar device of twin earth
(TE), and entails a failure of supervenience of mental
states on inner states. This view takes content to be
determined by a causal or contextual relation between the
subject and the world outside his head, from which it
follows that the mental states of two internally
indistinguishable subjects fail to supervene on those
internal states when the subjects inhabit different
environments. The other formulation of externalism involves
no entailment of non-supervenience; it is the view that only
the co-presence in a world of a subject and the relevant
worldly entity to which he is related is required in order
to effect the individuation of his mental states.
This more general formulation of externalism is to be
understood as a thesis concerning under what conditions
someone may or may not possess a thought: it is generally
understood to be the claim

that it is a necessary condition

on the possession of a thought that the subject be related
to extra-cranial objects and properties - the worldly
entities that are the reference of the expressions he
employs.3 It follows from this, of course, that should the
requisite objects and properties fail to exist, the thought
in question is, in Noonan's terms (1991, 1) "not available
to be thought." Note that the condition applies
counterfactually as well: were the requisite objects or
3

properties to fail to coexist with an individual in a world,
that individual would not possess the concepts held to be
individuated by those entities.4
Now, as we will show, twin earth cases do not apply to
all concepts, though of course they do apply to some; so
formulations of externalism in terms of twin earth cases are
too limited to be of any great use in formulating a general
theory of mind. What will emerge is that there is more to
the notion of externalism than is implied by cases where
content fails to supervene.
Among the many details we will consider in subsequent
sections is one so crucial it is best to mention it, even
preliminarily, here. It will emerge that the distinction in
formulations of externalism can be understood as turning on
important distinctions concerning the notion of
supervenience: in particular, concerning what is to be
included or excluded in the supervenience base.5 First,
however, some general remarks.

2. Meaning, Reference and Externalism
Formulations of externalism in terms of twin earth
cases have occupied a prominent position in some of the
literature; but there is, of course, no in principle reason
to take these as definitive of externalism.

We can begin

with an examination of the intuitions behind the emergence
of the notion of externalism in the literature, in order to
4

build up to the idea that formulations of externalism
involving cases of failure of supervenience are too
restrictive to adequately capture that notion.
Putnam (1975a, 215-271) was among the first6 to
consider the challenge to traditional theories of mind now
known as semantic externalism. Traditional theories are,
according to Putnam, methodologically solipsist, a view he
characterizes as follows:
. . . no mental state, properly socalled, presupposes the existence of any
individual other than the subject to
whom that state is ascribed.7
An externalist theory, by contrast, can be understood
as the denial of methodological solipsism. Burge (1982,
117;120) clarifies this, noting that:
In some instances, an individual's
having certain de dicto attitudes
entails the existence of entities other
than himself and his attitude contents
. . . [Putnam] also gives examples of
psychological states in the 'wide
sense', and characterizes these as
entailing the existence of other
entities besides the subject of the
state.
So, as the remarks by Putnam and Burge above indicate,
"widely" individuated mental states, to be "properly socalled," presuppose or entail the existence of some entity
other than - independent of - the subject of the state.
A few preliminary remarks are in order. Ultimately,
the issue in question centers on that of intentionality:
what our thoughts are about, captured in what our words
5

refer to. An externalist, as opposed to an internalist, will
hold that the content/meaning of a person's thoughts/words
is (necessarily) individuated by items extrinsic to her
spatial contours. But stated like this, the claim is very
general; too general, it might be thought. It is consistent,
after all, with the claim that states of affairs in a
distant galaxy are necessarily implicated in the content of
one's thoughts - and consistent with that claim's being a
unique necessary condition on the individuation of content.
And what we are after, in the end, is a way of necessarily
linking a subject's mental states with the material world of
objects and the properties they instantiate and with which
she consorts and co-exists.
And the most obvious way to proceed is by way of the
reference of the expressions of the language employed by a
psychological subject. Clearly what is "outside the head"
will not bear on content in the relevant manner - that is,
give us a way of determining how it is that content plays a
role in fixing the aboutness relation - unless it is through
the reference of mental states; these issues are naturally
joined. The relation between meaning and reference is the
relation between mental states and the world, given the
principle that the concept expressed by a term is given by
what that term means. Given this obvious point, externalism
is quite reasonably conceived of as a claim about the
relation between meaning and reference - and thereby about
6

the relation between the mind and the world.8
A glance at the early literature on this question
bears this out: it was precisely the meaning-reference
relation - and not anything to do with failure of
supervenience - that preoccupied those who initially
formulated the notion of externalism familiar to most.
Recall Putnam's claims in "Is Semantics Possible"
(1975e, 139-152), "Meaning and Reference" (1973, 699-711)9
and "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (1975a, 215-271), three
articles where the notion of externalism is introduced into
the literature. "Is Semantics Possible?" is an attempt to
come to grips with the question "why is the theory of
meaning so hard?" (1975e, 139):
. . . enormous progress seems to have
been made in the syntactic theory of
natural languages . . . Comparable
progress seems not to have been made in
trfe semantic theory of natural
languages, and perhaps it is time to ask
why this should be the case.
Putnam diagnoses the problem (1975a, 216-218):
Since the Middle Ages at least, writers
on the theory of meaning have purported
to discover an ambiguity in the ordinary
concept of meaning and have introduced a
pair of terms - extension and intension
or Sinn and Bedeutung, or whatever - to
disambiguate them . . . Suppose that
there is a sense of 'meaning' in which
meaning = extension, there must be
another sense of 'meaning' in which the
meaning of a term is not its extension
but something else, say the 'concept'
associated with the term. Let us call
this 'something else' the intension of
the term . . . . Something like the
preceding paragraph appears in every
7

standard exposition of the notions
'intension' and 'extension.' But it is
not at all satisfactory . . . Unclear as
it is, the traditional doctrine that the
notion 'meaning' possesses the
extension/intension ambiguity has
certain typical consequences. Most
traditional philosophers thought of
concepts as something mental . . .
Secondly, the timeworn example of the
two terms 'creature with a kidney' and
'creature with a heart' does show that
two terms can the same extension and yet
differ in intension. But it was taken to
be obvious that the reverse is
impossible: two terms cannot differ in
extension and have the same
intension. . . .
And makes a now familiar remark (1973, 710-11):
. . . the theory that (1) words have
'intensions' which are something like
concepts associated with the words by
speakers; and (2) intension determines
extension - cannot be true of naturalkind words like 'water' . . . [this]
leaves it open, however, whether to say
that 'water' in the Twin Earth dialect
of English has the same meaning as
'water' in the Earth dialect and a
different extension - thereby giving up
the doctrine that 'meaning (intension)
determines extension,' or to say, as we
have chosen to do, that difference in
extension is ipso facto a difference in
meaning . . . thereby giving up the
doctrine that meanings are concepts, or
indeed, mental entities of any kind.
Those familiar with the literature will recall that
Putnam was concerned to mount an attack on a Fregean
semantic theory; he was not alone (cf. Kripke (1972, 253355), Donnellan (1962, 356-379;1966, 281-304), and Kaplan
(March 1972, draft), among others). The arguments concerning
the role of reference in the individuation of meaning were
8

crucial to that project. The implications for a theory of
mind were obvious; and externalism emerged on the scene.
Now, the formulation of externalism as a claim
concerning the existence-dependence of mental states on
their objects - a formulation that takes its cue from the
denial of methodological solipsism and which is often
understood as the view that reference partly determines
meaning - certainly does not entail the failure of content
to supervene on an individual's internal states; this view
does not entail TE thought experiments. The TE formulation
has occupied a prominent position in the literature; so
prominent that some take it to be essential to formulations
of externalism. Our preliminary remarks suggest that this is
a mistake: and, in fact, there is no reason to accept the TE
formulation as definitive of externalism, as we shall next
argue.
It is worth noting that, since much of the notice in
the literature regarding externalism as a theory of content
devolves on its repercussions for content in belief-desire
explanation, it is all the more pressing to clearly
establish that the orthodox understanding of externalism,
formulated in terms of content's failure to supervene, is,
at best, limited. This, of course, suggests that the problem
of content in explanation is not - exclusively - the problem
of the failure of content to supervene on inner states. I
will show (see chapter 2) that the more general formulation
9

of externalism likewise results in explanatory role problems
for content, one of three consequences for this view that I
examine (see chapter 3). In sum, I contend that the true
significance of externalism as a theory of mind might be
better appreciated if it can be shown to be true of, and to
have repercussions for, content in general - something that
the influence of twin earth may have obscured.

3.

Supervenience and externalism: a reductio

We can begin with a reductio of the idea that there is
an essential connection between failure of supervenience and
the notion of externalism, as a preliminary salvo. The
Cartesian theory of mind has it that mental substance and
physical substance are utterly distinct - in fact, mental
states can be what they are independent of there being
bodies (heads with brains in them, say) at all. On this
view, it is perfectly conceivable - Descartes even thought
it was desirable - that one's mental states be what they are
whether or not the objects of those states exist. Now, this
is a view that entails, quite dramatically, a failure of the
supervenience of the mental on inner states; but it is
really a gross and unwarranted perversion of the Cartesian
position to claim that from this failure of supervenience
follows externalism about content. Descartes is,
notoriously, an internalist: what states one is in are not
essentially determined by any relation to the world.
10

Of course, it might be thought that Descartes is an
externalist with respect to God-thoughts, for these have the
their content in virtue of God, the only being of sufficient
magnitude to cause those ideas in us cranial entity,

and God is an extra-

(someone who clings to the TE formulation of

externalism will not see this, since what you're thinking
when you think about God won't vary depending on what world
you're in; more on this below). This would be confused,
however: the relevant thing to remember is Descartes's
mentalism. Ideas in the mind - whose origin is innate - are
the objects of thought and knowledge. That these Ideas
happen to correspond to the world (thanks to the nondeceptive nature of God) is not to say that these Ideas are
vulnerable to fluctuations of any sort in the world. God's
job is to ensure veridicality, and hence certainty; the
individuation of content is not His concern.

4. Externalism and Twin Earth
An unclouded consideration of the essence of TE cases
and what, if anything, they can be taken to establish with
respect to externalism as a general theory of mind, is next
in order.
Putnam (1975a, 214-271) uses TE cases as an
illustrative device in an argument to support the claim that
what a person's utterances mean cannot be a function of his
internal properties alone: a claim, as we have said above,
11

quite plausibly understood as the denial of methodological
solipsism.

(Nowhere, of course, is the TE formulation of the

issue offered by Putnam as a definition of externalism).
Surrounding a psychological subject are objects (and, n.b.,
the properties they instantiate); these are what he refers
to by his words, what his thoughts are about. The question
is: is it consistent to suppose that two subjects who share
all the same internal properties share the same conceptual
ones?
Putnam makes the point - aided by TE cases - that it
is not consistent: it is stretching plausibility to maintain
that one's words refer to anything - that one's thoughts are
about anything - but the items in the extra-cranial
environment with

which one is in (causal) contact. The

essence of a canonical

TE case is thus

tohold the internal

states of an individual fixed (or one individual at
different times, or entire communities of individuals) and
to vary the environment. The upshot is that a variation in
the environment results in a variation of a mental
state.10
Burge (1979, 73-121) makes an amendment to the basic
sketch.11 Among the items in one's extra-cranial
environment are other people, who perform a range of
linguistic acts.

Isn't it plausible to

suppose that the

meaning of one's

words and the content

ofone's thoughts

might also be subject to variation in the linguistic
12

practices and conventions in the social environment?

Thus,

consider two individuals who inhabit two communities where
the linguistic practices relevant to the use of the term
•cramps' differ. In community 1, 'cramps' correctly applies
to a uterine complaint alone. In community 2, 'cramps'
correctly applies to a uterine as well as a general muscular
complaint . Now consider two male individuals - identical in
every internal property - who utter the sentence "I've got
the worst cramps again, doctor." In community 1, the doctor
would presumably correct the speaker, saying that whatever
is wrong with him it can't be cramps. In community 2,
however, his doctor would simply prescribe the necessary
sedative.
We can critically examine number of things about the
basic idea, which may be useful in getting a clearer grasp
on the deeper intuition for which these cases are meant to
be an argument. First we will consider the nature of the
relation between Putnam-type TE cases and Burge-type cases
(which often are themselves formulated using the TE device),
and then move on to show that there is content for which it
is difficult to maintain that TE cases can be erected.
First: Putnam-type TE cases can be understood in terms
of the appearance/reality distinction (more on this below).
Both twins are in the presence of two substances that
present the very same appearance, but that have - as it is
sometimes called - different essences.12 These essences
13

are in principle discoverable by the experts, to which we
may need to defer for the sake of complete accuracy. Burgetype cases, however, at least according to Burge, are to be
understood in terms of an individual's incomplete grasp of
the meanings of his own words (1979, 79):
The argument can get under way in any
case where it is intuitively possible to
attribute a mental state or event whose
content involves a notion that the
subject incompletely understands. As
will become clear, this possibility is
the key to the thought experiment.
Questions to do with distinguishing some cubic
zirconium from some diamond, or a glass of Clorox from a
glass of water, can be settled - so, likewise, can questions
to do with what the words that refer to those entities mean.
For settling questions to do with what the meanings of words
like 'arthritis' or 'cramps' are, different standards community standards - are thought to apply. Vary the
community standard and you vary the meaning of the word.
Now, one thing to notice is that Burge's claims about
the role of the social environment in the individuation of a
mental state are not such as to impose a necessary condition
on fixing content, although this is, more often than not,
misunderstood.13 This strikes me as an important
disanalogy with respect to Putnam's conclusions about the
role of the extra-cranial environment in fixing the nature
of mental states.
Putnam's TE examples are, strictly speaking, best
14

interpreted as making a necessary claim concerning
distinctions in content-possession: twins whose environment
is not the same will (necessarily) not share the same
concepts. But it is also plausible to suppose that Putnam's
claims about the relation between the environment and the
mind are to be understood as imposing a necessary condition
on concept-possession itself.14 Certainly the formulation
of the view as the denial of methodological solipsism quite
explicitly exploits an entailment relation between the
existence of a head-independent, environmental entity and
the mental state that takes that entity as an object. TE
cases are not so explicit, but, as many would agree, it is
perverse to take them otherwise.
The key point is this: Putnam's formulations of the
notion of externalism are quite plausibly understood as
invoking a necessary connection between one's mental states
and the environment one is in.

No such necessary connection

is present in the Burge-type cases, however. For one thing,
social externalism (as we might call Burge's view) is at the
very least logically independent of environmental
externalism (Putnam's view), so considerations may in
principle be made with respect to one that do not impinge on
the other.
Consider that there is no claim in Burge to the effect
that one could not have the concept 'arthritis' in the
absence of a social environment. As he himself makes clear,
15

his thought-examples turn on defective possession of a
concept - it is members of a community with incomplete
understanding of a given concept whose mental states are, as
it were, vulnerable to variations from the social
environment. Nothing in Burge's claims prevents someone in
possession of the full definition of 'arthritis' to
genuinely so possess it quite independent of any of his
peers.
There is another, more important point to notice. From
the fact that meaning is subject to variations in an
individual's social environment it does not follow that
meaning isn't "in the head." The fact is that what
individuates the meaning of a particular individual's
expressions may just as well be in the heads of one or more
of those who comprise his social environment - a clear case
of anti-individualism15 but internalism about meaning.
Burge never clarifies this point, appearing to think that
the roles individuals other than oneself may play in the
fixing of the content of one's mental states is sufficient
to promote externalism in the relevant sense. It is hardly
the case, however, that other minds are sufficiently
externalistic - merely by being other - to add the other
dimension to externalist criteria of content individuation
that Burge seeks. It is hard to see that merely being not in
my head but in the head of another is going to capture the
intuition at work behind the notion of externalism.
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Further, and conversely, from the thesis that meaning
is subject and sensitive to variations in an individual's
environment need follow nothing about the role of the
individual's social environment in the determination of
meaning. So care must be taken here when applying these
cases to establish externalist claims.
Now: is it the case that the Putnam/Burge TE cases
apply to all concepts? They are taken to, at least by Fodor
(1988, 27):
. . . I'll assume that the Burge story
shows that if the Putnam story raises
any problems for the notion of content,
then the problems that it raises are
completely general and affect all
content-bearing mental states.
Putnam seems to concur (1975a, 242):
So far we have only used natural-kind
words as examples; but the points we
have made apply to many other kinds of
words as well.
Burge himself, on the other hand, appears to have
realized that Putnam-type cases are of limited
applicability, noting (1979, 118):
The argument regarding the notion of
water that I extracted from Putnam's
paper is narrower in scope than our
argument. The Putnam-derived argument
seems to work only for natural kind
terms and close relatives.
However, he seems to think that his own cases apply
quite generally (1982, 117):
The Twin Earth thought experiment may
work only for certain propositional
attitudes. Certainly its clearest
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applications are to those whose contents
involve non-theoretical natural kind
notions. But the arguments of
'Individualism and the Mental' suggest
that virtually no propositional
attitudes can be explicated in
individualistic terms.
There is reason to think, however, that this general
applicability thesis isn't true. First: since the Putnam
cases don't entail the Burge cases, nor the other way
around, one would have to find some way to defend the view
that the individuation thesis supported by these cases is
completely general. Second: even if Burge-cases can be
applied to a wider range of cases than those of Putnam, it
far from follows that Burge-type cases apply to most, let
alone all concepts. Recall that our concern here is to
formulate a notion of externalism that applies to as many
concepts as possible. It is my contention that the kind of
formulation of externalism exemplified by the Putnam and
Burge cases is too limited to be of any great interest for
issues concerning mind and mental content. An examination of
a few concepts for which TE cases can't be erected is next.

5. The Limited Applicability of Twin Earth Cases
Putnam's well-known summary of his view is this
(1975a, 227): "Cut the pie any way you like,

'meanings' just

ain't in the head!" McGinn makes a laconic comment (1989,
31) :
In fact this conclusion exaggerates what
has been established, since only some
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meanings have been argued to be
environmentally determined, not all. The
appropriate conclusion should have been
that a proper subset of meanings are not
in the head - a somewhat less resounding
announcement.
Let us see whether this is so: is there content for
which for which Putnam-type TE cases cannot be erected? If
Putnam-type TE cases can't be erected for some concepts, do
Burge-type cases take up the slack? If not, are there
concepts for which externalist individuation does not - or
even cannot - apply? We will answer these questions
respectively: yes, no, and no.
TE cases, remember, are cases where internal facts are
held constant and the extra-cranial "surround"16 is
varied. So what can we make of cases where the relevant
extra-cranial entity can’t be varied? McGinn gives a fairly
comprehensive list (1989, 47-100): that which is referred to
by complex concepts, formal concepts, psychological concepts
(concepts of mental states), and perceptual concepts. To
this we could add also the ethical and aesthetic
environment.
The most obvious instance of non-conformity to a
standard TE case concerns formal entities like number. How
is it possible to erect a situation where the mathematical
environment is varied but the internal factors - say the way
that environment appears to those on Earth and on Twin Earth
- stay the same? It seems practically incoherent to say that
•prime number' or the logical expression 'if and only if'
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refer to different things on Earth and Twin Earth but that
both communities have the same qualitative experiences with
respect to those entities.
What about, analogously, aesthetic concepts such as
1beauty'? Does it make any sense to claim that on Earth and
Twin Earth the aesthetic environment is (really) different
but appears the same to
word

both sets of people, so that the

'beautiful* refers to really quite differentthings

(maybe ugly things) that don't seem at all different? Could
the moral environment really be varied while appearing the
same both to me and my twin, so that when she applauds
someone's integrity, she's doing something I might in fact
recoil from?17
Davies (1992, draft, p.3) makes a few remarks
concerning the applicability of what he calls modal
externalism (what characterizes concepts that are subject to
TE cases) that are directly relevant here:
. . . perhaps we should consider . . .
ways in which it might turn out to be
impossible to generate the 'Twin Earth'
examples that would establish modal
externalism. One kind of case would be
where there is a necessary connection
between the relevant features of the
environment E and X's inner
constitution, so that a situation with
environment E' instead of E is
inevitably a situation in which there is
no duplicate of X.
If all this is correct, then not only do TE
formulations tend to come apart under scrutiny - even for
those concepts for which they are generally thought to apply
20

- but, more importantly, there are any number of concepts
for which the preconditions for setting up such cases are
not met. There is, as a result, no reason to suppose that TE
cases - at least Putnam-type TE cases - do apply generally.
Given the logical independence of Putnam- and Burgetype TE cases there is no reason to think that what the
Putnam cases don't cover the Burge cases will, but it is
worth pointing out that social externalism doesn't apply to
all concepts either.
Burge points out (1979, 79) that his cases depend on
the individual's only partially understanding the term that
she employs - but of course, Burge-type cases are slightly
more complicated than that. Burge never says that it is
sufficient to get one of his cases off the ground that one
be deficient in a particular concept that one possesses or
employs. What is actually operative in these cases is that
the deficiency be such as to allow for cases where I and my
counterpart both have a concept - but not the same one. My
counterpart and I both have a concept we express with the
word 'arthritis' - but given that, in the counterpart
community,

'arthritis' is used to refer to an ailment of the

joints and muscles, rather than the joints alone, we do not
have the same concept, in spite of our internal identity.
Now, imagine running a Burge case for a color
concept - say 'purple.' Could it plausibly be the case that
a person employs a color concept only partially correctly:
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say picking out purple things correctly six out of ten
times, and picking out yellow ones the other four times; and
that the relevant community standards allow 'purple' in fact
to applies to both purple and yellow objects? This just
can't be right: a person who so grasps the concept 'purple'
must be said not to grasp it at all.18
Burge cases are also unlikely to go through for
psychological concepts: for concepts of mental states. For
consider: we can stipulate the counterfactual community as
having different experiences from mine that they describe
with the same words. The words 'experience of red' apply to,
on Earth, an experience of red, but on Twin Earth, they
apply to an experience of green. The same words express
different (experiential) concepts. But now notice that if
the counterfactual community can fix my counterpart's
experiential concepts - the way it's supposed to work for
others - then her self-ascriptions with respect to those
concepts will be false. Her concept 'experience of red' is
fixed by the counterfactual community, where it means
'experience of green' - because that is the kind of
experience the community is having on Twin Earth. But the
experience that she's having is a red experience - since
that's the experience I ’m having and we are internal
duplicates. The same points apply vice versa for me,
obviously. My concept 'experience of red' is - supposedly fixed by my community, according to the experiences that
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they are having - and suppose these are experiences of blue.
My twin's community, however, has experiences of red that
they describe with the words 'experience of red.' I have the
same experiences as my twin - since we are internal
duplicates - so when I ascribe to myself the experiential
mental states under consideration here J am wrong - since
the words 'experience of red' on Earth apply to experiences
of blue. Surely it is vastly implausible to think that
anyone is so hyperfallible about the content of one's own
experiences - and therefore about the concepts used in
referring to those experiences. Likewise, it is implausible
that Burge cases go through for such concepts.19
There is another aspect of externalism that needs to
be clarified, as it has important repercussions for the
distinction in formulations of externalism that we shall be
exploiting in later remarks. The issue here concerns the
understanding of supervenience on internal properties or
states: how is the idea that content - in some cases - fails
to supervene on such states most accurately to be
understood? In the next section (section (6)), we will make
some remarks concerning the best understanding of internal
properties. In section (7) we will reconsider the notion of
supervenience.

6. Internal properties
We can begin by taking note of a few interesting
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details. Burge (1979, 79), for instance, gives an inventory
of 'internal' factors that he takes as relevant to
establishing externalist content individuation:
internal qualitative experiences,
physiological states and events,
behaviorally described stimuli and
responses, dispositions to behave, and
whatever sequences of states [mediate]
. . . input and output.
In order to assess the true contribution of TE cases
in support of externalism as a general theory of mind,
however, it is important to characterize 'internal' factors
in such a way as to avoid begging the question. It won't,
for instance, follow from the fact that a state is inside
the head that it is thereby 'internal' in the relevant
sense. McGinn (1989, 2) notes:
it is important to notice that
'internal' is being used as a term of
art . . .; internalists, in the intended
sense, do not literally locate the mind
inside the head (though they may do);
they assert, rather, that mental states
are determined by facts relating to the
subject considered in isolation from his
environment - by facts about him . . .
internalism is best seen negatively as
the denial of externalism; it is the
role of the environment in fixing the
nature of mind that is centrally at
issue.20
Now, it is natural to take the base domain in issues
regarding the fixing of content as physiological - even
neurophysiological - but we ought to be pedantic. There are
at least three kinds of things that could plausibly count as
'inner' or 'internal' in the sense needed to drive the
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intuitions about content illustrated in the TE cases. These
are: 1) internal states of the body and brain 2) behavioral
dispositions 3) local stimulations at the sensory receptors.
And, what's more, it is certainly open to someone to claim
that all three are individuated relationally. What's
relevantly 'internal' in these discussions should not be
thought to be fixed when the geography is fixed.
It seems that inaccurate formulations of the upshot of
the TE story can lead to pitfalls concerning grasp of the
more general nature of externalism that I shall shortly be
urging. Consider Stich (1978, 575, emphasis his):
. . . the principle of autonomy states
that the properties and relations to be
invoked in an explanatory psychological
theory must be supervenient upon the
current, internal, physical properties
and relations of organisms.
The kind of failure of supervenience thought to be
illustrated by TE cases won't necessarily follow even if the
states on which content is supposed not to supervene are
thought to be neurophysiological. Again, that such states
are internal to the organism - in a geographical sense isn't enough to guarantee that they are non-relational’
, and
it is this sense of 'inner' or 'internal' that is required
to get failure of supervenience.21
Further: surely it is at least logically possible that
content should supervene on qualitative states, which a)
needn't themselves be thought to supervene on the
physiological (disembodied minds, etc.); or b) might well,
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for all we know, be themselves non-relationally
individuated.
It is interesting to note that in the usual
formulations of the TE thought experiment consideration as
to whether qualitative states really are internal in the
relevant sense is rarely raised; these kinds of states are
generally assumed to be paradigms of the internal (Cf.
Burge's inventory above). In fact, a short summary of
Putnam's conclusions with respect to twins is that although
both share the same phenomenological states ("water is a
tasteless, colorless, liquid," they say) they do not share
the same contentful states as expressed by that sentence.
But this does beg the question: what if phenomenological
states are externally individuated? It takes argument to
show that they are not, if they are not; this cannot simply
be presupposed.22

6. Supervenience
The canonical formulation of externalism, as we know,
has it that content fails to supervene on inner states. What
we will be formulating and defending shortly is that there
is another

- much more general - formulation of externalism

that denies failure of supervenience. On this more general
formulation of externalism, content is - consistently - both
externalistically individuated and supervenient.
It turns out, in fact, that the notion of
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supervenience is ambiguous enough to lead to some genuine
misunderstandings about the general notion of externalism.
What we shall do in this section is distinguish between
three notions of supervenience, as to avoid even prima facie
inconsistencies. It goes without saying that in the
subsequent discussion of weak externalism, the distinction
between the three notions of supervenience must be kept
firmly in mind.23
First things first: obviously, no claim about
supervenience or non-supervenience will in itself involve
any claims about externalism. Supervenience is a
metaphysical relation between two domains: it is the claim
that one domain supervenes on another if there can be no
difference in the supervening domain without difference in
the base domain, and can be brought to bear in the analysis
of almost anything.24 When, however, this notion is
brought to bear on issues concerning the aboutness relation,
then the question is as follows: what facts are such that
when you fix them, the aboutness relation holds? or, what
does the aboutness relation supervene on?
This question ultimately concerns the interaction of
three things: the internal states of heads, the aboutness
relation, and the objects out there in the world. It is
sometimes put by asking whether fixing the internal states
of the head is sufficient to guarantee the aboutness
relation under certain conditions. What tends to be
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presupposed - completely plausibly, of course - is that the
object that the mental state in question is about exists. An
analogy helps with this.
Consider the 1loves-relation.1 Suppose our question is
whether the 'loves-relation' between x and y supervenes on
the intrinsic states of, say, x. What we are obviously
asking here is what makes it the case that x loves y and not
2,

and it ought to go without saying that we are

presupposing that x and y (and even z) exist. Now we might
of course have been interested in a more abstract question,
one having to do with the loves-relation and its necessary
and sufficient conditions, and that kind of inquiry would
not necessarily presuppose the existence of any beings that
instantiate the relation. But our previous question was not
that one: it was the question what is it about x (if
anything) that is sufficient to guarantee his loving y and
not

2.

Now, externalism as a general claim can be understood,
as we noted in section (1), as the view that a mental state
essentially involves being in a relation to the object of
that state - that mental states are relational.25 In other
words, given that an object exists, what we want to know is
what it is about a subject (if anything) that makes her
thought about a and not about b. Is it sufficient that she
be in a particular physiological state s - that is, does her
thought being about a rather than b supervene on her
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intrinsic states? Or is there more to the story? Could the
causal/environmental relations that she bears to a play a
relevant role? What about these kinds of relations
themselves? Are they conditions that must met in order to
claim that a mental state is relational? Or can a mental
state be relational without them?
These remarks set up the context against which it is
imperative that the distinction to come in formulations of
externalism be understood. Canonical TE cases make the point
that whether you're thinking about water as opposed to
something else does not supervene on your intrinsic states
alone. Intrinsic states are not sufficient given that your
twin has just those states and yet is not thinking about
water; how could she be? She bears causal/environmental
relations to a certain substance that is not water but
something else. And it is these causal relations that have
to be added, in TE-type cases, to reach an adequate
supervenience base (i.e. sufficient condition).
Now, the analogy with the question concerning the
'loves-relation' specified above makes it absolutely clear
what the issue concerning TE cases is all about. The
question there concerns the issue whether, given the
existence of XYZ and H20, whether you're thinking about one
or the other is what fails to supervene on inner states. The
intrinsic states, familiarly, are not sufficient: what is
further necessary is certain causal/environmental relations
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that will select (as it were) one thing rather than the
other.
What we want to defend is a notion of externalism that
goes (well) beyond TE cases, since, as we saw above, these
kinds of cases cannot be erected for many kinds of content that is, no causal dependence or environmental theory will
be correct or apply to them- And a very natural way to put
this will be to say that many mental states are relational
without being causally/environmentally relational. In fact,
we can go further: we will show that there is a sense of
supervenience that is perfectly consistent with the claim
that content supervenes but is nevertheless relational.
Now, on the face of it, there seems to be a glaring
problem. Externalism is the claim that mental states are
relational: it is a necessary condition on being in a mental
state m that the object of the state exist. But to say that
mental states supervene on intrinsic states means - in one
sense of supervenience - that intrinsic states are
sufficient to fix what mental state you're in. So how can a
mental state be both supervenient and externalist?
The answer is that the notion of supervenience at work
throughout this issue is ambiguous enough to support three
different readings. In the formulation that follows of weak
externalism, the notion of supervenience at work there could
be understood, roughly speaking, as a kind of shorthand.
What we need to do is specify what the supervenience base
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includes or does not include in order to make certain
crucial distinctions between states that supervene, states
that don't, and to formulate a notion of externalism that
straddles that distinction. Once the supervenience base is
specified for a particular case, all we need to do is to
remember what the term 'supervenience' for that case is
meant to include or exclude. The same term will be used, but
it will mean slightly different - but importantly
different - things.
We distinguish between three cases:
1. Pain states: when we say that pain states
supervene on physiological states, we stipulate that the
supervenience base consists solely of the physiological
states. It is sufficient, to fix the pain state, to fix the
physiology: there are no other necessary conditions.
2. Canonical TE cases: Here, we must understand the
supervenience base to consist of three things: the intrinsic
facts about the subject; the facts about the world - the
existence of the objects of the relevant mental states and, further, the causal/environmental relations that the
subject bears to the objects of her mental states. These
three are necessary for determining whether someone is
thinking about one thing rather than another; and they are
jointly sufficient. Content (in some cases) fails to
supervene on intrinsic states in the sense that intrinsic
facts alone are not sufficient to fix the aboutness
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relation; a causal/environmental relation is also required.
3.

The Intermediate case: weak externalism. There is

a position in logical space that denies that
causal/environmental relations are part of the supervenience
base. The claim is, roughly speaking, that mental states can
be relational (externalist) without being
causally/environmentally relational. What we need to
stipulate for this kind of intermediate case is that the
supervenience base will include intrinsic facts, and it will
include facts about the world - the existence of the objects
of the mental states in question - but it will exclude any
causal/environmental relational facts. The upshot is that
there is room for the idea that being in the very same
intrinsic physiological states is sufficient to fix mental
states, without ruling out the possibility that the states
are relations to - but not causal relations to - headindependent entities. That is, no further property of the
object needs to be instantiated, in contrast to what holds
for content subject to TE cases.
Keeping the threefold distinction above firmly in mind
puts us in a position to amplify - and refute - the
objection alluded to above. Briefly, one way of
understanding the issues here might proceed as follows:
since, according to externalism, aboutness is relational (it
necessitates there being an object of the intentional mental
state), then it is quite false to suppose that aboutness
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supervenes. The latter claim means that intrinsic states are
sufficient to fix the mental state in question, but this is
inconsistent with the claim that the mental state is
relational. To say that a mental state supervenes on inner
states is to say that the state is not world-involving; the
only necessary condition for fixing that state relates to
the head. How can it make any sense to say that a mental
state is both supervenient and world-involving? It might be
possible to make those two claims consistent by claiming
that intrinsic states somehow guarantee the existence of the
object of the state, but this is, of course, absurd.
The reply to this (admittedly rather perverse) reading
of the question concerning the more general formulation of
externalism is now obvious, given our distinctions above.
The objection presupposes an understanding of supervenience
such that the only things that are included in the
supervenience base are intrinsic states. But there are two
other possible formulations of the supervenience base: one,
the familiar TE case, where there are three necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions included in the supervenience
base; and the other, middle of the road position, which
includes not only intrinsic facts in the supervenience base,
but also the existence of the objects of the mental state.
What is not included in this latter position is, of course,
the causal/environmental relations to the objects in
question; and it is just here that the two views can be
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essentially distinguished. And it is this distinction - no
other - that is the focus of our discussion.
Of

course, it should be fairly obvious that the entire

issue concerning the aboutness relation and what it
supervenes on presupposes that the objects of the
intentional state exist: after all, intuitively, if they
didn't, there wouldn't be such an instantiated relation. The
position here is exactly on analogy with the remarks made
earlier concerning the 'loves-relation.' Obviously, if what
we are interested in is what facts about that relation (as
it is borne by x and y) supervene on what facts about x or
y, then it quite obvious that we are presupposing that both
individuals exist: what sense would it make to ask the
question "what makes her love him rather than the other
guy?" if there wasn't anyone you were talking about?
As

we said above concerning a familiar TE

issue is

not to do with the existence of H20 or

case,the
XY2 somehow

failing to supervene on intrinsic states, rather, the
question concerns which of those substances you can be said
to be thinking about under certain conditions. What we have
shown here is that there is logical room to hold - given a
specification of supervenience that builds in the perfectly
obvious presupposition that the object of the mental state
exists - that internal facts are sufficient (in conjunction
with the object) to fix the mental state in question; but
the mental state is no less relational for all that. Again,
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the only facts about the subject that are part of the
supervenience base are intrinsic - no extrinsic
causal/environmental relations are required, in contrast
with the lesson of the TE case.

8. Strong and Weak Externalism
The question to consider now in greater detail is
whether the fact that TE cases - both the social and
environmental varieties - don't apply to all concepts means
that externalism need be abandoned as a general theory of
mind. The answer, as we have suggested, is no.
We can best think of externalism as a genus of which
there are two species. Following McGinn (1989), we can
distinguish externalist claims into two sorts. Strong
externalism is to be understood as the species of
externalism that entails non-supervenience. Weak externalism
is to be understood as the species of externalism that
claims that the (necessary) existence and identity
conditions of content are those of the objects of the mental
state with that content. The key difference is that strong
externalism claims that the local environment inhabited by a
subject is what determines her mental states; it is this
part of the environment, after all, with which she has
contextual and causal contact; what (some of) her thoughts
are directed onto, what (some of) her words refer to. Weak
externalism, however, claims that the (necessary) relation
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between mental states and the environment is one between the
subject and those parts of the head-independent environment
to which her words refer, not just those with which she
locally consorts.
The difference between strong and weak externalism
ought not to be thought of in terms of the degree of
externality that applies to concepts, but should rather be
thought of as a distinction that concerns the conditions
under which content - externally determined content - gets
fixed. McGinn notes (1989, 8):
The distinction between the two sorts of
externalism arises out of the simple
point that something can exist or be
instantiated without existing or being
instantiated in a given subject's
environment, where the notion of
environment is taken causally or
contextually, thus making people on twin
earth occupy a different environment
from us. Co-existence in a possible
world is not the same as co-presence in
an environmental niche. These two
conditions coalesce only for the case of
God: because of his omniscience and
omnipresence the whole of reality is his
environment - which is why you cannot
run a twin earth case for God.
The best way to understand the difference between
strong and weak externalism is as follows. TE cases (and the
concepts subject to them) are meant to counter the Fregean
picture that what one means by one's words is to do with,
exclusively, facts about oneself. The anti-Fregean picture externalism - claims that mental states are determined by
relations to entities that are independent of the subject of
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those states. Twins make the case that being identical in
every local (non-relational) respect does not always
guarantee sameness of mental content. Content doesn't
(always) supervene on inner states, since we can stipulate
plausible cases where all the inner states are held stable
but a subject is quite obviously not in a position to be
ascribed the contentful state.
Now, I can alter the natural kind environment (at
least in principle) - so taking natural kind concepts with
me - but no such alteration is even in principle possible
with respect to, for instance, the ethical, formal, or
aesthetic environment. So the respective concepts will
supervene on inner states. They can't be pried apart: it
isn't coherent to argue that what my twin means by 'not'
isn't what I mean by 'not' because on TE 'not' is really F
. . .

although it looks like/feels like what it does to me

here on Earth (G, say).
The upshot is that my twin and I are in the same mental
states when it comes to 'not,'

'beautiful,'

'two' and the

like. Fix the inner non-relational states and you fix the
mental states when it comes to these kinds of concepts.
Anyone who takes externalism to be equivalent to failures of
supervenience will of course deny that externalism applies
to these concepts: these don't fail to supervene. But this
is, of course, nonsense.
Externalism is a quite general individuation thesis,
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like many others. The general claim is that content is
essentially determined by relations to non-mental entities
that are independent of the subject of the mental states in
question. And what could be more obvious than that being in
a mental state whose object is the number two or the
property ’beautiful' is to be in a relation to headindependent entities? The objects of aesthetic, mathematical
and ethical beliefs are properties. The most sensible view
to take about properties is realism and non-mentalism with
respect to them.26 So what you're thinking about when
you're thinking about 'not' is determined by something that
is not in your head: a perfectly straightforward - and
recognizable - formulation of externalism.
Given our remarks about the general applicability of
TE cases, we now are in a position to appreciate that for
content for which TE cases can be erected - strongly
external content - weak externalism will also be true. But
not all content for which weak externalism is true is
content for which strong externalism will likewise be true.
We now turn to arguments in support of the general
applicability of weak externalism.

9. Weak Externalism: Presuppositions
There are at least two ways that weak externalism
might be understood. In this section, we will consider a
semantic argument for weak externalism; in the next, a
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metaphysical one. Both are, as it might be surmised,
essentially two sides of the same coin.27
Weak externalism can be derived from some
straightforward - although not uncontroversial and not
uncontested - semantic principles.28 By way of scotching
at least preliminary misunderstanding, let me say that it is
imperative to understand at the outset that weak externalism
should be understood to result from these principles taken
together; each one in itself is not sufficient to establish
the claim. The semantic argument can be most simply
understood by way of the following three presuppositions:
(i) Externalism is the claim that there is an
existence-dependence between mental states and the objects
of those states - a characterization of mental states that,
as we have seen, is consistent with failure of supervenience
formulations, but that also applies to mental states that do
not fail to supervene.
(ii) A Russellian semantic background, extended,
however, to general thoughts. According to Russell, singular
terms are meaningful on condition that they refer; this
condition applies to predicates as well. It goes without
saying that also presupposed here is an ordinary materialist
metaphysics, wherein singular terms refer to ordinary
worldly particulars, and predicates to the properties those
particulars instantiate. Quantifiers are to be interpreted
here as objectual rather than substitutional.
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(iii)

Exportation - inferring the relational form of

a belief sentence from the notional form - is to be
considered a legitimate inference.
The first of these presuppositions is definitional,
and we have said a great deal about it already.29 We turn
to the second.
It is best to start with a rough sketch of the line of
argument. First, a brief reminder of Russell's claims
regarding denoting expressions, as summarized by Strawson
(1956, 222):
Of logically proper names Russell says
or implies the following things:
(1) That they and they alone
can occur as subjects of
sentences which are genuinely
of the subject-predicate form.
(2) That an expression
intended to be a logically
proper name is meaningless
unless there is some single
object for which it stands:
for the meaning of such an
expression just is the
individual object which the
expression designates. To be a
name at all, therefore, it
must designate something.
Now, presupposing the Russellian characterization of
genuinely denoting expressions summarized by Strawson
above,30 consider first the truth-conditions of

(1) That dog is a dachshund

These are such that (1) is true when the referent of 'that
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dog' satisfies the predicate 'is a dachshund' and false when
it doesn't. Should a referent for the expression 'that dog'
fail to obtain,

(1) fails to express a proposition.31

Now, we can, quite uncontroversially, symbolize (1) in
standard predicate calculus notation as

(2) Fa

to which we can further apply existential generalization, a
valid rule of inference in first-order predicate logic,
which yields

(3) (3x) Fx

(2) , that is, has what are known as existential entaiIntents.
But now consider the behavior of a demonstrative
expression inside a that-clause. The question arises: does
it retain its existential implications when embedded?

For

existential generalization to apply just as readily to the
embedded demonstrative in

(4) Keith believes that dog is a dachshund

would be for it to follow that there is something in
particular such that Keith believes that thing to be an F.
And given that there is an existential entailment between
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(1) (symbolized as (2)) and (3), then, intuitively, there is
- on grounds of uniformity, if nothing else - an analogous
case to be made for the retention of such ordinary
existential entailments of expressions in opaque contexts.
So untutored intuition might suppose. And notice that, if
such an inference were legitimate, this would amount to not forgetting our other presuppositions, of course - a
capsule statement of weak externalism.
For consider that if a sentence p is true, then its
implications have to be true. So - presupposing the
legitimacy of inferring the relational from the notional
form of a belief sentence - it is clear that if the beliefsentence p is true, then its existential entailments are
also true. Add to this the Russellian theory of denoting
expressions, and belief-sentences can be characterized as
existence-dependent on their objects. Were no such objects
to exist, then no such belief sentence could be ascribed,
since no proposition would be expressed.32
The lie of the land ought now to be more or less
clear. We move on to details.

10. Weak Externalism and Exportation
The third presupposition in our formulation of weak
externalism makes use of the notion known as exportation.
Exportation is, of course, a thorny issue, details of which
we consider below. In spite of the complications33
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which go beyond the scope of my project to consider, let
alone adjudicate - the key idea is quite intuitive. We ought
to keep firmly in mind that it is certainly an option,
logically speaking, to insist that exportation is a valid
inference. This intuition is consistent with a Russellian
approach to the issues, as opposed, of course, to Fregean
accounts - hence my earlier emphasis on the combination of
the presuppositions in the formulation of weak externalism.
Some remarks about exportation are in order. Quine
noticed (1975b) that in ordinary thinking about
propositional attitude idioms like belief, it was
appropriate to distinguish between what he called relational
and notional readings of ambiguous sentences like

(5) Keith believes someone is an artist.

The relational

(sometimes called de re) reading of (5)

emphasizes the subject's relation to an object and is
rendered with the existential quantifier outside the scope
of the propositional attitude verb34:

(6) There is someone believed by Keith to be an artist.

The notional (de dicto) reading of (5) captures
instead the subject's relation to a proposition, and is
rendered with the quantifier inside the scope of the
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propositional attitude verb:

(7) Keith believes that there exist artists.

Now, Quine comments, inter alia, on a certain
inferential move which is intuitively correct and appears
reasonable, at least in some cases, but which unfortunately
creates a theoretical headache. It appears difficult to get
an adequate semantics for the inference from the notional
form of a sentence like (5) to the relational form; the
inference known as exportation.
This can be understood with the aid of a few intuitive
points concerning truth-conditions. As we said above, the
truth-conditions of (1) are such that the reference of the
singular term 'a' must satisfy the predicate 'F.' This makes
it legitimate to existentially generalize on the singular
term position: what is being expressed by (1) is that what
is referred to by 'a' satisfies 'F'; so, we can infer that
there is an x such that Fx.
Things become less straightforward, however, when (1)
is embedded in a propositional attitude context. For, as is
well-known, the truth-conditions of the embedded sentence
would appear now not to be the same: if they were, we could
unhesitatingly substitute a co-denoting term 'b' for 'a' and
expect that the truth-value of the whole sentence would
remain unchanged. But of course, the stability of truth44

value is not guaranteed.
The truth-conditions of the unembedded sentence are
made in terms of the object and whether it satisfies the
predicate: no mention whatever is made of the way in which
it is presented or referred to. But in an opaque context,
the way in which an object is referred to makes a difference
to the truth-value of the belief sentence: it is the very
proposition believed that is relevant to the truth-value of
the whole sentence.
These are familiar points concerning the opacity of
contexts such as belief. But now the difficulty concerning
quantifying into these contexts emerges. When from (7) we
infer (6) it seems we are in effect proceeding as if the
truth-conditions of an opaque occurrence of singular term
are just what they are when the occurrence is transparent.
For what is being claimed when existential
generalization is applied to (1) is that there exists an
object and it satisfies the predicate. All that matters is
that the object exist and that it satisfy the predicate the way in which it is referred to does not make a
difference. This suggests, in the interest of uniformity,
that existentially generalizing on an opaque occurrence of a
singular term is to treat that occurrence as if all that
matters is whether the object exists and whether it
satisfies the predicate. But failure of substitutivity of
co-denoting expressions shows that the way in
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which the

object is referred to is relevant. Hence the puzzle about
quantifying in.
This, roughly speaking, acknowledges the controversy:
as I have said, I will not attempt to adjudicate it, let
alone weigh in on any side, although a few remarks are in
order.35 What is at work here is the intuitive idea that
expressions do have straightforward existential entailments
(pace Frege), and that these entailments need not
necessarily be thought to be abandoned when those terms
occur opaquely. After all, as Davidson vividly pointed
out,36 the natural reaction is to resist Frege's solution
to the (putative) problem of the behavior of expressions in
intensional contexts, imposing as it does what might well be
thought of as a quite preposterous referential ambiguity as
regards expressions in those contexts.
Keeping this Davidsonian attitude in mind, we can try
to undermine some of the orthodox resistance concerning
quantifying into intensional contexts by drawing an analogy
between the so-called opaque contexts wrought by, for
example, modal operators, and factive expressions, and
propositional attitude contexts such as belief. The natural
and intuitive expectation (and the one that Davidson makes
much of) is that expressions that find themselves in the
scope of such operators will not suddenly find themselves
denuded of their usual or standard semantic value. On the
face of it, at least, there is no reason why they should. A
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demonstrative expression, for instance, has a certain
function: it refers to a certain entity. And whether it
succeeds or not is quite naturally supposed to depend on the
way the world is, rather than on its location in a sentence.
Consider, to drive this home, a vacuous demonstrative.
If embedding a demonstrative expression in an opaque context
is sufficient to derail its usual reference to the extent
that the Fregean picture maintains, what's to stop us
supposing such an embedding is sufficient to make up for
failures of reference? Why not suppose that a reference is
generated for such expressions? Clearly this is
unacceptable. The semantic role that is played by
expressions outside of intensional contexts is most
plausibly thought to persist when they are embedded.
Inserting a vacuous demonstrative inside a belief context
can't magically generate a reference for it.
Negation offers a straightforward commonsense case.
Negating a sentence that contains a demonstrative expression
doesn't inexplicably deprive the expression of its usual
role of referring to a certain entity; the truth-value of
the whole, familiarly, is a function of the truth-value of
the parts. Existential entailments don't just vanish in
these cases. Can't such commonsense apply equally to modal
contexts as well? Is there any reason to suppose that the
expression 'that F is S' won't do its usual semantic
business - among other things, hang on to its customary
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existential entailments - when it is embedded in the scope
of the modal operator It is necessary that . . .? And
similarly for sentences reporting factive attitudes. In the
sentence 'C knows that that cat is an Angora,' the embedded
demonstrative expresses no fact without a corresponding cat:
in the case of hallucination, no genuine state of knowledge
can be ascribed. The key point to remember is that it is
understandable to suppose that the principle of semantic
constancy or uniformity ought to prevail - in fact,
initially, it does prevail - with respect to expression
outside and inside these contexts, and there is no in
principle reason not to try to defend its holding for
propositional attitude contexts - obstacles notwithstanding.

11.

Weak Externalism: Formulation

Having commented on the presuppositions, we can now
consider how it is that weak externalism can be formulated
in terms of their combination. The next thing to examine is
whether every sort of expression capable of occupying
singular term position - descriptions as well as proper
names and demonstratives - will admit of existential
entailments. The essence of weak externalism, we might say,
is located in this issue. For the orthodox understanding of
existential import denies that general sentences (sentences
of the form 'For all x. . . .1 and 'There is an x. . . .')
imply the existence of the referents of the expressions in
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those sentences. And descriptions - according to Russell are to be analyzed as general sentences. What will emerge is
that although descriptive sentences themselves cannot be
thought to have existential entailments, it is perfectly
plausible that their constituents - the predicates that make
them up - do.
Let us recapitulate.

(4), above - a sentence

containing a demonstrative singular term - can be true only
if its logical implications are true; and one of these is an
existential sentence. This is essentially equivalent to the
claim that the belief in question is existence-dependent on
the object of that belief: should the reference fail to
obtain, no proposition is expressed: and if no proposition
is expressed, so no proposition can be believed.37
There is nothing particularly controversial about
this. Obviously one wouldn't use a demonstrative in a
belief-report unless one took it to refer: the report could
only be true if the expression did refer. The idea is this:
suppose Katie hallucinates a dog directly in her path baring
its teeth and poised to spring. She no doubt takes herself
to possess the belief that dog is baring its teeth and is
poised to spring, which she would express by saying "That
dog is baring its teeth and is poised to spring." Janet,
observing her behavior, which includes looking frightened
and clutching at her in a panic, turns to me, wondering what
can explain Katie's behavior: Katie's odd behavior, given
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that neither Janet nor I perceive any object in Katie's
path. I cannot sincerely report Katie's mental state by
uttering the sentence "Katie believes that dog is poised to
spring," since I don't believe there is a dog there. Were I
to attempt such an ascription, Janet would be fully entitled
to ask - even testily - "WHAT dog?" In sum: I cannot report
a belief with existential commitments when I possess
disconfirming knowledge concerning the existence of the
object of the belief. Segal, for one, makes this explicit
with his own example (1989, 54-55):
Suppose that Orville, perhaps in the
clutches of a mad scientist, is
undergoing a visual experience that
seems to present a particular olive.
Orville, fond of olives and hungry,
extends his hand in the appropriate
direction. What is Orville doing?
Orville, what are you doing? 'I am
reaching for that olive.' When we try to
describe Orville's action what we find
ourselves saying is: Orville is reaching
for the olive that he thinks is there
. . . We say 'he is reaching for the
olive that he thinks is there' because
we are trying to say that he is reaching
for an olive, which is what he thinks he
is doing, without committing ourselves
to there being an olive that he is
reaching for.
This is the intuitive case for non-descriptive
singular terms. The difficulties are thought to arise with
respect to descriptive sentences.
Certainly the meaningfulness of 'There are F's'
doesn't depend on there being anything that is an F (whether
or not such a sentence is true, however, does so depend). So
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we have a clear distinction, on the Russellian picture,
between expressions like proper names and demonstratives which do depend on their reference for meaningfulness38 and quantified expressions, which do not. And this isn't so
surprising, given that expressions like proper names and
demonstratives are singular terms, whose very point is to
refer to an object. Quantified expressions, as Russell
notoriously pointed out, are not singular terms. The thing
to realize at this juncture is that were there nothing to
left to say about the existence-dependence of expressions,
externalism in its most general formulation would not be
established: for, at this stage, the only thing that emerges
is the existence-dependence of non-descriptive singular
terms on their objects. And there are many concepts that are
not expressed by singular terms.
But there is something further to note. Consider
descriptive expressions. Definite descriptions are not,
according to Russell, proper singular terms, for they have
the logical form of existential sentences. The sentence

(8) The author of Waverly was a man

is analyzed according to the Theory of Descriptions as

(9) There is one and only one x such that x wrote Waverly
and x was a man
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Now those familiar with the terrain here will recall
that the canonical position concerning a descriptive thought
is that one can possess, for instance, a descriptive belief
without being en rapport (Kaplan 1968) with the object that
satisfies the description: for instance, from

(10) Jerry believes that the most amusing cat in New York
should go on the stage

there is supposed to be no clear inference to

(11) There is some cat in particular believed by Jerry to be
the most amusing in New York and to thereby belong on the
stage

since clearly Jerry can frame beliefs about the most amusing
cat in New York and its theatrical potential by reasoning
that cats come in different degrees of comic talent, and
that there are cats in New York, so that there must be some
cat or other who, by virtue of being the most amusing of the
felines in that city, belongs on the stage. The canonical
position regarding descriptive belief, that is, is that
exportation is not a justified inference. But that would be
to ignore the possibility that existential generalization
might well apply to terms in predicate position as well to
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those in singular term position. If this could be made
plausible, then the case for the existence-dependence of
even general thought on its objects would be at least prima
facie secured.
Briefly, the idea is this. As we have said, for

(12)

(3x) Fx

to be true, an individual (corresponding to the variable)
must exist. But now consider the meaningfulness of (12).
Certainly (12) can be meaningful in the absence of any
individual. But if we consider (12) more closely, it's clear
that there might be thought to be something further that
needs to be true in order for (12) to be meaningful. And
this is that the property referred by the predicate exist after all, what makes (12) true or false is whether the
world obliges with an object that instantiates that
property.
What is of course presupposed in this line of thought
is second-order quantification, argument for which is well
outside the scope of my project here. Assuming, therefore,
that second-order quantification (quantification over
properties) is legitimate, then we may say that the
meaningfulness, the content, of (12) presupposes that
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(13) (3P) (P = A x Fx )

is true: what (13) says is that there is a property P such
that P is identical to the property F. The content of (12)
is thus existence-dependent on properties via the predicates
it contains; and properties are extra-cranial entities.
This line of thought can be understood to extend a
certain way of thinking about singular terms to predicates
Those familiar with that way of thinking will remember that
Strawson (1956;1959;1974), and, later, Evans (1982), argued
that if 'a' is a logically singular term, then for

(14) Fa

to express a proposition (to have content, to be
meaningful), it must be the case that there is an x such
that x is identical to a. Strawson writes (1974, 58):
. . . what about the very rare but not
impossible case where there is an
intended primary use of a name but . . .
there just does not exist any real
particular such that to indicate or
specify that particular would be
correctly to answer the question,
•Who/what is being named (or even mis
named) by the name?' . . . The answer I
suggest is simple. If there is nothing
which counts as command-of-the-name-asthen-used, then there is no proposition
asserted, though the speaker by
hypothesis thinks there is. . . .
Given, then, a putative utterance of a
proposition of our basic class with,
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say, a personal name in the 'a' place,
we have it that a necessary condition of
such a proposition being expressed by
the utterance is that there should
actually exist someone to whom the
speaker is referring in uttering the
HcUQO •

•

•

•

The analogous move for predicates, as we have seen,
requires that a second-order existential sentence be true;
what (14) can be understood to express, that is, is that
there is a property F such that

a has F. And

for this to

be

the case, it must follow, roughly speaking, that thereexist
a property F - although, of course, what won't follow is
that anything does have F.
Let us summarize the basic points. Russell, as it
happens, himself remarks (1988, 51):
. . . speaking generally, suppose we
wish to say that the author of Waverly
had the property <J>/ what we wish to say
is equivalent to 'One and only one
entity wrote Waverly, and that one had
the property <|>'.
And this serves to focus attention on a key idea.
Descriptive sentences are made up predicates, as the
analysis afforded by the Theory of Descriptions makes even
more manifest. And while we can agree that general sentences
do not bear a relation of existence-dependence to the
entities over which the (first-order) quantifiers range, it
does not follow from this that the predicate expressions
that constitute those general sentences won't bear
existence-dependence relations to extra-cranial entities.
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Predicates are (assumed to be) open to second-order
quantification, and second-order quantifiers range over
properties.
After all, what is it that makes predicates
meaningful? One perfectly straightforward answer (captured
in presupposition (2), above) is properties; the properties
that those predicates refer to. Predicate expressions can
thus be thought to have existential entailments in the same
way that singular terms do: such expressions depend for
their meaningfulness on the existence of the properties to
which they refer.39 We have the basic picture in place for
a prima facie case for the existential entailments of even
general thought.
The picture that emerges from putting all of our
presuppositions together is that, from (10), there is a
perfectly plausible inference to

(15)

There is an x (in particular) and there are properties

F and G such that J believes that x instantiates F and G.

And, if so, it supports a notion of the existencedependence of (both singular and general) beliefs on their
objects. Given that, quite plausibly,

(10) couldn't be true

unless its logical implications were true - and some of its
logical implications are the existential entailments of the
expressions in predicate position, as well the existential
56

entailments of the expressions in singular term position we are in a position to formulate weak externalism.
Mental states such as belief are relational externalistically determined - in that they depend for their
existence on their (mind-and-language independent) objects:
the particulars and properties referred to by the
expressions that make up the belief-sentence; the singular
terms and the predicates. This existence-dependence is made
manifest in the considerations concerning inferences from
the notional to the relational forms of belief sentences.
Given the admittedly controversial but perfectly acceptable
intuition that what logical and semantic characteristics
apply to expressions outside of intensional contexts ought
uniformly to be supposed to apply to them when they are
embedded, we have seen that there is no reason to suppose
that both singular terms and definite descriptions

- via

the predicates that make up those descriptions - can't be
thought to have existential entailments.
And if this is so, then descriptive content is no less
existence-dependent on extra-cranial reality than is nondescriptive singular content - existence-dependent on extracranial abstract reality, to be sure, but extra-cranial
nevertheless. McGinn sums up the point (1989, 41):
weak externalism . . . does seem to me
pretty uncontroversial considered by
itself . . . properties are precisely
the kinds of item that things in the
world instantiate. The item that has to
exist for me to think (say) 'something
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is square1 is the very same item that
has to exist in order for the material
object in front of me to be square,
viz., the property of being square. This
property . . . has causal powers (when
instantiated) that operate out there in
the extramental world. It should strike
us as more surprising (more significant)
than it does that this very objective
property also enters into the
individuation of mental states: that
what is objective and nonmental should
enter into the very identity conditions
of something subjective, a state of
mind.
A few concluding - historical - remarks should
suffice. One way to absorb the line of thought behind weak
externalism is to recall the context in which it is located:
that of a wider issue onto which the work on singular
thought and descriptive content - prominent in the late
1970's and early 1980's - was directed.
A question can arise concerning the connection between
externalism and the theory of descriptions: is it or is it
not possible to avoid externalism with respect to
particulars? According the theory of descriptions, all
apparent singular terms can be analyzed away, so there is no
reason to suppose that some thoughts necessarily involve
reference to a (head-extraneous) particular: all thought is
general thought.
Now, apart from the objection that the theory of
descriptions may not apply to all denoting singular
expressions, there is the following. What motivates the view
that externalism should be denied for particulars? It seems
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that a determined internalist about the mind might

well try

to deny the existence of singular thought - since the
necessary condition on the existence of a singular thought
is that the worldly object of that thought exist - and think
to succeed in this suppression by characterizing all thought
as general. But this would be to fail to notice that
descriptions themselves might arguably be indirectly linked
to extra-cranial reality. Descriptions are composed of
predicates: expressions that, plausibly, refer to
properties. The internalist (masquerading as a description
theorist) determined to deny an extra-cranial link between
thought and its objects would then have to presuppose a
particular ontological view about the status of properties that these are mentalistic or in some way internal - in a
rather desperate move to avoid externalism about even
general thought.
Ultimately, the issue of whether or not there exists
singular thought is independent of the debate between
externalism and internalism, since singularity need not in
itself imply extra-cranial content links (suppose you
thought the reference of all singular expressions were
sense-data). However, there is a convergence, since it will
be sufficient for externalism that there be singular
thoughts about non-mental entities. The point is, however,
that even if it could be argued that there were no singular
thought about non-mental entities, externalism would not
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necessarily thereby be avoided: externalism could still be
claimed with respect to descriptive content, by raising
issues concerning the ontological status of properties. And
this brings the sketch up to date (for more, see Blackburn
(1984), Evans (1982), McCulloch (1989), and McGinn (1989),
among others).

12.

Weak Externalism

and Propositional Constituency
Weak externalism's claim that mental states are
necessarily individuated by mind-and-language independent
reality - that their existence-and-identity-conditions are
those of objects and properties that are the reference of
those states - can be formulated in a slightly different
way, according to a line of argument associated with Russell
(1918), and developed by Evans (1982) and Kaplan (1972,
1978) , among others. This is the view, roughly speaking,
that states of affairs have constituents, and, given that
propositions represent states of affairs, it is quite
plausible that propositions have the very same constituents
that do the states of affairs they represent. It follows
from this that the existence conditions of a belief content
are those of the state of affairs the content represents:
for the having of a belief is to bear a certain complex
psychological relation to a state of affairs.40 Let us
review the basic architecture of this view.
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Kaplan notes (1979, 212):
There is also an important - though less
often noted - difference between Frege
and Russell regarding the structure of
intensional entities. According to
Russell, an individual may be an
immediate element of a proposition. In
fact, certain atomic propositions
consist of just individuals and
attributes (or relations); whereas, for
Frege, the immediate elements of a
proposition must themselves be
intensional entities of one sort or
another.
This is borne out in the correspondence between Frege
and Russell on the subject of propositional constituency
(Frege, 1980, 163;169):
Truth is not a component part of a
thought, just as Mont Blanc with its
snowfields is not itself a component
part of the thought that Mont Blanc is
more than 4000 metres high. (Frege to
Russell, 13.11.04)
Concerning sense and meaning, I see
nothing but difficulties which I cannot
overcome. . . I believe that in spite of
all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is
a component part of what is actually
asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc
is more than 4000 metres high.' We do
not assert the thought, for this is a
private psychological matter: we assert
the object of the thought, and this is,
to my mind, a certain complex (an
objective proposition, one might say) in
which Mont Blanc itself is a component
part . . . This is why for me the
meaning of a proposition is not the
true, but a certain complex which (in
the given case) is true. (Russell to
Frege, 12.12.04)
Kaplan (1979, 218) adapts the Russellian conception of
a proposition and makes a distinction between singular
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propositions (those propositions which contain individuals
as immediate constituents;

'This is blue') and general

propositions, which do not contain individuals as
constituents ('All men are mortal'). Kaplan's view sometimes known as the Theory of Direct Reference - is that
a propositional attitude like a belief is a relation to a
proposition, whose constituents are the reference of the
expressions of the sentence that expresses the belief: for
singular propositions, objects, for general propositions,
properties. It is true that Kaplan himself does not extend
his points about propositional constituency to general
propositions,41 nor does he draw the implication for
possession of thought or the lack of it, should the relevant
objects (properties) fail to obtain, but the implication is
obvious. If to be in belief-state b one is held to be in a
relation to a proposition whose constituents are object o
and property P, and o and P fail to exist, then one is not
related to a proposition: so one fails to be in belief-state
b.
Evans's work on the subject of what he calls
Russellian thought (1982) parallels Kaplan's but makes the
existence-dependence of singular propositions on their
objects completely explicit. For those unfamiliar with Evans
on the subject of Russellian thought, the following is a
precis of the position: content involving non-descriptive
singular terms cannot be possessed in the absence of the
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object.42 The possession of descriptive thought is subject
to

conditions that are a little less uncompromising, as

descriptions are analyzed according to Russell's Theory of
Descriptions.43
According to Evans (1982, 44-6; 30-1):
Russell . . . held a theory of thought
which incorporated the principle that it
is not possible for a person to have a
thought about something unless he knows
which particular individual in the world
he is thinking about . . . Given
Russell's restriction, a situation can
never arise in which a subject thinks
that he is having or expressing a
thought about an object while failing to
do so; and this was a possibility which
Russell very much wished to rule out,
because it seemed to him incoherent. . .
However, there does not seem to me to be
anything incoherent in the idea that it
may be, for a subject, exactly as though
he were thinking about a physical object
(say) which he can see, and yet that,
precisely because there is no physical
object he is seeing, he may fail to have
a thought of the kind he supposes
himself to have. It is not part of this
proposal that his mind is wholly vacant
. . . The claim is simply that there is
a kind of thought we sometimes have,
typically expressed in the form 'This G
is F ' , and we may aim to have a thought
of this kind when, in virtue of the
absence of any appropriate object, there
is no such thought to be had.
Anyone who is attracted by a Russellian
view of a class of singular terms must
always attempt this further task: the
task of explaining why, when a member of
the class is empty, there is such a
strong impression of understanding,
communicating, and thinking.
Now, weak externalism extends, to general concepts,
the idea of the identity-and-existence-dependence of content
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on the world outside the subject's skin.44 There is no
prima facie reason to rule out properties being themselves
constituents of propositions,

(assuming there are any such

things as properties). Russell (1912, 58, emphasis his)
notes:
Many universals, like many particulars,
are only known to us by description. But
here, as in the case of particulars,
knowledge concerning what is known by
description is ultimately reducible to
knowledge concerning what is known by
acquaintance . . . every proposition
which we can understand must be composed
wholly of constituents with which we are
acquainted.
Of course, if one suffers from a deep-seated
scepticism about the existence of properties, one will fail
to be persuaded by the unzipped realism presupposed in weak
externalism's Russellian conception of a general
proposition. Now, it is no part of my project to argue for
realism about properties; a remark by Field (1981, 110),
however, sets the tone45:
Some people may feel that there is no
ontological gain in quantifying over
properties rather than over
propositions. Such a person should read
Putnam (1975f). Putnam makes a good case
(a) that quantification over properties
is needed in science, and (b) that
properties are quite distinct from
meanings, in that two predicates like 'x
has temperature 210°C' and 'x has mean
molecular energy 10-20 joules' can turn
out to stand for the same property even
though they clearly differ in meaning.
Here, however, we can make a few points about abstract
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objects and weak externalism, in anticipation of the charge
that externalism is not relevantly supported by the claim
that extra-cranial abstract reality has a contentindividuating role.

13. Externalism and Abstracta
There is, of course, no reason to lump all abstract
objects together from the point of view of their potential
role as content-individuating items. We must distinguish,
say, between Fregean senses and properties. Fregean senses
are, of course, not in the head; Frege was himself adamant
that they be considered objects in the public domain, so as
to serve as media through which cognitive information could
be transmitted. Now, it is an interesting question in what
respect, if any, content individuated by way of Fregean
sense can be considered externalistic in the sense we are
interested in here (we might perhaps call that notion Very
Weak Externalism, if we could bring it off),46 but it is
one that would take me too far afield here. I will confine
myself to a few suggestive remarks.
It seems to me to be a gross distortion of Frege's
canonical position to claim that Fregean senses belong to
the world in a sense of world illuminative of the notion of
externalism we are interested in formulating here. It may be
useful to remember the characterization of Fregean sense
given by Barwise and Perry (1982, 4), who attribute to Frege
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the notion of a "third realm," a realm "neither of ideas nor
of worldly events;" the realm to which sense can be thought
to belong. Barwise and Perry may get this from Popper
(1972), who puts the point in terms of "worlds": he
distinguishes the world of physical objects or physical
states; the world of states of consciousness; and, finally,
the world of objective contents of thought. We can adapt his
usage and speak of the 'world of sense' as distinguished
from the 'world of reference.' Both of these 'worlds' can be
thought of as mind-and-language independent,47 but only
one of them, according to this line of argument, will have a
genuinely externalistic role to play in the individuation of
mental content.
To see this, one must keep in mind the notion of
externalism that is at stake here. Externalism, as we have
been formulating it, is a claim that the nature of mind is
essentially determined by something usually thought of as
utterly different in character - states of affairs; the
movements and permutations in objects and their properties.
What makes this an interesting and innovative claim is
precisely that the mind, on this view, is conceived of as a
set of relations to the world of objects and their
properties: the ordinary world, the one that engages the
interest of scientists and ordinary people.48 This flies
in the face of the usual conception of mind: as a substance,
as autonomous with respect to the world of things it is
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presumably directed onto in its states of perception of
knowledge, as directly, introspectibly, infallibly
accessible.
Now, to say that the essential character of mind is
determined by a relation to Fregean senses simply doesn't
have the same kind of bite, and there is a plausible way to
explain that: following our usage above, Fregean sense does
not belong to the world of reference (by definition).
Fregean sense is a semantic device, introduced to explain
certain pyschological phenomena: for instance, why it is
that in spite of the fact that the reference of two
expressions a and b is identical, different cognitive
information is expressed by the sentence 'a is a 1 than is
expressed by the sentence 'a is b . 1 Fregean sense is
supposed to explain why knowing the truth of 'a is a' is
trivial, while knowing the truth of 'a is b' is informative.
Now, none of this has anything to do with the world of
interest to scientists and ordinary people: the world, as it
is sometimes characterized, as it is in itself. States of
affairs are not determined by the, say, causal interaction
of their Fregean senses (it is difficult to know what this
would even mean) - they are determined, if by anything, by
the permutations undergone by objects and their properties.
Objects, likewise, do not instantiate Fregean sense: they
instantiate properties. There is a plausible distinction to
be drawn between the role that properties could conceivably
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play in the externalistic individuation of mental content
and the role that senses might play: to deny this is to be
perverse.
It cannot be emphasized enough that clinging to a TE
formulation of externalism will obscure one's grasp of these
points. For example, an objection might be raised that
properties, being abstract objects, are necessary existents,
so there is no such case as one where two individuals
inhabit a different environment: their abstract environment
will always be the same; thus, no externalism. Clearly, this
is to confuse the formulations. Of course, the notions of
'environment' or 'world-involving' or 'world-dependent' are
not always understood in the same way in the literature.
Some take them to mean the causal context - the familiar
twin earth story - but others take them merely to mean what
Pettit (1986) calls the "surround" outside the subject's
skin. This demarcates the 'environment' or 'world' in a
broader way than does the twin earth story, and supports the
view that 'environmental' or 'worldly' entities need not
necessarily exclude, for example, abstract entities such as
properties. This is a rather complicated issue, which I
believe is illuminated by distinguishing properties from
other abstract objects in terms of their causal powers and
their role in explanations about the physical world (See,
among others, Armstrong, 1983, 1989; Dretske, 1977;
Haugeland, 1980; Shoemaker, 1984; Tooley, 1987). I consider
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this in more detail in chapter 3.
We might further remark that there are conceptions of
universals which link them to their instantiation (cf.
Aristotle: "For the species is synonymous with its
individuals"; Topics, 154al8); surely not every world will
instantiate all properties. The thing to keep in mind is
that that externalism is a theory of mind from which a
determined Cartesian about the mind would recoil; what makes
it so repulsive to the Cartesian is its adherence to a
genuinely constitutive necessary relation between mindindependent reality and the the mind; a relation analogous
to that, say, between a set and it members. It is a
necessary condition - but not sufficient - on candidates for
individuation that they be mind-independent; and properties,
instantiated or not, satisfy that condition.

14. Conclusion
We have been concerned, in this chapter, with
formulating a notion of externalism that captures the idea
that there is inextricable relation between independently
obtaining states of affairs and the mind. We have argued
that there is natural correlation between issues to do with
meaning and reference and those to do with the fixing of
mental content by head-independent reality. We have shown
that the Twin Earth formulation of externalism - that
content fails to supervene on inner states - though
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prominent, fails to reckon with the idea that there may be
content for which failure of supervenience is not an option;
as the price of popularism is, familiarly, precision, this
may perhaps come as little surprise. The exposure of the
Twin Earth formulation as very likely limited to a few kinds
of content raises the possibility that there is a more
general formulation of externalism that more accurately
captures the general intuition that Twin Earth cases were
meant to support.
We have distinguished externalism into two strands:
strong and weak; and have argued that weak externalism can
be established by the use of familiar semantic principles
concerning, among other things, expressions and their
existential entailments. None of this is without
controversy, of course. But a case has been put forward for
a general and necessary connection between content and the
extra-cranial environment, a view whose interest stems from
its direct challenge to the traditional Cartesian model of
the mind as an entity of an incomparable and immaterial
sort, permutating in splendid isolation from the world of
objects and properties.
The consequences of externalism for psychological
explanation is a familiar issue. In Chapter 2, I argue that
the repercussions for explanation are more widespread than
has been hitherto supposed, given our more general
formulation of the notion of externalism.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1.
The notion of mental states as existence-dependent
on the extra-mental environment can be found originally in
Russell (1988, 175-281;285-322).
2.
One that, as I intend to show, is more or less
spurious. In fact, however, there seems to be a split on the
understanding of 'externalism' depending on which side of
the Atlantic one is on. In England, the issues center around
singular or object-dependent thought; in the US, Twin Earth
cases - failures of supervenience - are the dominant
criteria for establishing externalism (those on the west
coast (Kaplan, say), are closer to the British, however, in
their formulations). A glance at the references to this work
will give some idea of the division.
3.
The condition is a necessary one, since it is
otherwise difficult to see how one could establish a
decisive distinction between a theory of mind that claims
that the world, as it happens, corresponds to the mental
states directed onto it; and one that claims that the fact
that mental states have intentionality is partly because the
world is a constituent of mental states.
4.
More will be said about this controversial claim
below: see the discussion of Evans (section 8).
5.
section (6).

I subject this to detailed scrutiny below in

6.
Putnam is sometimes credited with being the first
to raise the issue of externalism, which has for one reason
or another come to mean, in the minds of some, the view that
content fails to supervene, but the fact is that his
concerns about whether meaning was or was not in the head is
a clear historical progression - with a slightly different
emphasis - from the concerns of Russell about the nature of
the proposition. It was Russell, actually, who first argued
against Frege that the constituents of propositions were the
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very objects of the proposition, as against Frege's view
that the constituents of propositions were, rather, a
mediate, semantic entity. Naturally the Russellian view has
interesting consequences for the individuation of content
and for belief-ascription: what if the objects don't exist?
What if two people have exactly the same internal makeup but
are causally related to two completely different objects?
What if the objects are unfailingly mind-and-language
independent, whether they are contingent or abstract? It is
this extremely general issue that I take as the context
against which the critical remarks in this chapter need to
be understood.
7.
Psychological states that are methodologically
solipsist can be understood to be psychological states in
the narrow sense; Putnam makes the point and Fodor generates
an industry: see Fodor (1980, 63-109).
8. See McGinn (1989, 31).
9.
The title of this paper - a compressed version of
"The Meaning of 'Meaning'" - says it all. But, just for the
record, note Burge's remarks (1979, 117, n. 2) in
summarizing his position and its connection to that of
Putnam's :
Putnam himself does not give quite this
argument . . . This is partly just a
result of his concentration on meaning
instead of propositional attitudes.
10.
The fact is that even for content for which TE
cases are usually thought to apply, a careful examination of
the facts reveals that the canonical case - varying the
environment while keeping internal states the same - doesn't
always make a perfect fit. Take for instance beliefs about
oneself. Using 'I,' two speakers utter the sentence "I'm
hot." Their internal states are the same, but it is
stretching a point to say their environment has varied what has varied is the identity of the speakers. This, I
suppose, is sufficient for the purpose at hand; but it isn't
a canonical TE case.
A separate but related point is this. Once you earmark
for the reference of an expression (or a mental state) a
necessary role in the determination of content, then the way
is clear to claim that content is existence-dependent on its
objects. So, in the case where two people believe a horse is
snorting behind them, and one of them is hallucinating, then
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only one of them is in possession of the belief that that
horse is getting nearer - the relevant (individuating)
object of the belief being a figment. This kind of case can
be understood in terms of non-supervenience: having the
belief in question doesn't supervene on inner states - but
there is no necessary connection; putting it this way gets
the point across but involves none of the canonical TE
apparatus.
The right thing to say about this (given that the
examples involve indexicals, which Putnam argues are the
other kind of content for which TE cases can be erected) is
that even for the kind of content for which TE cases can be
erected one should realize that TE itself is unnecessary, as
is varying the environment in some dramatic sense. These
points ought really to eradicate any lingering idea that TE
is somehow necessary for making claims consistent with
externalism. The really interesting question concerns
content for which TE cases CAN'T be erected: can content
both supervene and be thought to be externalistically
determined? We shall see below that the answer is yes.
11.
Putnam (1975a) himself appears to make the
essential points in the section entitled "A socio-linguistic
hypothesis" (227-229).
On a different note, it is worth pointing out, for the
sake of accuracy, that Putnam does not, in (1975a), actually
draw the conclusion that the mental states of Twins differ
when their environments do: his view in 1975a, summarized by
McGinn (1977, 531), is
that two speakers, or two linguistic
communities, could use (phonetically
identical) terms whose extensions in
their respective languages were disjoint
and yet be in the same mental states
with respect to the terms and their
extensions.
Burge (1979, p.117, note 2) concurs:
[Putnam] remarks in effect that the
subject's thoughts remain constant
between the actual and counterfactual
cases (p.224). In his own argument he
explicates the difference between actual
and counterfactual cases in terms of a
difference in the extension of terms,
not a difference in those aspects of
their meaning that play a role in the
cognitive life of the subject. In my
view, the examples do illustrate the
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fact that all attitudes involving
natural kind notions, including de dicto
attitudes, presuppose de re attitudes.
12.
This notion was made much of later by Kripke,
(1980), Lecture III.
13.
It seems that Burge himself seems to think such a
condition is imposed; see Antony (1993, 247-48) who accepts
Burge's own valuation of the matter, but goes on to
challenge it:
Of all Burge's thought experiments those
alone [in 'Individualism and the
Mental'] support his thesis that social
relations are essential to the nature's
of one's thoughts . . . Burge does
provide an account from which it follows
that Yolanda's actual and counterfactual
thoughts differ - his story that
'language-community membership' is
essential to the natures of one's
thoughts.
14.
Certainly a number of commentators proceed as if
this is Putnam's claim: see almost anyone British who writes
in this area. Anyway, as we have said above, the interest of
externalism as a general characterization of mental content
would be significantly diminished if the claims in question
weren't thought to be imposing necessary conditions on
concept-possession.
15.
Here the use of the term should be understood in
Burge's sense. Note that 'individualism' is used in at least
two ways in the literature. Burge (1979, 103) originally
uses it to
apply . . . to philosophical treatments
that seek to see a person's intentional
mental phenomena ultimately and purely
in terms of what happens to the person,
what occurs within him, and how he
responds to his physical environment,
without any essential reference to the
social context in which he or the
interpreter of his mental phenomena are
situated.
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Fodor (1988, 30), on the other hand, uses
'individualism' to apply to: ''standards of individuation
according to which my Twin and I are in the same mental
state. . . . "
This might be a good place to make a few
terminological points. It has become standard to use 'anti
individualism' to mean 'externalism' at least in some sense.
This seems to me to add a certain amount of confusion to an
already complicated set of issues. We will take
'individualism' and 'anti-individualism' to refer to issues
having to do with what McGinn (1989, 2, n.5) calls the
subject-other relation; and 'internalism' and 'externalism'
to refer to issues having to do with what he calls the
subject-object relation. As McGinn puts it:
The guestion whether minds can fix the
content of other minds is really a very
different question from the question
whether the extramental world can fix
what holds of minds: different
'interfaces' are being considered in the
two cases.
16.
Pettit and McDowell (1986, 1-15) use this notion
in their formulation of Putnam's thesis.
17.
presupposed.

Realism about moral and aesthetic concepts is here

18.
Burge (1979), despite a number of remarks about
color concepts, doesn't appear to face up to this point. He
considers the case of color ranges (p. 82):
People sometimes make mistakes about
color ranges. They may correctly apply a
color term to a certain color, but also
mistakenly apply it to shades of a
neighboring color. When asked to explain
the color term, they cite the standard
cases . . . but they apply the term
somewhat beyond its conventionally
established range. . . .
That's fine as far as it goes. But then he goes on:
The error is linguistic or conceptual
. . . It is not an ordinary empirical
error. But one may reasonably doubt that
the subjects misunderstand the
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dictionary meaning of the color term
. . . we can imagine that 'red' were
applied as they mistakenly apply it. In
such cases, we would no longer ascribe
content-clauses involving the term 'red'
in oblique position.
This seems to suggest that when a subject's mistake
about color-ranges goes so far as to lead him to think a
color term applies to two colors (a sort of extreme colorrange mistake, perhaps), then the conditions for the
thought-experiment break down.
19.
He who remains sceptical is invited to try to
erect a Burge-type case for concepts of belief and desire,
or concepts of pain and pleasure. Surely we want to deny
that it is possible to be wrong about whether one has a
belief - as opposed to a desire. Yet, if on TE the words
'belief-state' are used by the community to apply to
desires, then my twin and I are in the same state - that of
desire - which I inaccurately ascribe to myself as 'beliefstate, ' since on Earth, the community uses 'belief-state' to
apply to belief states. This is really quite implausible.
20.
McGinn further points out that even this
characterization of the conditions on formulation assumes
that 'personhood' is not environmentally determined something that might be open to question.
21.
I have no particular views here: I am merely
spelling out the logically possibilities for the sake of
accuracy. The fact is, you could take the view that brain
states are individuated by their function or purpose: if
you're a teleologist about brain states then you're an
externalist about such states, and the preconditions for TE
cases might not be met. See Millikan (1984) for the basic
picture; see also Fodor's (critical) discussion (1988, 31).
I discuss teleological views of content below: section x,
(e) .
22.
I don't want to anticipate my later remarks too
much at this ground-clearing stage: suffice it to say that
McGinn's distinction between strong and weak externalism the distinction in formulations of externalism introduced at
the beginning of the chapter - applies to perceptual
content. Qualitative states are weakly, but not strongly,
external, as he argues (1989, 58-100). Externalism about
perceptual content is a thorny issue, and not one that is
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relevant to my concerns in this thesis.
23.
It must be said that the original formulations of
externalism qua externalism (and many subsequent) do not
avail themselves of the notion of supervenience - Putnam
(1975a) most certainly never mentions it, and neither do
Evans, McDowell, or anyone else working in that tradition of
thought about externalism. This concept has crept into the
externalist literature and become entrenched - at least in
some parts of the world - mainly, I would say, as a result
of Fodor's arguments (1980, 1988) concerning content and
explanation. But now there is every reason to suppose that
the notion of supervenience might be actually somewhat
ambiguous.
24.
Say, for example, the relation of the moral on the
descriptive, the aesthetic on the physical, and the modal on
the actual.
25.
But let's be careful here. Those who are
unfamiliar with the literature concerning weak and strong
externalism might easily simply take 'relational' to be
equivalent to 'bears causal/environmental relations to . .
.' This is of course because such persons confuse TE with
externalism. We stipulate rather that "relational" be
understood as generally as possible: to include
causal/environmental relations, but not to be exclusively
restricted to those.
26. Much more about this below.
27.
These arguments are by no means original to me:
McGinn, adding to certain key ideas from Russell, Strawson,
and Evans, makes them in his 1989, chapter 1. More on this
below.
28.
It must be said that there are issues that could
arise here that are extremely complex and raise all sorts of
difficulties; for example, the remarks below will touch on
exportation, the reference of predicates, Russell's theory
of descriptions, opacity, vacuous singular terms, fictional
discourse, negative existentials and de re modality. I
resist getting drawn into the controversies that surround
these fearsome issues. All I am concerned to do here is to
examine the ways in which some of these notions and that of
externalism in its most general formulation might be seen to
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converge.
29.
We have already pointed out that nearly all of
those who write on the subject of externalism put it in
terms of object-dependent thought - anyone working on the
subject, that is, in England or the on West Coast. It really
is only a handful of people who put this issue in terms exclusively - of failures of supervenience. It remains to be
noted that most of the work done with respect to objectdependent thought concentrated on (non-descriptive) singular
terms; for a long time, for instance, demonstratives were
all the vogue (see Evans, 1982; McDowell, 1977;1984 for
starters). McGinn 1989 was the first to extend the notion of
object-dependent thought to the predicates involved in
attitude ascription.
30.
The issue of vacuous singular terms is one with
familiar complications, comment on which is mercifully not
part of my project here. A comment on the semantic behavior
of indexicals like "I" and "now" might be useful, however:
from the fact that it is difficult to erect a case with a
vacuous referential use of "I" it won't follow that the
semantics of this kind of demonstrative expression differs
from the others: it simply represents a sort of limit case.
31. McGinn (1989, 37):
The term 'that dog' . . . has need of a
demonstrated dog if the sentence is to
succeed in stating a fact.
32.
The sceptic about denotation and existencedependence is invited to examine the history of these
notions. The place to start is Russell (1988, 39-56; 175282). If that isn't sufficient, Evans (1982) is worthwhile.
Finally, Kaplan (1972) is useful.
33.
In particular, I will not consider issues to do
with vacuous names, fictional discourse, negative
existentials, or de re modality. These are obviously
interesting but too complicated to be treated in this paper,
and, in particular, not relevant to my project, which is to
formulate externalism as generally as possible. I will,
however, have something to say about descriptive singular
terms. For a survey and treatment of the problems associated
with these issues, see Evans (1982).
I would make one point however, concerning these
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difficult cases. As those familiar with the literature will
know, it is sometimes argued that these cases show that
there cannot be any such thing as object-dependent or
singular thought. One line of argument against this one
might proceed as follows: there has got to be a fallacy
involved in the argument that claims that because
(0) It is not the case that Hermes is mortal
can be true without there being a real god that is mortal it
must follow that
(O') Alan is disgusted
does not presuppose the existence of a concrete individual.
If this argument were correct, that would mean that no
sentence ever presupposed the existence of a concrete, real
individual. And it's doubtful that the reference relation is
in that much trouble.
34.
An analogy can be drawn, as is well-known, with
modal contexts.
35. See at the very least, Kaplan (1968).
36.
For more on this, see Davidson (1984, 93-108);
also chapter 3 below.
37.
Once more, the sceptic is invited to review his or
her Russell, Evans and Kaplan. I emphasize this since
resistance on this point will completely interfere with
grasp of the essence of this chapter.
38.
Of course, this is a slight misrepresentation of
the conservative Russellian view of what counts as a proper
singular term. As those familiar with Russell will recall,
the only expressions that count as logically proper names
are the expressions 'this1 and 'that1 - and these only when
they are used to refer to one's own sense-data.
39.
A very good source for views on the subject (as
well as critical commentary and a defense of property
realism) is Armstrong (1978, Vol. I); see also Bealer
(1992). It so happens that Burge makes a relevant remark
(1982, 120):
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As I mentioned earlier, one might hold
that ‘water1 names an abstract property
or kind and that attitude attributions
typically attribute de re attitudes of
the kind. . . .
40.
Classic sceptical arguments, say about the
existence of the external world, proceed by noting that one
can indeed instantiate the belief that the table is in the
room even if there isn't a table (or a room). This is
because there would appear to be a distinction between
having the belief that p and having the veridical belief
that p. The literature opposed to this view does indeed
claim that for some content (non-descriptive singular
content), an ascription cannot be made unless it is
veridical (see Evans, 1982, among others, for an extended
discussion). Naturally this is controversial.
41.
chapter two.

But Salmon does. See his (1982), particularly

42.
The issue concerning the possession of negative
existential thought is a familiar complication; Evans has
much to say on the subject, and the reader is referred to
his (1982). My desire is simply to make use of some basic
concepts from Evans, not to treat his views to extensive
critical scrutiny.
43. And so (1982, 47; 43):
. . . Russell held, and I think he was
entirely right to hold, that where a
clear descriptive condition exists for
something's being the referent or
denotation of a term, a quite
determinate truth condition is
associated with sentences containing the
term, whether or not it is empty; the
sentence is true just in case there
exist something which uniquely satisfies
the condition, and which satisfies the
sentence's predicate. . . .
Where '<J>' is a coherent description,
perfectly clear conditions for the truth
of the sentence 'the <t> is F' (and
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thereby equally clear conditions for its
non-truth) have been laid down: the
absence of a satisfier of the
description is no obstacle to someone's
correctly understanding an utterance of
the sentence as having these truthconditions. A thought may be conveyed;
and a belief (that the conditions are
satisfied) may be induced. I do not
believe that it is open to us to hold,
with Strawson, that someone who utters a
sentence containing an empty description
has said nothing (expressed no
proposition). . . .
44.
It cannot be emphasized enough that basic ideas
must be kept clear in order to avoid getting sidetracked on
to orthogonal issues. The claim that reference is a
necessary condition on meaning/content is not equivalent to
the claim that it is a necessary and sufficient condition.
(Worth remembering here, as an example, is that the
Evans/McDowell view of Russellian thought does not preclude
sense (See Evans, 1982, 39;51)). As a purely logical point,
it is surely obvious that from the fact that reference is
taken to be a necessary propositional constituent, it will
not follow that reference is taken to be the only
propositional constituent. The claim that propositions are
held to contain worldly items is not in itself a claim that
worldly items is all they contain. In a word, it won't do to
mix up the claims of a Direct Reference Theory with, for
instance, the more conciliatory claims of dual componency
theories of content.
Of course, the question: "In virtue of what are the
propositions expressed by
(1) Batman is Batman
and
(2) Bruce Wayne is Batman
distinguished, given that a) Catwoman believes (1) and
doesn't believe (2); and b) on the account under
consideration, these propositions have the very same
referential constituents?" is a perfectly good question. It
is not one whose answer is essential to my project, and I do
not anticipate delving into the vast literature on the
subject, as it is to one side of my interests.
It is worth pointing out, however, by way of suggestive
remark, that:
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(1) propositions can be claimed to have the same
referential constituents without it following that they must
contain the very same intensional constituents.
(2) We can draw a plausible analogy with perceptual
states such as seeing an object, to support the claim that
propositional states can share the same necessary conditions
without sharing the same sufficient ones.
(3) It won't do to understand 'containment' or
'constituency' too crudely: it is best to understand these
as a way of talking about the necessary conditions on
content.
45.
The account of analyticity given semantic
externalism formulated in chapter 3 will rely on a firm
distinction between concepts and properties. Some remarks to
challenge mentalism about properties will be made there.
46.
On further thought, however, it seems likely that
we shall have to deny that any such notion of externalism is
defensible. One might be tempted to think that there is
variety of externalism formulable in terms of the contentindividuating role of any and all abstract entities, these
not being in the head. What appears to be at stake here is
the claim that it is sufficient to generate externalism that
the phenomenon in question involves a relation to an
abstract entity: the having of belief b, for instance, in
that it involves a relation to some abstract entity, thus
implies externalism about belief-individuation.
But this claim appears open to a glaring reductio.
Take, for instance, an object's being square. An object's
being square is plausibly a function of a relation between
the object and an abstract object - the universal 'square.'
But surely no one in their right minds would want to argue
that since an abstract object is involved in something's
being square then we have to be externalists about objectindividuation. So, analogously, for claims about mental
state individuation, for this sort of view implies that you
are an externalist in virtue of instantiating any property:
like the property of being in pain, or the property of
instantiating neurophysiological property p, both commonly
considered quite internal properties. What's worse, this
sort of view implies that you are an externalist in virtue
of believing in beliefs at all: being the belief that snow
is white, is, after all, an abstract entity.
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47.
Although, as Fregean exegesis will attest, there
is some controversy over whether Fregean senses are indeed
language-independent.
48.
McGinn (1989, 18, n.24) makes the point that there
is an interesting analogy between the externalistic
determination of mind and the relational determination of
space.
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CHAPTER 2
EXTERNALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
. . . Koznyshev was not alone. With him was a famous
professor of philosophy who had coe from Kharkov for the
express purpose of clearing up some difference that had
arisen between them on a very important philosophical
question . . . They were discussing the fashionable
question whether there was a dividing line between the
psychological and physiological phenomena in
human activity; and, if so, where?
Tolstoy, Anna Karenin

1.

Introduction: Causation and Explanation

A number of related questions arise concerning the
occurrence of an event. Two of the most predictable, and
familiar, are "what caused this event?" and "what explains
the occurrence of this event?" That these questions can be
distinguished is something that has been very thoroughly
examined by Davidson (1980), among others, whose remarks on
the subject serve as a useful background. We will briefly
rehearse a few points about causal relations and their
descriptions, then move on to consider the consequences of
semantic externalism for mental events and their
explanation.
Davidson, familiarly, does not directly consider the
nature of causal relations1, but focuses instead on the
logical form of causal sentences. The sentence:
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(1) The explosion caused the evacuation of the World Trade
Center

expresses a two-place relation, with the singular terms 'the
explosion' and 'the evacuation' referring to particular
events. Now, in that this sentence states a causal relation
between two events, it is referentially transparent. That
is, replacing the two singular terms with other coref erential singular terms, as in

(2) The act of terrorism linked to the blind Islamic cleric
caused the biggest catastrophe in New York in 1993

results in no variation in truth-value. So, briefly, it
appears correct to say that causal relations hold between
events and do so no matter how the events are described.
The same thing, however, cannot be said for
explanations. When the question concerns the explanation for
the evacuation of the building, rather than the relation
between the evacuation and its causal antecedents, then it
appears to be the case that only some purported explanation
sentences will be adequate to the job, not all.
A natural reply, when asked why the building was
evacuated is, "an explosion went off." The property of being
an explosion here almost certainly can be said to have an
explanatory role. Explosions involve disintegration of
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materials and the like, which appear to reveal the mechanism
at work behind a sudden mass exodus out of a building.
Consider, on the other hand, whether the following reply
would be satisfactory: "the building was evacuated on
account of the occurrence of an event linked to the blind
Islamic cleric in New Jersey." This reply is unsatisfactory
in that it seems quite beside the point, given that we want
to explain the connection between the explosion event and
the evacuation event. That these events had something to do
with the cleric does not seem to get to the root of the
question: after all, lots of things are linked to the cleric
every day, not many of which result in evacuations of
buildings. His merely being linked to an event, that is,
isn't sufficient to bring about the evacuation of a
building.
The upshot is that not every description of an event even if it is a true description - will refer to the
properties of the event that have a role in an explanation
involving that event. Metaphysically speaking, this comes
down to the fairly uncontroversial claim that for any event,
many things (even infinitely many things) are true of it,
but not all of those things will explain it or its effects.
In sum, not every property of an event has an explanatory
role.
Clearly, however, if one is interested in explaining
an event, then one needs some criterion to narrow down those
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properties of an event that do have an explanatory role. A
criterion that is widely thought to be useful involves laws
and counterfactuals.2

2.

The role of laws in scientific explanation

Hempel is noted for, among other things, a classic
treatment of the role of laws in explanation. His deductivenomological model (D-N model) of scientific explanation
(1965, 336-337):
. . . effects a deductive subsumption
of the explanandum under principles that
have the character of general laws. Thus
a D-N explanation answers the question
'Why did the explanandum-phenomenon
occur?1 by showing that the phenomenon
resulted from certain particular
circumstances, specified in C1(
. . .
Ck [sentences describing the particular
facts invoked], in accordance with the
laws La, L2, . . . Lr [the general laws
on which the explanation rests]. By
pointing this out, the argument shows
that, given the particular circumstances
and the laws in question, the occurrence
of the phenomenon was to be expected;
and it is in this sense that the
explanation enables us to understand why
the phenomenon occurred. In a D-N
explanation, then, the explanadum is a
logical consequence of the explanans.
Furthermore, reliance on general laws is
essential to a D-N explanation; it is in
virtue of such laws that the particular
facts cited in the explanans possess
explanatory relevance to the explanandum
phenomenon.
Hempel's criterion illustrates one paradigm of the
nature of explanation: that explanation in science is
concerned to uncover the mechanisms that operate with
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respect to the objects and events that we observe. These
mechanisms are understood as the links between causes and
effects of phenomena, and science is understood to offer
causal explanation (Hempel 1965, 347-349):
An explanation of a particular
occurrence is often conceived as
pointing out what 'caused' it . . . But
causal attributions . . . presuppose
appropriate laws . . . And by virtue of
thus presupposing general laws which
connect 'cause' and 'effect,' causal
explanation conforms to the D-N model
. . . And the law tacitly implied by the
assertion that b, as an event of kind B
was caused by a as an event of kind A is
a general statement of causal connection
In sum: explanations are deductive arguments, the
conclusion of an explanation is a sentence that describes
the phenomenon to be explained, and the premises of the
argument contain a natural law.
Hempel's criterion, although it relies heavily on the
notion of a law, does not in itself offer any
characterization or explication of the notion of law, as he
himself notes (1965, 340-345). This is an issue best left to
one side here; one or two remarks, however, can help to shed
light on the issue of the explanatory role of properties of
objects and events.
Properties customarily thought to characterize a law
are, first, its generality, and second, its being
counterfactual supporting. Take the statement "All the cats
in my apartment are black and white." Does this entail the
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conditional "If x were a cat, and x were in my apartment,
then x would be black and white?" No: given the fact that
what cats there are in my apartment are black and white is
accidentally true, we cannot hope to rely on the property of
being in my apartment to reliably, predictably, and
necessarily to generate black and white cats.
The statement, "Sugar dissolves in liquid," on the
other hand, does entail the counterfactual "If this were
sugar, it would dissolve in liquid," and, as such, is
thought to be an instance of a natural law. It is
sufficient, that is, to bring it about that something will
dissolve in liquid if it is so naturally disposed; and sugar
is one of those of things with a disposition to dissolve.3
This distinction between accidentally true
generalizations and those that are counterfactual-supporting
is one that can help to distinguish those descriptions of
events that have a role in the explanations involving those
events, and those that do not. Some descriptions of events
will generate laws by way of supporting counterfactuals and
will thus be pertinent to explanations; and some will not,
although many of those that are not can be used, of course,
to identify events which are causes.
Now it is important to point out that it is possible
to reject the causal criterion of scientific explanation
(see Salmon et al., 1992).

One might even reject the idea

that laws of any kind are needed in order to get to
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mechanisms, and so to explain how things work (Schiffer
1991). Davidson, of course, is famous for claiming that
psychological explanation can't be got at by the positing of
laws (1980). The issue of competing models of explanation is
one that will get some attention below, as it bears on the
question of whether an externalist criterion of content
individuation is compatible with the causal relevance of
content.4
To return to the issue of primary concern: we have
seen that a causal statement will contain singular terms
referring to the causes and to the effects. The question is:
do the descriptions occuring in those statements have an
explanatory role or not? Let us see how this question
applies to the case of mental events, their causes and
effects, and psychological explanation.

3. Mental causation
Presupposing that mental events can be causes, we can
ask the question: what does this amount to? A believer in
mental causation would presumably take it that there are
true singular causal statements referring to mental events:

(3) Pain caused her teeth to clench.
(4) Her thinking it was lunch time, and her desiring lunch,
caused her to ring for the parlourmaid.
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The question now is whether mental descriptions
('pain,'

'thinking,'

'desiring,') are explanatory or merely

accidental. That is, is it in virtue of having mental
properties that these events have the effects they do have?
The question is particularly pressing since mental
events are thought to have a physical realization, so it is
certainly not at all obvious that it will be the mental
descriptions that have an explanatory role. Yablo (1992,
248-249) expresses the worry:
. . . the mystery is how mental events,
desires for example, can be making a
causal difference when their
unsupplemented neurophysiological
underpinnings are already sufficient to
the task at hand . . . mental events
are effective, maybe, but not by way of
their mental properties; any causal role
that the latter might have hoped to play
is occupied already by their physical
rivals.
Of course, just because a mental event is described
physically doesn't mean that the physical description will
be ipso facto explanatorily pertinent: surely there can be
many physical properties of an object or event that simply
reveal nothing about the causal mechanisms at work. The
point here is only that there are at least two descriptions
of a mental event that can operate at any given time, so
there is no logical reason to suppose that the mental
description will be the one that will pick out the
explanatory properties.
As we saw in the general case, causal relations are
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referentially transparent. Causes can be picked out without
its being specified which of their characteristics have an
explanatory role; that is, a cause can be referred to
without its being specified what it is about it that brings
about its effect. Making a causal statement does not entail
making an explanatory one. So, for instance, even if you
denied epiphenomenalism for mental events, it wouldn't
follow from that that descriptions of mental events tell you
what you need to know to explain their effects. Is there any
real reason not to abandon mental talk in explanatory
contexts?

4. Belief-Desire Psychology
Given the above quite familiar points one obvious
option is simply to deny that mental descriptions are
causally explanatory. This of course may or may not go along
with the further option of denying that mental states are
causal engines in the first place.5 The problem with these
options, however, is that they appear to fly in the face of
a commonsense theory about psychological explanation.
Human behavior, as well as that of some animals, is
commonly and plausibly thought to be the outcome of a
certain amount of mental perturbation. When we want to know
why A kissed B, it helps to be told that A believed B was
her lover, and that A desired to show her lover some
affection. When we want to know why the cat is yowling, it
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helps to be told that he wants food. Behavior, that is,
seems at least partly produced by mental states with
content; and the content of those states appears to tell you
much of what you need to know to explain behavior. So a
discipline whose aim is to categorize, characterize and
explain behavior seems to need to include mental states in
its roster.6 Psychology plausibly proceeds by way of
propositional attitudes.
Strong words have been uttered concerning the
feasibility of abandoning talk of content in psychology
(Fodor 1987, p.xii):
. . . if commonsense intentional
psychology really were to collapse, that
would be beyond comparison the greatest
intellectual catastrophe in the history
of our species; if we're wrong about the
mind, then that's the wrongest we've
ever been about anything . . . We'll be
in deep, deep trouble if we have to give
it up.
Of course, Fodor concedes that folk psychology bears
something of a mere family resemblance to the "rigorous and
explicit intentional psychology that is our scientific goal"
(1987, p.xii). No matter. In the end, it is intentional
psychology that is our scientific goal. In fact, what it is
that a properly scientific psychology should be is an issue
that emerges as more problematic than Fodor makes it appear,
inasmuch as the problem of content's explanatory role begins
to look somewhat stubborn, inviting creative solutions.
will consider the issue of what should count as proper
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We

psychology below. For the moment, we can launch the
investigation into the status of content's explanatory role
as follows: content-citing mental descriptions seem, for the
most part, to be successful tools for predicting and
explaining behavior. And while it is the case
presupposing a causal criterion of explanation - that it is
possible to merely assert that mental descriptions have no
explanatory utility, in fact there is a theory of content
that has the unfortunate consequence of making it difficult
to see how it is that content can play an explanatory role.

5. The Case of Factives: An Analogy
A useful analogy, both with respect to the issue of
the explanatory relevance of mental descriptions in itself,
and with respect to the complications engendered by
externalism and psychological explanation, is the case of
factive expressions: descriptions of mental states that
imply that certain facts obtain:

'knowing that p , '

'remembering that p ,' 'regretting that p , ' 'realizing that
p , ' and 'perceiving that p , ' for example.
Consider whether

(5) A went to Fairway to buy arugula because he knows that
Fairway sells arugula
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cites an explanatorily relevant characteristic of the mental
state involved in A's going to Fairway to buy arugula.

(5)

seems reasonable, on the face of it, as an explanation. But
there is an objection, which goes as follows. The
explanation offered, which cites A's knowing that Fairway is
a place to get arugula, is misleading. Suppose A only thinks
he knows that Fairway is a place to get arugula; suppose
Fairway is a dressmakers instead. The fact that A is

not,

after all, in a state of knowledge turns out to be neither
here nor there with respect to his Fairway-directed
movements - what really matters is what A believes with
respect to Fairway. From the fact that his belief is

false

it doesn't follow that he doesn't possess it, and it

is the

property of possessing that belief about Fairway - though
false - that is causally implicated in his doings, and that
it would be explanatorily useful to cite.
The point holds for cases, say, of remembering and
even seeing. Both of these imply facts about the world which
are out of the range of the subject's psychology, which,
intuitively, is located inside his head. But it isn't what a
subject actually remembers that plays a part his psychology:
it's what he thinks he remembers. And it isn't what a
subject sees that play a role in his psychology, but what it
seems to him that he sees.7
What a subject knows, sees or remembers can be
expressed in mental descriptions that imply something quite
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external to the subject: the state of the world.
Intuitively, it seems difficult to see how the state of the
world outside the subject could make any difference to the
subject's psychology. And so the correct thing to say about
such cases would appear to be this: of course you can use
factive descriptions of mental states to make causal
statements about the doings of a subject, but, in so doing,
you would not necessarily be citing the characteristics of
his mental states that play a causally explanatory role. And
if, say, you wanted to specify the taxonomic principles by
which your science of human agency proceeded to make its
distinctions, factive descriptions of mental events would be
ruled out, for these do not necessarily pick out the
explanatory factors that are operative in the doings of a
psychological subject.

6.

Externalism and the role of content
in explanation

This brings us at last to the consequences of
externalism for psychological explanation. In fact, the
basic intuitive problem has been anticipated - as intended by the analogy with factive expressions. A theory of content
that claims that some or all attitude attributions use
content clauses which imply something independent of the
subject's psychology - the environment, both particular and
abstract, that surrounds her - will similarly have to face
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the possibility that such content clauses fail to have a
genuinely explanatory role.
That there are consequences for the role of content in
explanation given externalism is, on the face of it, a
familiar issue, concerning which there is a vast literature.
It is necessary, however, to revise some of the details
associated with the orthodox view. Most in need of
rethinking is the tacit belief that the explanatory role
problem for content is its failure to supervene; that
content becomes problematic in propositional
attitude psychology because it fails to supervene; so,
complementarily, if content does not fail to supervene there
is no problem. Of course, given the rather widespread
tendency to take Twin Earth cases as definitive (even
necessary) for an understanding and formulation of an
externalistic view, this conception of the problem of
content's explanatory role is not surprising. But there is
reason to think it is inaccurate.
The distinction between weak and strong externalism,
defended in chapter 1, raises a question as to just what is
to be understood by the consequences of externalism for the
role of content in psychological explanation. We must
understand this issue now as dividing into separate but
related questions: What are strong externalism's
consequences for explanation? Are there consequences for
psychological explanation given weak externalism as well as
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strong externalism? And what, if any, are the logical
connections between these problems?

7.

Non-supervenience, extrinsicness,
and redundancy

We can begin by briefly considering the familiar
consequences of strong externalism for content-based
psychology. Two presuppositions - these are not completely
uncontroversial in themselves - are relevant to this issue.
One, as we have already noted, is the causal character of
explanation. The other is that mental states have
representational or semantic properties as well as intrinsic
ones. The question arises: which features of propositional
content have a genuinely explanatory role?

The explanatory

claims of a content-based psychology, of course, advert
essentially to the semantic features of content, taking more
or less the form:

(6) C did a because she believed that p and desired that g.

But is it the semantic features of content that have
an explanatory role? The problem, briefly, is as follows. On
one criterion, psychological explanation, like all
scientific explanation, is causal explanation. The features
of a cause that lead to an effect must be located where the
causal interaction takes place, on pain of making a mystery
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of the causal process: invoking action at a distance and
other occult phenomena. Mental causal interaction must thus
be understood to take place in the head, as it is most
likely to suppose that the relevant machinery to effect
causal processes is going to be located there. But this of
course sits uneasily with the contention that content fails
to supervene on what's in the head. The tension is clear:
the causal powers of content must be in the head, but
content itself is not; a puzzling result.
As we noted above, it is a familiar story that strong
externalism has untoward consequences for content in
explanation. What may be less familiar, however, is the
claim - to be defended here - that externalism in its most
general formulation has problematic consequences for
content's explanatory role; that is, an explanatory role
problem arises for content whether or not content supervenes
on inner states. What we are after, ultimately, is a way to
formulate the problem of content's explanatory role so that
it is clear that any concept for which externalistic
determination conditions hold will fall afoul of it.8
It is worth showing how the orthodox formulation of
the problem of content's explanatory role can be absorbed
into a more general one. Some kinds of content, as we know,
just imply that a person is on TE. And this, of course,
implies something about the person's environment, the world
they're in, the facts that obtain. Content doesn't supervene
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on the inner states that do the real explanatory work, so
content doesn't do any real explanatory work.
One quite popular way of understanding this is to say:
wide content varies in this way, and given that its
variation doesn't seem to make any difference to the doings
of the subject, then wide content has no explanatory role.
What does have an explanatory role is narrow content. That
is, given that twins could do the same thing whether or not
they both believe that p, both me and my twin could yelp and
run away at the sight of what we both call "water," since
the respective substances referred to by that word in our
environments scare us. So there must be something that is in
common between us that explains why we do the same thing.
And it isn't our belief that p, when it is taxonomized
widely; she doesn't believe that H20 is scary (and I don't
believe that XYZ is scary). What we do share is a narrowly
taxonomized belief that p; and it is this that has the
explanatory role.
Logically speaking, of course, this is exactly the
same as the claim that knowing that p is not what explains
someone's doings; rather, what really explains someone's
doings is, say, narrow knowledge, stipulated to mean
believing that p. Of course in this case it is somewhat
easier to

see that there is something in common between

someone who believes truly that p and someone who believes
falsely that p: they both believe that p. The fact that one
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belief is true and the other false is a - dispensable - wide
fact about them. Nevertheless, it is thought that some such
distinction can be made for belief content itself.9
Now the arguments in chapter 1 put forward the case
that only natural kind and indexical content fails to
supervene. This of course suggests that two kinds of content
- no more - fail to sustain a viable role in the explanatory
claims of propositional attitude psychology (which,
coincidentally, suggests that narrow content is a limited,
even if successful, solution to the problem).10 Can we
thus dismiss the problem of content's failure to supervene
as too limited to be of any real worry? Or is there a wider
aspect to the problem lurking beneath the surface?
Let us scrutinize a canonical failure of supervenience
problem to see whether there is more to this sort of example
than meets the eye. My twin is molecule-for-molecule
identical to me, but when she believes that her colleague is
a humorless prig, her mental state is not the same as mine,
since we are not in the belief-relation to the same items.
So there is no content-involving psychological
generalization that covers our (by hypothesis similar)
behavior. My twin does not roll her eyes because she
believes my colleague is a humorless prig.
On reflection, it seems clear that there is an obvious
question as to what is the truly relevant factor that drives
the standard type of non-supervenience problem. Content
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fails to supervene because, given externalist taxonomic
criteria, it is individuated in virtue of head-independent
entities. But isn't it the case that this fact alone is
sufficient to generate an explanatory role problem?11 The
essence of the non-supervenience problem really appears to
devolve on the reason why content fails to supervene in some
cases. And the answer is clear: externalistically determined
content is extrinsic to the boundaries of the causal
machinery of the subjects of mental states, making it
difficult to see how it could play an explanatory role. The
failure of supervenience problem, when we think it through,
more accurately emerges as an instance of the widespread
problem that arises whenever the individuation conditions of
any concept are held to necessarily involve entities
extrinsic to inner states, the states most plausibly thought
to bear the causal burden in explanations of behavior.
These remarks suggest a very natural preliminary way
to describe the explanatory role problem that arises for
content from an externalist perspective: descriptions of
mental states, on this view, are extrinsic - they refer to
entities outside the boundaries of what can intuitively be
claimed to play a role in the internal causal works

- the

psychology - of a subject.12 Commonsense thinking about
what matters to a subject's psychology centers on, among
other things, what appears to her to be the case; how things
look, what she believes. And if something extrinsic to or
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independent of these states can vary without resulting in a
variation in these states, then, intuitively, that something
will not play an explanatory role with respect to the
subject's psychology.
A few remarks on the notion of extrinsicness might be
useful, although it must be said that beyond the obvious, it
is not an easy notion to define. It can be understood by way
of the distinction between internal and external relations,
a topic that has enjoyed at least one period of
philosophical vogue (see Moore 1922, and

Ryle 1935, among

others). It won't do to become too embroiled in this topic,
however, as it raises deeply controversial metaphysical
issues like essentialism, accidental properties, and the
like, which it is preferable to avoid here.13
Typically, extrinsicness is understood as a spatial
relation: two things are extrinsic to one another if they do
not enter into each other's natures, are not part of one
another. With respect to the issue of content in
psychological explanation, however, it is best not to take
the usual spatial understanding of this notion too
literally. We

can stipulate that an object a is extrinsic to

a system Jb if

a is not part ofthe causal powers of b -

a's

causal powers

aren't a part of those of b, say. So if b

is a

person and a is a denotatum

of b ’s terms, then, since a

is

out there in the head-independent environment, its causal
powers aren't part of the causal powers of b. But if a is
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not part of the causal powers of b, then there seems to be a
prima facie problem as to how it can be the case that being
in relation to a is explanatory with respect to the doings
of Jb.14 A question will arise - to be treated below - as
to how best to understand the extrinsicness of the denotata
of predicate expressions.
We have alluded, above and in chapter 1, to the
prominent position occupied by the orthodox understanding of
the failure of supervenience problem. But, as we have seen,
the non-supervenience problem apparently affects only two
kinds of contentful states. And as long as the problem of
content in explanation is thought to be the problem of
content's failure to supervene, we must conclude that the
problem of content in explanation is a very limited problem.
But of course we have reason to suppose that there is
more to the problem of content in explanation from an
1

externalist perspective than the problem of content's
failure to supervene, since we now have reason to suppose
there is more to externalism than the failure of content to
supervene. As we have seen, what really lies behind the
failure of supervenience problem is content's extrinsicness.
Extrinsicness is a ubiquitous feature of all content
individuated according to externalist criteria, whether
strongly or weakly external. And if we pause here to ask the
question what conceivably could be the operative idea behind
the usual formulation of 'content's explanatory role
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problem,' what we see, after a moment's thought, is that the
only thing that could mean is that referring to content in
explanation is irrelevant; content has no explanatorily
relevant role to play in causal explanations of behavior.
We are now in a position to formulate a completely
general explanatory role problem for content. If content is
extrinsic - as externalism weak and strong demands - then it
will be redundant in psychological explanation. Consider the
following: suppose someone insisted, in her explanations of
a companion's behavior, on referring to his (justified true)
belief-states by using the expression 'knowledge.' What
would we make of this? It is, of course, possible to refer
to someone's beliefs using the term 'knowledge' or to refer
to someone's mental states by using contents that bring in
the environment, but those modes of expression are
irrelevant in the sense of being redundant. If they were
omitted, clearly nothing by way. of explanatory force would
be lost. And since, in psychology, what we are interested in
is explanation, it appears safe to conclude that they can be
omitted, since they appear to have no explanatory function.
A number of examples can be culled from the literature
to illustrate what is known as the redundancy problem
(hereafter TRP; see McCulloch 1988; Noonan 1991; Peacocke
1981; Segal 1989).15 Most of these remarks focus on the
redundancy of singular thought content, but the basic point
has been extended to general thought (McGinn 1989) .
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The best way to understand TRP is in terms of
counterfactuals. As we noted in chapter 1, externalism in
its most general formulation is best understood as a thesis
concerning the possession conditions of mental states. The
existence of extra-cranial objects and properties - the
reference of the expressions in a psychological subject's
language - is a necessary condition on the possession of
those of her mental states involving those objects and
properties. Should the relevant object or property fail to
exist, no contentful state can be attributed.
But now consider the not implausible case where two
people (or one person at different times) should perform the
same behavior, and yet only one of them instantiate the
relevant propositional attitude property. McCulloch gives an
example16 (1988, 84-85):
Faith, Hope and Charity are as similar
as you please but for some important
details. They are physically very
similar, are embedded in very similar
environments, have very similar
histories, and each seems to herself to
be confronted by a dangerous cat. Each
seems to think to herself a thought she
would express thus: 'I'm going to kick
that cat.' Each conseguently lashes out.
But here are the important differences.
Faith and Hope confront distinct cats
(Mildred and Consuela respectively), and
Charity confronts no cat, but is
hallucinating. Now some philosophers
espouse the doctrine of Russellian
thoughts (RT-doctrine), the doctrine
that a thought standardly expressible by
e.g. 'I'm going to kick that cat'
essentally concerns the cat (if there is
one) to which 'that cat' would refer.
And they mean this to imply (a) that
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Faith and Hope think different thoughts
(since they think about different cats),
and (b) that Charity thinks nothing of
the corresponding type (since she
confronts no cat) . . . the RT-doctrine
is part of a claim that Intentional
psychology as we normally conceive it is
externalist, in the sense that seeings,
believings and many other states of mind
are taken in a relational or
environment-involving way, as seeings or
believings about this or that
environmental item . . . Some reject the
RT-doctrine. With respect to the above
case, their essential reason would be
that our subjects are so similar:
subjectively, things seem the same to
each of them; objectively, they each
lash out in the same manner because of
how things seem. So (the thought
continues) the lashings ought to succumb
to parallel psychological explanations.
Yet the Russellian thought theorists
seem to rule this out. According to
them, there are psychological
asymmetries among our subjects, and so
if the actions are explained in the
usual way by the ascription, . . . of
thoughts entertained, the explanations
will not be parallel.
The idea is this: the same behavior can, intuitively,
ensue irrespective of the existence of an object or
property, so citing an object-or-property-involving thought
in accounting for the behavior is bound to be explanatorily
irrelevant. It can't be that what explains Charity's
behavior is her belief that that is a cat, since she
possesses no such belief. Citing a cat-related belief in an
attempt to explain the three women's behavior will be beside
the point (two of them don't have the same thought because
it's not about the same cat, and the other just doesn't have
a comparable thought at all - though, by hypothesis, she
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thinks she does), a violation of Ockham's maxim.17 Content
in explanation is therefore causally redundant.
Another example, from Noonan, makes this explicit
(1991, 3-4):
Suppose I kick a cat, and suppose my
action is intentional under a
description in which occurs a term
denoting that cat . . . Imagine now a
second situation in which, from my point
of view, everything is the same, but in
which, in fact, I am hallucinating a
cat. Since this is so I presumably lash
out at the cat I believe to be within
kicking distance in exactly the same way
as in the first situation. The
difficulty for the opponent of (the
Redundancy Thesis] is now to explain why
I do so . . . [In the first situation]
some of the object-dependent
psychological states I was in, reference
to which was essential to the
explanation of my action there, are not
present at all in the second,
hallucinatory, situation. Moreover, my
hallucination in the second situation
does not make it possible to me to think
anything I was not able to think in the
first, veridical situation . . . if the
contentful psychological states
available to me in the hallucinatory
situation suffice to explain my action
there, no reference to psychological
states with distinct contents will be
required to explain my action in the
veridical situation . . . no reference
to any object-dependent content, not
available in the hallucinatory
situation, will be required to explain
my action in the veridical situation,
non-relationally described . . . For if
the subset of contentful psychological
states common to deluded HN and non
deluded HN suffices to explain the
former's action, it must suffice to
explain the latter's action, also, since
the actions are identical - each, that
is, makes the same bodily movement.
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These examples ought to suffice to get the intuitive
problem across.18 Now, the arguments in chapter 1 defended
the role of part of the abstract environment, as well as the
more immediate environment, in the determination of content.
Properties, we saw there, are head-independent. And if being
in a content-bearing mental state involves being in a
relation to, among other things, a property, one is thereby
and likewise in a relation to something quite extrinsic to
the causal entities relevant both to effecting the
transition from thought to action, and explanatorily
pertinent.
Mathematics offers the most obvious preliminary
example. Thoughts with, say, arithmetical content ("I hope
that lifting a 20 pound weight for 3 sets of 12 repetitions
each will tone the bicep”) are expressed in sentences that
contain expressions referring to numbers (number
properties). Entertaining this thought puts one in the
entertainment-relation to number properties, entities (pace
anti-piatonism) that are completely head-independent. Their
extrinsicness puts them well beyond a plausible causal range
with respect to affecting behavior.19
The formulation of the problem with respect to content
that does supervene, however, is most clearly understood in
terms of counterfactuals, as in the case of singular thought
content. Again, the existence-and-identity conditions of
general content are those of the reference of the terms of
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the content-sentence: should these fail to exist, no content
can be attributed. It is nevertheless plausible to suppose
that a person could perform exactly the same behavior in the
case where he does not genuinely possess the thought in
question (but only appears to himself to so possess it20)
as in the case where he does.
A superficial objection can arise regarding this
formulation of the problem; it is not a good objection, but
it is instructive. It may be said that properties, as
abstract objects, are necessary existents; so that the
counterfactual premise regarding their content-determining
and causally explanatory role can never obtain. But this is
confused. In the first place, it is not obvious that
conditionals with impossible antecedents can't be welldefined21: why isn't it perfectly coherent to say that if
property P hadn't existed - even though it necessarily
does - then its non-existence would make no difference to
the behavior person (thinking himself to be) referring to
that property. Although the counterfactual is harder to
interpret for the case of properties, it is clear that the
same basis for the redundancy problem of content applies.
Just to be sure this has penetrated, consider the
parallel case concerning a state of knowledge. Take a limit
case: a belief one can't help knowing (Descartes' cogito,
say). Now surely, even for a case like this one, it is
perfectly in order to raise the question whether knowledge
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is an explanatory concept. Even in cases where a belief
cannot be false, it is nevertheless the case that what is
causally relevant, on the face of it, is the belief, not the
state of knowledge. So a perfectly coherent question can
arise regarding the explanatory role of knowledge, one that
is mirrored in the formulation of the problem of weakly
external content's explanatory role.22
A related point, worth clearing up, concerns the
metaphysics of properties. The claim that properties are
necessary existents is sometimes defended on the ground that
they are abstract objects. This would appear to result from
uncritical dogma regarding the modal status of properties, a
view subjected to criticism in chapter 1. We can add a
counterexample to what we said there, so to put to rest any
further difficulty concerning this point. Consider sets.
Sets are abstract objects but their existence-and-identity
conditions are those of their members; and the set of cats,
it must be conceded, does not exist necessarily.23
Putting the issue of the modal status of properties to
one side, it is now clear that there is more to the problem
of content in explanation that its mere failure to
supervene. Even when content does supervene, externalistic
criteria require that it be individuated with respect to
head-extrinsic entities: properties. Two related problems
thus ensue (both of which also apply to content that fails
to supervene): extrinsic entities are not situated at the
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causal nexus, so to speak, and so are explanatorily inert.
And if we ask what difference the extrinsic, headindependent world makes to behavior, one quite plausible
answer is none. Even when an object or property fails to
exist, one can perfectly well be thought to behave in
exactly the same way, in spite of the fact that one fails to
be genuinely belief-related to an item out there in the
world. To advert to the extrinsic objects of thoughts in
explaining behavior is thus causally redundant.
A few clarificatory remarks are in order, especially
with regard to the idea of a property - an abstract entity being 'outside' or 'extrinsic to' the causal nexus. This
extrinsicness certainly should not be thought of as a
spatial issue. Confusion on this point might lead to the
following objection: since properties are abstract, they
can't be at the causal nexus (they can't be anywhere; the
causal nexus is a specific location in space and time. So,
if not being at the causal nexus were sufficient to rule
something out as being explanatory, then all properties
would be ruled out as explanatory, by reductio.24
This objection arises, as we suggested, by a tooliteral interpretation of 'at (or not at) the causal nexus.'
'Not at the causal nexus' shouldn't be thought to mean 'not
existing at that place'; rather,

'outside the causal nexus'

has to be understood, with respect to properties, as to do
with not being instantiated.

After all, it appears to be a
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minimal necessary condition (although not sufficient) of the
explanatory relevance of a property that the property be
instantiated: no property not instantiated by the table is
going to be relevant to the causal powers of the table (its
1causal nexus1). A property P not instantiated by this table
will be outside its causal nexus, thus, in this sense, and
not in the (really rather puzzling) sense of not 'existing
there.1
Properties can both be instantiated by and be the
objects of mental states (as we have argued); confusing
these two characteristics will interfere with grasp of the
basic picture here. There is a difference between a
property's being a content-constituent and its being
instantiated. The point (the problem) about content in
explanation is that the properties which are (arguably) part
of the content are not instantiated by the person, the
subject of the mental states in question. And it would be an
obviously desperate and unsuccessful move to try to save the
causal relevance of some set of properties by claiming that
although properties are abstract universals which don't
exist at or in the person, nevertheless they are
instantiated by the person. In general, of course, one does
not instantiate every property one can think about. The
property that is instantiated by a subject is the property
of having belief b about a property which, of course, is not
the same property as the property one has the belief about.
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It is the relationality of content that results in
content's explanatory role problem. What we have seen here,
however, is that content is not just a relation to
particulars, but also to properties via the predicateexpressions in content-bearing sentences. The properties
that individuate content interfere with its causal role in
that they themselves are not instantiated by the subject of
the mental state in question. Properties fail a quite
minimal condition on causal relevance - and long before any
questions to do with their suitability for being the kinds
of things that can be causally relevant can be raised.25
Formulating content's explanatory role problem in
terms of redundancy is useful in that it undermines what
appears to be the tacit understanding that there are no
problematic consequences for content unless it fails to
supervene. What we now see is that all concepts to which
externalistic determination conditions apply are extrinsic
to the causal machinery to which the fundamentals of
mechanical engineering - even mental engineering - must
apply.

8.

Non-supervenience, Extrinsicness and Redundancy:
Entailment Relations

It is worthwhile to pause here to spell out the
entailment relations between the problems with which we have
been concerned. First: that content is extrinsic doesn't
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entail that it fails to supervene: you can't run a TE case
for mathematical content (as we saw in chapter 1), but, as
explanations involving mathematical content will advert to
entities quite extrinsic to the head, there remains the
problem of adverting to content that is not situated in the
requisite causal location. It seems plausible to suppose,
however, that when content fails to supervene, it does so
because of its determination in virtue of entities extrinsic
to the head.26
Similarly, it will not strictly speaking follow from
the fact that content is extrinsically determined that it
will be explanatorily redundant. There are models of
explanation, in fact, where being extrinsic to the head is a
positive boon: a functional/teleological criterion of
explanation is one such. The redundancy of content in
explanation will follow, however, on the presupposition that
explanation is meant to be causal. Extrinsic entities particular or abstract - are simply not in the right
location to play the required explanatory role, if what is
relevant to explanation are the causal processes involved.
Finally, content might be redundant in explanation
without it following from that it is externalistically
individuated, of course. That x is redundant in a science,
in a theory, or in an explanation is an extremely general
complaint to make of it. X could be redundant for any number
of reasons: it might be magical, meaningless, unverified,
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platonic, intrinsic. The terms of the inquiry set the limits
of relevance.

9.

The Redundancy Problem: Distinctions

There are connections between the redundancy problem
as we have formulated it and two other issues that can arise
with respect to the problem of content in explanation that
also involve a notion of redundancy. The issues we are about
to consider are by no means equivalent, but they do have
enough points of contact to cause confusion, and to make it
imperative to delineate very carefully between them.

a. Syntactic Properties vs. Semantic Properties in
Explanation.
There is a line of thought, associated with Stich
(1978, 1983) and Field (1978), that urges the repudiation of
semantic properties of content for the purposes of
psychological explanation.27 Stich, for example, writes
(1983, 8-9):
The core of my argument is the claim
that the theorist who seeks to couch the
generalizations of cognitive science in
the content-ascribing language of folk
psychology will be plagued by problems
that can readily be avoided . . . I
shall sketch an alternative paradigm for
cognitive theories which avoids the
problems engendered by appeals to
content . . . The alternative is what I
will call the Syntactic Theory of Mind.
Cognitive theories which cleave to the
STM pattern treat mental states as
relations to purely syntactic mental
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sentence tokens, and they detail the
interactions among mental states in
terms' of the formal or syntactic
properties of these tokens.
According to this view, it is the

syntactic properties

of mental states that are the explanatorily relevant ones,
and Stich, for one, gives arguments are meant to show that
"folk locutions are scientifically otiose" (1983, 9).
Stich's position with respect to content in explanation is,
in effect, indeed one that charges content with irrelevance
given the demands of a properly erected cognitive science.
But,

as we said above, redundancy is an extremely general

notion.What externalism contributes with respect

to

explanation is indeed also the idea that content is
redundant in psychological explanation: the question is why.
The answer will distinguish TRP from a position like that of
Stich.
As we noted above, what lies behind TRP is a
counterfactual idea: given the individuation-conditions on
content imposed by externalism, and the parallel content
possession-conditions that result, it is clear that no
mental state can be ascribed if the object of the mental
state (a particular, in the case of singular thoughts; a
property, in the case of general thoughts) does not exist.
But two subjects (or one subject at different times) can
behave exactly the same way, in spite of the fact that only
one of them can be ascribed a mental state with some content
C. The explanatory generalization we desire will thus have
117

to proceed other than by citing the content of their
thoughts.28 On the other hand, a view that takes the
syntactic properties of mental states to be all that need
figure in properly scientific explanations can obviously be
defended quite independently of anything to do with semantic
externa1ism.29
To see this, consider the familiar Language of Thought
hypothesis.30 Whenever a belief is ascribed, it is
surmised that there is a sentence in Mentalese that
corresponds to the belief, and believing that p is
formulated as a relation to that Mentalese sentence.
Mentalese sentences, being sentences in the language of
thought, are, of course, in the head. There are, of course,
various effects of possessing the belief in question, which
are what are meant to be explained by citing the belief.
Now, note that the Language of Thought hypothesis can
be in principle paired with any number of theses concerning
content and its individuation. But given that, on this view,
to ascribe a belief that p is always to ascribe a
corresponding sentence s of Mentalese, clearly one could
consider explaining another's behavior by citing the
Mentalese sentence; instead of (roughly): 'when C believes
that p she does a , ' rather:

'when C tokens sentence s she

does a .' And it appears reasonable to propose that should it
be the case that the syntactic properties of the mental
state prove to capture all and more of the generalizations
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we require than do the semantic ones, that we jettison the
semantic ones as excess baggage. It is worth pointing out
that this position is more radical than the one that favors
narrow content over broad content in explanation: for, after
all, a notion of narrow content is still a semantic notion.
If sentences in the head have both shape and narrow content,
and their shape properties do succeed in doing the required
explanatory work, it is reasonable to ask what point there
is in speaking of these sentences as having truth-conditions
at all - even when those truth-conditions are narrow
ones. 311
In short, the kind of view that defends the
explanatory role of syntax as being more adequate than that
of content results in the idea that semantic properties are
redundant in explanation, but does so in a completely
different way, and according to quite different criteria,
than does TRP. What Stich calls STM does not, for instance,
make a counterfactual point in claiming that even narrow
states have syntactic properties, so why bother citing the
narrow states when the syntactic properties do the
explanatory job; the point is not that even without narrow
content the syntactic properties of a mental state are still
on the scene. Rather, those that defend the explanatory
superiority of syntax do so on the grounds that there is a
kind of overdetermination problem that results when we
compare the explanatory utility of syntactic and semantic
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properties; one that, as it happens, can be formulated as an
invitation to apply Ockham's razor in favor of syntax.
The notion of overdetermination ushers in another kind
of redundancy claim that must be distinguished from the one
that underlies our formulation of TRP. Though somewhat
controversial, there is a view that the sciences form a
hierarchy, from the 'basic'

(physics) to the 'non-basic'

(sociology or anthropology), roughly speaking. The non-basic
sciences are sometimes regarded as being explanatorily
useless, or redundant. The question is, on the basis of what
is the redundancy of the special sciences thought to obtain?
Should special science redundancy be equivalent to that
which results for externalistically individuated content in
psychological explanation, then the latter is a) a tacit
repetition of familiar points, and so uninteresting; and b)
clearly vulnerable, on that score, to a host of telling
objections to special science redundancy.

b. Redundancy and the special sciences.
What we are concerned to point out here is, in fact,
the disanalogy between the causal redundancy of content
engendered by externalism, and the familiar - though
contested - point that special sciences (psychology, for
instance) are explanatorily redundant. The problem of
content in explanation as we have been formulating it is not
to be confused with the objection to special sciences, and
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one of the ways to make the disanalogy explicit is to focus
on whether the scepticism regarding content's explanatory
role arises within the framework of objections to the
explanatory relevance of special sciences in general, or
whether, as we have been suggesting, the consequences of
externalism for content's explanatory role are specific to
externalism.
The explanatory relation between the special sciences
and basic science is an issue that emerges from the wider
one of reductionism in the sciences. Hempel comments (1969,
179) :
. . . one further reason for the
fascination the subject [of reduction]
has held for philosophers lies, I think,
in the ontological roots of many
questions concerning reduction questions such as these: Are mental
states nothing else but brain states?
Are social phenomena simply compounds of
individual modes of behavior? Are living
organisms no more than complex
physicochemical systems? Are the objects
of our everyday experience nothing else
than swarms of electrons and other
subatomic particles? Or is it the case,
as the doctrine of emergence would have
it, that as we move from subatomic
particles to atoms and molecules, to
macroscopic objects, to living
organisms, to individual human minds,
and to social and cultural phenomena, we
encounter at each stage various novel
phenomena which are irreducible, which
cannot be accounted for in terms of
anything that is to be found on the
preceding levels?
It is sometimes thought that the sciences are arranged
in a hierarchy, according to a certain criterion of property
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instantiation. Not all objects in the world instantiate the
same sorts of properties, so, plausibly, a particular theory
will quantify over properties that another does not. So, for
instance: all physical objects in. the world have physical
properties, but not all of them have chemical properties some don't form molecules. Of those that form molecules, not
all have biochemical properties (not all are living things).
Now take all the things with biochemical properties - do
this set belong to the set of things with biological
properties? Putting aside a detailed consideration of the
question of what counts as a biological property, suppose
you stipulated that a biological property is a functional
property. Then not every piece of biochemical material has a
function, clearly - some of these things could be, for
instance, small freestanding bits of tissue. Finally, not
everything that instantiates biological properties
instantiates psychological properties.
Now consider an account of an object in the vocabulary
of a theory of, say, evolutionary biology. Say that object
is a person. This is an object with psychological
properties, and it is true that all the objects with
psychological properties that we know of have biological
properties, and those that satisfy biological descriptions
satisfy biochemical descriptions . . . and so on down. But
when you are talking about an object from the point of view
of evolutionary biology, and in those terms, it is plausible
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to claim that what you are not doing is talking, say,
biochemistry; you are, presumably, at a higher level of
generality. The controversy surrounds the question whether
it follows that a higher level of generality means an
explanation of little or no utility.
The methodological presumption behind reductionism in
the sciences is that sound scientific generalizations are
found only at the level of physics and possibly chemistry.
Theories of any other kind - and their explanations - are
thought to have to come under the rubric of physics in order
to be sanctioned as making properly scientific
contributions. This absorption is to be effected by certain
principles of theory reduction. Nagel's work (1947, 1961) is
the locus classicus for this notion. Briefly, reduction
applies intertheoretically, and is accomplished by
interpreting the non-logical vocabulary of the target theory
into that of the so-called reducing theory. Combining this
idea with the conditions imposed by the deductivenomological model of explanation results in the further idea
that the explanations of the now-subsumed theory can be
derived from premises in the vocabulary of the reducing
theory.32
An enthusiastic defense of reduction with respect to
folk psychology has been recently given by Churchland (1986,
395-396; 399):
Once folk psychology is held at arm's
length and evaluated for theoretical
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strength in the way that any theory is
evaluated, the more folkishly inept,
soft, and narrow it seems to be . . .
Insofar as it is a theory, it is an
empirical, not an a priori question how
good a theory in fact it is, and its
'obviousness' will not protect it from
revision or replacement if it is flawed
. . . it would be astonishing if folkpsychology, alone among folk theories,
was essentially correct. The mind-brain
is exceedingly complex, and it seems
unlikely that primitive folk would have
lit upon the correct theoretical
framework to explain its nature . . .
Mental states may be functional states,
but this does not imply that the
specification of their functional
profile based in folk psychology is
correct . . . Nor does it imply that
psychology cannot be reduced to
neuroscience. The claims for the
autonomy of psychology are therefore
misbegotten.
This is a rough approximation of the line of thought:
it is, in fact, far from being universally accepted particularly with respect to the elimination of folk
psychology.33 Now there are obviously many questions that
arise concerning the relations between the putative levels
of scientific theories, their laws and their explanations,
and the autonomy of psychology, all of which must be set
aside here. I wish to focus instead on a more fundamental
question: on what basis are the special sciences thought to
be explanatorily redundant? Remember that our main concern
is to distinguish the core of the objection to the
explanatory relevance of the special sciences from that of
the objection to the explanatory relevance of extrinsic
content in psychological explanation. And this is simply
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stated. The special sciences are thought to be explanatorily
irrelevant because, the objection to them goes, you won't
lose any explanatory force by failing to cite them. No
explanatory force is lost because the underlying or
counterpart laws of physics - to which all these other
vocabularies will reduce - capture all the generalities you
need.
Now this is a highly general - if disputable - claim,
and it applies to, say, chemistry, just as much to
psychology. Nothing in this line of argument against the
special sciences depends on the extrinsic individuation of
content. Nobody who objects to the special sciences in terms
of their explanatory utility is concerned even remotely with
the extrinsic individuation of content, I'll wager. The
argument concerning the redundancy of the special sciences
arises quite independent of any issues to do with the
individuation of content: it can arise if you are an
internalist; it can arise if you didn't even believe in
psychology at all (it applies to biology, to chemistry, to
whatever isn’t physics).
It is particularly important to avoid assimilating
content's explanatory role problem (as we have been
considering it) with objections to special sciences, for
this may easily result in the error of supposing that the
objections to content's explanatory role can be overcome by
countering the objections to special science explanations.
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But an example will show that such a move won't work.
Someone who thinks that objections to content in
explanation stem from a failure to properly understand the
explanatory relation of the special sciences to basic
science, might, roughly speaking, make the following point,
alluded to above: there is no reason to suppose that the
move to a higher level of theoretical generality (assuming
it even makes sense to think of the sciences as arranged in
a hierarchy) entails, in some sense, a less effective
explanation. If what we are interested in is, say, whether
it is the fact that Elizabeth believes that Darcy is
ungentleman-like that leads her to refuse him, and what kind
of generalizations can be constructed as a result, then the
laws of, say, gravity - though presumably applicable
won't help. Why can't there be, that is, more than one
explanation of the same thing. Imagine, analogously, the
state of pornographic literature if all we could give were
descriptions and explanations couched wholly in the
vocabulary of basic physics; of course these terms apply but that's not what we want from our dirty magazines.
The multiplicity of explanations point is, arguably,
quite effective in the special vs. basic science debate, but
it is not terribly convincing when it is applied to the
problem of extrinsic content's explanatory role. Consider
the familiar formulation (now, of course, superseded) of the
problem in terms of content's failure to supervene: it does
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not seem very effective to counter the argument with the
claim that there is every reason to suppose that there can
be more than one kind of explanation for the same thing. The
failure of supervenience problem, as we have seen, depends
on certain quite specific issues raised by, in part, the
nature of causation. The explanatory relation between
special science and basic science is quite orthogonal to
this.
Consider, to drive this home, what someone who was
confused on just this sort of point might say in objection
to narrow content. "Jerry," they'd likely sniff, "when you
say that broad content isn't explanatory you're just
forgetting that there are special sciences, and in one/some
of them you've got broad content. The fact that there's
another science that has narrow content and that explains
the same events is neither here nor there. There can be more
than one explanation of the same thing, you know." The right
reply to this, of course, would be to say, "but there's a
special reason why that view - one that in general has
something to recommend it - doesn't apply here: and this
special reason has to do with failures of supervenience. In
those other special sciences the chemical, say, does
supervene on the physical, so there's no violation. But a
whole different problem emerges if broad content doesn't
supervene on the physical.

..."

On reflection, we can make the point that even if
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psychology were basic, one could still raise the question
whether all of its descriptions were causally relevant after all, in physics, I can describe a collision of
particles using a causally irrelevant description. It would
be, nevertheless, a description of elementary particles, but
one with little or no explanatory role. And, ultimately,
even if Cartesian immaterialism were true - even if there
were no supervenience on the physical - one could still at
least raise the question which mental descriptions are the
causally relevant ones. Perhaps some are, perhaps some
aren't, perhaps all are, etc. The answer to the question
would have to proceed along the usual lines; the point is,
the question is not empty, and none of these points have
anything to do with the issue of special science redundancy.
In sum: it is confused to suppose that a hierarchy of
the sciences and the availability of subsequent counterpart
basic level explanations are sufficient reasons to entail an
elimination of mental terminology from explanations, and
further confused to suppose that any and all objections to
mental terminology in explanations are just versions of that
point. Redundancy is a very general concept, and more or
less always means the same thing: what distinguishes TRP as
we are considering it from both syntactic views about the
mind and special science redundancy is what motivates
TRP.34 The motivations have been enumerated above. It now
should be quite clear that TRP cannot be said to presuppose
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any view at all about the status of the special science with
respect to explanation, and, as a result, it should be clear
that TRP cannot be overcome by way of counter-objections to
scepticism about the explanatory relevance of the special
sciences.

10. Resolving the problem of content's explanatory role:
the options
We have clarified and cleared aside a number of points
regarding the formulation of extrinsic content's explanatory
role problem. What concerns us now is to consider the
options for a solution.
Let us recall, once more, the core of the problem.
McGinn comments (1989, 133):
Basically the point could be stated
thus: the reference relation, as between
symbol and object, does not contribute
to the causal powers of the symbol - it
is not what empowers the symbol to bring
about its effects. The causal mechanism
whereby the symbol has an impact on the
world does not somehow incorporate the
relation of reference. The relation of
reference is to the symbol what the
country of origin of a car is to its
engine, i.e. not part of the causal
machinery. Intentionality is not what
makes the world go from one state to the
next. Content is not a mechanistic
feature of the world.
Different authors35 put this in different ways:
mental causes must be supervenient on internal states of the
subject; the only thing with a causal role is the "shape"
of a mental symbol; the characterizations of causal mental
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processes must respect a "formality constraint"; the
cognitive operating system is causally a "syntactic engine";
mental algorithms can be causally sensitive only to local
features of their inputs; truth conditions cannot play any
role in causal-role or functional psychology; it is a sort
of category mistake to attribute causal potential to
meanings; a causal-explanatory taxonomy of mental states
must be narrowly individuated. In spite of the fact that all
of these formulations fail to recognize a truly widespread
problem with respect to content - taking it for granted that
failure of supervenience is a necessary condition for the
problem - nevertheless, all attempt to accommodate what
appears to be an undeniable: mental explanations must cite
local, proximate, intrinsic causes. So the causal powers of
a mental state cannot depend essentially on relations to
entities whose existence is extrinsic to the body. But
externalism says that contentful states are identified by
just those entities. So any science devoted to uncovering
the causal laws and mechanisms of the mind cannot do so by
reference to contentful states; or, at the very least, any
science that purports both to refer to contentful states and
to uncover causal mechanisms will suffer the usual
instability of any mismatched alliance.
So, in some sense, the issue really begins here. What
then are the alternatives for a solution to this problem? We
can preliminarily, and quite abstractly, characterize the
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main contenders as follows:
1. Externalism is not at all inconsistent with
causal relevance.
2. It is indeed inconsistent; what is necessary is
a notion of narrow content.
3. No notion of narrow content can really be
defined, and yet the argument against
wide content is correct, therefore,
eliminativism about content is the only
solution.
4. It is not necessarily the case that explanatory
taxonomy need proceed along
causal lines; there are other, perfectly
respectable sciences that individuate
according to other criteria.36
There is also a view - which has both a radical and a
moderate side - which, although not unfamiliar, seems to
have been somewhat neglected in the most recent debate. I
believe it is interesting enough to resurrect here. This is
the view that belief-desire psychology is not at all a form
of causal theory; rather, it is a radically different kind
of understanding, involving a notion of rationalization.
While it is true that this view and its associated
repercussions has enjoyed some vogue in the past, what is
worth considering now is the intersection between it and the
issues raised by externalism and explanation. What seems to
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be the case is that such a view has the effect of
undercutting the arguments against wide content, as
psychology is thought not to be in the business of giving
causal explanations - certainly something at which it is
worth taking a closer look.
All of these views have different consequences for the
issue as to whether content is something to preserve or
reject in psychological explanation. And the key issue with
respect to which this issue should be understood is that of
the relation between individuation and causation. Wide
content is thought to have to go when the dominant criterion
is that of causation, with its concomitant imposition of
locality, with which individuation is supposed to fall in,
under threat of emasculation. A view that challenges that
criterion, unsurprisingly, will have very different results
for content in explanation.
So let us consider the alternatives for a solution to
the problem of content in explanation according to how they
view the individuation/causation connection.

a. The consistency of explanatory relevance and externalism.
We can begin with the the claim that externalism poses
no problem for the explanatory relevance of content. This is
a view associated with McDowell (1980;1984;1986), Evans
(1982), and Peacocke (1981, inter alia). The most effective
attack comes from, among others, Fodor (1988); McGinn
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(1991); Noonan (1986); and Segal (1989).
The view takes it that individuation - at least of
singular content - is relational, and no explanation of an
action directed onto a particular object can proceed other
than by citing such content. So not only is wide content
explanatorily relevant, it is downright indispensable in
explanations of certain kinds of behavior. Peacocke, for
instance, claims,

(1981, 205):

. . . No set of attitudes gives a
satisfactory psychological explanation
of a person's acting on a given object
unless the content of those attitudes
includes a demonstrative mode of
presentation of that object.
This view is, of course, illustrated by way of
demonstrative content - content subject, as we have seen, to
strongly external individuation. In spite of the usual
difficulties attendant on the suitability of wide content in
explanation, Peacocke sees no problem, in accounting for the
explanatory relevance of such content (1981, 198-199):
. . . the obvious reply is that in the
case of your belief that pen is
valuable, your belief and the
corresponding belief of your
Doppleganger are not psychologically
indistinguishable, because your belief
causes you to act on the pen in front of
your and his belief causes him to act on
the pen in front of him. These are
distinct pens.
That is: different objects of thought, so different
causal powers of thoughts; different causal powers, so
different thoughts. Wide content has an indispensable
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explanatory role, at least with respect to actions directed
onto particular demonstrative objects. Having a 'pen'
thought has different causal powers than having a 'twinpen'
thought; in fact, according to this argument, a 'pen'
thought is a different causal power than a 'twinpen'
thought. These are distinct pens.
Both Fodor and McGinn make the point that this is just
confused. Fodor (1988, 34-35):
. . . so, to summarize, if you're
interested in causal explanation, it
would be mad to distinguish between
Oscar's brain states and 0scar2's; their
mental states have identical causal
powers . . . it's true that I say
'water' I get water and when my Twin
says 'water' he gets XYZ. But that's
irrelevant to the question about
identity of causal powers . . . what is
relevant to the question of identity of
causal powers is the following pair of
counterfactuals: (a) If his utterance
(/thought) had occurred in my context,
it would have had the effects that my
utterance (/thought) did have; and (b)
if my utterance(/thought) had occurred
in his context, it would have had the
effects that his utterance (/thought)
did have.
McGinn concurs (1991, 585):
The obvious fact that behaviour admits
of relational description in terms of
environmental entities has, we know,
been triumphantly seized upon by
opponents of the kind of causal thesis
defended here: these opponents think it
shows that there must be a difference
between the causal powers of my beliefs
and my twin's - after all, I reach for a
drink of water (H20) and he reaches for
retaw (XYZ)! Fodor (1991) definitively
puts this 'argument' out of its misery
(if it has not already expired of
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natural causes). You might as well say
that my knife and its molecular double
have different causal powers because
they each cut numerically different
loaves of bread - or do it at different
times and places I
Now what about cases where subjects are deluded in
their, say, demonstrative perceptions? We have already seen
that such subjects can perfectly well be thought to behave
in exactly the same way as their non-deluded counterparts but no thought content can be brought to bear in an
explanation of such behavior - since there is no such
content possessed. In fact, as Segal (1989, 43) points out,
this kind of view (the Russellian or singular thought
theory) can't make sense of "actions of subjects of empty
singular thoughts . . . without undermining itself." In
fact, what he does is press the redundancy objection the
same way that Noonan (1991), does above. Segal concludes
(p.45):
[singular thought theory] faces an
unpleasant dilemma: either objectdependent thoughts . . . are always
explanatorily redundant, or sometimes
the actions of subjects who act on the
basis of what they take to be singular
thoughts are not rationally explicable.
But neither of these options is
acceptable. If we can explain all of a
given subject's actions under
intentional descriptions without
attributing object-dependent thoughts,
then surely we have no basis at all for
making such attributions.
In sum, according to this kind of view, both
relational individuation and explanatory relevance can apply
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to content - but only because, as we have seen, the notion
of causal power or causal role has not been properly
understood. However misunderstood, there is a general effort
on the part of this kind of view to make causation the
criterion of individuation: the mistake is to characterize
that criterion, in our terms, extrinsically.

b . Syntax
Earlier (section 8, (a)), we considered the view that
folk psychological categories - beliefs, desires and the
like - have been superseded, and that, on pain of
irrelevance, they ought to be excised from any science of
the mind. Here we will limit ourselves to a few comments.
First: how does the syntacticalist interpret the
individuation/causation relation? Such a view that takes
the goal of specifying the causal mechanisms underlying
behavior to be the only one that a properly scientific
enterprise ought to be concerned with. Stich notes (1978,
575-576, emphasis his):
. . . the principle of psychological
autonomy states that the properties and
relations to be invoked in an
explanatory psychological theory must be
supervenient upon the current, internal,
physical properties and relations of
organisms (i.e. just those properties
that an organism shares with all of its
replicas) . . . in specifying that only
internal properties and relations are
relevant to explanatory psychological
properties, the autonomy principle
decrees that relations between an
organism and its external environment
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are irrelevant to the organism's current
(explanatory) psychological state.
Representational or semantic properties of content, of
course,

(sometimes) do not supervene, so cannot bear the

required mechanismic role. Stich is explicit in his
understanding of what the individuation/causation relation
means for belief/desire explanation (1978, 578) :
I will argue that if the autonomy
principle is accepted then there are
large numbers of belief properties that
cannot play a role in an explanatory
psychological theory . . . I think the
belief/desire thesis can be profitably
viewed as the speculation that these
intuitively sanctioned singular causal
statements can be cashed out in a
serious psychological theory couched in
terms of beliefs and desires. In showing
that large numbers of these singular
causal statements cannot be cashed out
in this way, we make the speculation
appear idle and unmotivated.37
What can bear the required causal role are cognitive
states (1983, 149):
whose interaction is (in part)
responsible for behavior . . .
systematically mapped to abstract
syntactic objects in such a way that
causal interactions among cognitive
states, as well as causal links with
stimuli and behavioral events, can be
described in terms of the syntactic
properties and relations of the abstract
objects to which the cognitive states
are mapped . . . the idea is that causal
relations among cognitive states mirror
formal relations among syntactic
objects.
Differently expressed but essentially consistent is
what Field (1981, 100-101) proposes: a system of internal
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representation, or a narrow psychology:
. . . the syntax and type-identity
conditions for a system of internal
representation should be regarded as
functionally characterized by a
psychological theory in which they
appear; and we can take that theory to
be narrow psychology, that is, the kind
of psychology that does not employ any
semantic characterizations of the
sentences in a system of representation.
This is important, for it means that the
syntax and conditions of type-identity
for the system of representation could
in principle be determined independently
of any considerations about what the
sentences in the system mean.
This sort of view is explicit about the
individuation/causation question. Causal considerations act
as the primary constraint on individuation on this view,
since they act as the primary constraint on any properly
scientific enterprise. And semantic properties - since they
fail to supervene - are not such as to be caught in the
causal net.38

c. Narrow Content
The notion of narrow content, first proposed by Fodor
(1988) as a solution to the problem of content in
explanation, is excessively familiar; and as in our remarks
above we have in effect provided some essential evaluative
points, we can here be brief.39
How does Fodor interpret the individuation/causation
connection? He notes (1988, 30-32):
. . . scientific psychological
138

explanation, like commonsense
belief/desire explanation, is committed
to states to which semantic and causal
properties are simultaneously ascribable
. . . and I think it's quite easy to see
how the required principles of
individuation should be formulated . . .
individuation in science is always
individualistic. Common sense postulates
a relational taxonomy for the attitudes,
psychology postulates states that have
content but are individualistic, so the
question arises what notion of content
survives this shift in criteria of
individuation.
The scientific theory that vindicates belief-desire
psychology is the computational conception of mental
processes. The mind is conceived of as a symbol manipulating
system, and mental symbols have both semantic and causal
properties, which Fodor believes is the only way even to
formulate an - or the - important question about the mind,
namely, how it is that its causal processes make sense. But
wide content falls afoul of a constraint on scientific
theories: these, according to Fodor, are in the business of
giving causal explanations ("of course," p. 34), and wide
content cannot have a causal role because it doesn't
supervene on the proximate bearers of the causal properties
presumably involved in the production of behavior internal, often physical, states. Enter narrow content: a
notion of content that "survives the shift in criteria"
since it cannot be sundered from its causal powers.
Fodor is thus crystal clear about the
individuation/causation question: these stand or fall
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together, and, on pain of postulating causal mechanisms the
likes of which the world has never seen, they stand united
internally to the subject organism.
The notion of narrow content has come in for its share
of criticism,40 and as my intention here is to consider
the alternatives for a solution to the problem of content in
explanation from a particular perspective, rather than to
adjudicate these options, I will have little to add.
A few critical comments will, however, provide a
natural segue to the next stage of these remarks. Recall
that the interesting question insofar as these options are
concerned is a common thread that runs through all but one
of them: that is, how the relation between individuation and
causation is to be characterized. As we shall shortly see,
there are yet other options that reject the connection in
question, with what success we shall see.
Confidence in narrow content as a solution to the
explanatory role problem is eroded, as I suggested above, by
the fact that it is only useful - if at all - in two cases:
with respect to natural kind and indexical content, the only
two kinds of content that fail to supervene. In cases where
content does supervene, as we have seen, the extrinsicness
of content generates the redundancy problem, a problem I
have argued really subsumes the failure of supervenience
problem, and for which narrow content fails to provide a
relevant - even coherent - solution.
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The problem for content in explanation, once again,
arises when classification criteria for content don't
coincide with what has to be the case about causality and
causal powers. And whenever content is extrinsically
classified, this problem will arise - the point is, content
can be so classified, and yet supervene. The mistake is to
think that the only time content gets pulled apart from its
causal powers is when it fails to supervene. Isn't it just
grotesque to apply the notion of narrow content to cases
where content did not fail to supervene (even if it weren't
the case that it is defined in terms of non-supervenience)?
Consider, again, formal or mathematical concepts; we argued
in chapter 1 that it was just not possible to coherently
consider these cases where the internal and external
properties could be independently varied, what needs to be
the case to get the failure of supervenience off the ground.
Let the sceptic imagine trying to propose a notion of narrow
number, or narrow truth-function, to provide explanatory
generalizations in cases where, say, my twin means something
different from me when she says "not," but what she means
seems the same to her as it does to me.
Further, should someone confuse the wide/narrow
categories with the distinction between weak and strong
externalism, one will embroil himself in no end of further
confusion. Among other things, the status of the problem of
content's explanatory role may appear more accounted for
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than we have reason to suppose it is. Weakly external
content is not equivalent to wide content: wide content is
what varies in twin earth cases; what fails to supervene.
And, as we spelled out in chapter 1, though it is the case
that

if it's wide it's

weak,so

tospeak, it is notthecase

that

if it's weak it's

wide.We

might - if we could besure

not to risk total referential chaos - stipulate a notion of
wide* content: wide* content is to be understood in the
sense of broad, global, extensive, sweeping - comprising, as
we have argued, the particular and the abstract environment.
When, however, wide content means what it is usually thought
to mean, we would do well to remember that narrow content at best
A

- leaves much left over to be explained.
final pedantic

note.Fodor(1988, 27) says:

I am about to tell you two stories that
you've very probably heard before.
Having once told you the stories, I will
then spend most of this chapter trying
to puzzle out what, if anything, they
have to do either with commonsense
belief/desire explanation . . . The
conclusion will be: not much . . .
Indeed, contrary to the conclusion that
I am driving toward, it is widely held
that one or both stories have morals
that tend to undermine the notion of
content and thereby raise problems for
propositional-attitude-based theories of
mind.
The two stories are, of course, the Putnam/Burge twin
earth cases, which, as we have seen, Fodor mistakenly takes
to apply to all content. Be that as it may: another question
arises. Contrary to Fodor's claim, it does seem as if
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externalism

genuinely raises a problem for propositional-

attitude-based theories of mind - even if, like Fodor, you
take externalism to be defined in terms of twin
earth/failure of supervenience cases. Isn't the dialectical
progression in Fodor's argument just that since the ordinary
kind of content at work in ordinary commonsense psychology
is too wide to accommodate the causal constraints on any
scientific explanation, that we need this other - narrow aspect of content? The point is that the

ordinary

commonsense content at work in folk psychology i s n 't narrow
content. Fodor's claim that folk psychology can be saved
from elimination by narrow content seems somewhat
optimistic.
In any event, it may be that the very thing that Fodor
takes as unarguable - namely, the causal nature of
scientific explanation - is a constraint that ought to be
relaxed in order to account for content's explanatory role.
Clearly, as we have seen, all of the accounts that consider
the criterion of individuation to be that of causation are
faced with the problem of accommodating content's
extrinsicness in a causal apparatus. It is unclear that any
are terribly successful at resolving the problem. Let us
consider two other accounts that distinguish individuation
from causation and see whether they fare any better.41

d. Non-causal criteria of individuation
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When Fodor sets his agenda for the issue of content in
explanation, he - as we saw above - meets with incredulity
the idea that scientific explanatory taxonomy could be
anything but causal. Some views regarding the problem of
content in explanation, however, are attempts to recalibrate
the individuation/causation relation in just the way that
Fodor finds unthinkable. It seems fair to say that the view
associated with Burge (1986) tries to make causal locality
compatible with distal individuation, a somewhat more
radical claim than views associated with Millikan (1984). In
urging an altogether non-causal criterion of individuation
in explanation, the latter do not have to overcome the prima
facie incompatibility of intrinsic causation and extrinsic
individuation, whatever the rest of their difficulties.
Dretske's (1981, 1988) views, are also, I believe,
reasonably represented here among those who claim that noncausal criteria of explanation can make more profitable
headway with content's explanatory role problem.
The sort of view in question might be generally
summarized as follows. While it is true that referring to
content in what purports to be a causal explanation will be
problematical, to infer from that it need be eliminated from
psychology is to suppose that the only legitimate way to
individuate for the purpose of explanation in science is
causally. However, it is contended, this doesn't follow. Why
can't it be supposed that it is legitimate to individuate
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entities in ways that are, in fact, not relevant to their
causal powers. Among the sciences there are some - perfectly
respectable - in which entities are individuated in ways
that are not causally dictated. The mere fact that content
and causation are not compatible is no reason to eliminate
content from explanation - the solution is to individuate
content non-causally.
Burge (1986) gives a sustained argument in defense of
the thesis that individualism - understood as a view about
how kinds are correctly individuated - is false for
psychology. I will limit myself to

comment on Burge's

•metaphysical' remarks, as it is these that most directly
address the issue of concern here.
Individualism - the view that what is within the
physical confines of an individual is all that can be
relevant to, among other things, his psychology - seems to
be a natural result of a causal constraint on individuation.
The individuation of kinds in psychology have to be causal,
so they have to be individualistic; there can be no other
way to accommodate the causal requirement presupposed as
essential to scientific enterprise. Burge, however, is
sceptical (1986, 9):
. . . I shall assume that individualism
is prima facie wrong about psychology,
including cognitive psychology . . . the
generalizations with counterfactual
force that appear in psychological
theories, given their standard
interpretations, are not all
individualistic.
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Burge summarizes two arguments against nonindividualistic accounts. These arguments, according to
Burge, presuppose the familiar Twin Earth cases. The first,
according to Burge, takes it that twins are behaviorally
identical, so there is no reason to suppose that we cannot
formulate explanatory generalizations to cover them, in
spite of the contextual differences that apply. The second
argument is essentially the causation argument with which we
are already familiar. According to Burge (p.13), proponents
of this argument take it that
the determinants of behavior supervene
on states of the brain. So if
propositional attitudes are to be
treated as among the determinants of
behavior, they must be taken to
supervene on brain states. The
alternative is to take propositional
attitudes as behaviorally irrelevant.
Burge attacks the presuppositions of the first
argument, arguing that the conception of behavior that is at
work there cannot sustain an intelligible position. We have
already made some points with regard to the subproblem of
the individuation of behavior and its relevance to
explanatory role problems, and must put further comment on
this to one side here. Instead we will focus on one of
Burge's attacks on the second argument; it is reasonable to
suppose that these points can be applied to both positions.
The focus of Burge's criticism concerns the
individuation/causation relation. The argument for
individualism in psychology, according to Burge, proceeds by
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way of what he calls (p.15):
bland observations about the etiology of
mental events and behavior. It is
plausible that events in the external
world causally affect the mental events
of a subject only by affecting the
subject's bodily surfaces; and that
nothing (not excluding mental events)
causally affects behavior except by
affecting (causing or being a causal
antecedent of causes of) local states of
the subject's body . . . only if mental
events (and states) supervene on the
individual's body can the causal
principles be maintained.
But this, he says, is confused reasoning. According to
Burge, there is every reason to suppose that the
individuation of explanatory entities in psychology must
meet causal criteria, but there is no reason to suppose that
it follows from this that standards of individuation are
individualist; that is, intrinsic, local, proximate: what it
is that causes have to be. Rather, he claims (p.16-17):
. . . there is no simple argument from
the causal principles just enunciated to
individualism . . . local causation does
not make more plausible local
individuation, or individualistic
supervenience . . . causation is local.
Individuation may presuppose facts about
the specific nature of the subject's
environment.
How does Burge make local causation and non-local
individuation compatible? First, he urges care regarding the
use of the notion of "affect," a preliminary to the
examples that are meant to carry his counter-argument
intuitively. The individualism argument proceeds by way of
the claim that commonsense conditions on causality impose
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certain constraints on all that is involved in mental
causality, both in the world-mind direction as in the mindbehavior direction. That is, the head-independent world can
only impinge on mental events via the subject's body; and
the only way for anything mental to be connected causally to
some behavioral episode is for it to affect the body
involved in that episode. Twin Earth cases are thought to
pose a problem for content - and consequently suggest that
psychology needs to be individualist - because the nature of
such cases is to drive a wedge in between mental states and
states of the body (recall that twins are intrinsically
identical down to their molecular structure; but they do not
share the same mental states). One way to put this is to
say, as Burge has it (p.16): "events in the environment are
alleged to differentially 'affect' a person's mental events
and behavior without differentially 'affecting' his or her
body." This is bad news for causal explanation, clearly,
especially when what is supposed to be explained is the
connection between what I thought with what I did: so
psychology must be individualist in its taxonomy of mental
states.
What Burge claims is that this line of argument
equivocates on 'affect,' confusing causation with
individuation. Events in the environment 'affect' in the
sense of individuate a person's mental events and subsequent
behavior; this does not mean, however, that such
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individuation fails to get implicated in someone's
psychology according to the usual constraints; it is not the
case, that is, that the body is not also causally
1affected.'
Burge offers a number of examples to illustrate his
claim that local causation and remote individuation are not
mutually exclusive: predominant among them is the notion of
functional individuation. The relations involved in the
movement of tectonic plates are all physical and proceed
along the usual causal lines - but what counts as Continent
A has something to do with its spatial relations; so that if
the very same collection of molecules were to sink to the
bottom of the ocean, or be mysteriously removed to Mars,
there is no reason to suppose we would continue to count it
as Continent A. Likewise, if the very same molecular
configurations that in us perform visual functions were to
perform menstrual functions in other organisms, then, in
those organisms, they wouldn't be eyes. These examples are
meant to show that we do not always individuate along
causal, intrinsically supervenient lines.
The readily available literature is replete with
parries and thrusts on the issue of whether psychology must
be individualistic;42 I shall limit myself to a few
remarks.
Burge, who, like others, takes it that his own
versions of the TE cases are almost universally applicable
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(see chapter 1), fails to realize that content's failure to
play a causal explanatory role is a question of more than
its failure to supervene. His remarks about the
individualism thesis in psychology all presuppose that the
real problem stems from, as we said above, the fact that
content's failure to supervene pulls it apart from its
causal role, since it interferes with a reliable,
generalizable, context-independent correlation of contentful
states with intrinsic, physical states.
Now, we have already seen (chapter 1) that it is a
misformulation of the main issue to suppose that the
intrinsic states thought to be held stable betwixt twins
must be physical states; quite apart from this, what Burge
doesn't consider is the case of supervening content with no
causal/explanatory role. Recall that the main thrust of
Burge's counter-argument against the individualist is that
there are non-individualistic modes of explanation - in, for
instance, geology, physiology and parts of biology - where
there is an appeal to entities that do not supervene on the
physical substructure (1986, 19). The explanation adheres
nevertheless to causal principles. But now what of the
numerous cases of supervening but extrinsically individuated
content? As we know, a causal role problem for such content
arises for all that it supervenes. The fact that there are
ways of individuating non-individualistically -

yet

causally - won't be of great help with respect to the
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problem of weakly external content: and, as we have already
seen, there are a lot more concepts vulnerable to the
redundancy problem than there are likely to fail to
supervene.
In sum, we can object to Burge's position from a quite
general point of view. The question arises why it is that
extrinsic individuation is defended if causal properties
have to be intrinsic. It is hard to see, given the adherence
to the usual causal requirements, what motivates extrinsic
individuation, save faith in the TE cases - faith that turns
out to be exaggerated, as we have seen. Perhaps there is an
independent reason for defending extrinsic individuation in
the face of having to make it compatible with intrinsic
causal requirements; but if so, it is not forthcoming from
Burge.

e. Teleology
Burge tries, in a sense, to have it both ways, with
limited, if any, success. There is another, less
compromising view, associated with Dretske (1981;1988);
Millikan (1984); Papineau (1987) and Stampe (1975;1977).
Fodor veered close to once endorsing something like it
(1984;1985), and McGinn once found something to recommend it
with respect to the issues raised by content's explanatory
role problem (1989).
This kind of view effects an adjustment of the
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individuation/causation relation so to comprise an idea
familiar in modern accounts of evolutionary biology teleology. I want to avoid detailed comment on the prospect
for naturalizing content by way of teleology (for an
exhaustive consideration, see Millikan (1984); also Dennett
(1987)). Rather, I will limit my remarks to the way that
teleological theories of content can be thought to
recalibrate the individuation/causation relation and what
results for the problem of content's explanatory role.
The claim, ultimately, is that citing the content of a
mental state is to give its function, and this will explain
why an organism does what it does. What does it mean for
content to be individuated with respect to function? And how
is this meant to circumvent content's explanatory role
problem?
The idea is this. Things like organs, traits or
processes are to be understood to have functions. The proper
function of an entity is understood normatively: what it
supposed to or ought to do. The key point is that the
normativity has a relational or environmental element organisms evolve characteristics in the fullness of
evolutionary time in order to survive; so what a given
characteristic is supposed to do is to be understood
relative to this supreme need of the organism in which it
resides. But, of course, an organism inhabits an
environmental context, which supplies both what to exploit
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and what to avoid in the survival contest. The functions of
an organism's constitutive parts therefore must be
understood relative to the context in which the organism
either flourishes or perishes. In fact, a rather stronger
claim can be made: not only are these entities to be
understood relative to the environment, they are defined
with respect to the environment. So: a duck's foot is webbed
so it can cope with water; cat's eyes reflect light so as to
be able to hunt in underilluminated conditions; etc. The
function of these entities is hence extrinsically defined:
it is individuated by reference to things outside the
organism itself.
Now the interesting and controversial claim with
respect to content is that representational mental states not just physical states -

are themselves capable of being

understood as having a proper biological function that is
determined relationally. This is perhaps most easily seen in
the case of desire. The desire that p has a function - that
of bringing it about that the organism does what it has to
do to get p. Sometimes getting p has crucial survival value,
and sometimes not (the unfulfilled desire for food and water
has earlier, quicker and nastier effects than does the
unfulfilled desire for a date with Peter the aerobics
teacher). The mental state is nonetheless determined with
respect to something independent of the organism that
possesses it. The general picture, according to McGinn
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(1989, 148), is this:
Evolution must install mechanisms which
perform . . . interlocking functions of
sensitivity to need and sensitivity to
what in the world will meet the need:
desire and perception are the solutions
it has come up with, at least in
'higher' organisms. The teleological
theory sees in these basic relational
functions the deep roots of content.
Belief comes into the picture as a way
of guiding behavior in the light of
perception so as to satisfy desires.
Thus the function of the belief that
there is water here is to combine with
perceptions of water to guide behavior
in the satisfaction of the desire (and
hence need) for water: the desire can
only cause the right goal-satisfying
behavior if it controlled by beliefs
about the current state of the
environment. In this way, the, the
functions of mental states are absorbed
into their content, thus incorporating
the worldly items that the functions
themselves concern. Teleology is what
originally brings the world into the
mind. It spans the divide.
Lots of complicated issues converge at this point:
whether and how 'indication' is a part of mental
representation; misrepresentation, original intentionality
and derived intentionality; how it is that genuine
intentionality can emerge from relational proper function
(or, for that matter, from causal theories) - how, that is,
that function can be thought to be attached to something
propositional; purposes that go forever unrealized.43
Fortunately, the only one that can concern us here is how an
individuative criterion of content according to function is
thought to overcome the problem of content's explanatory
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role.
The solution is thought to lie in the fact that
teleologically-individuated content is understood to have a
non-causal explanatory role. What explains why organism 0
did a is what his mental state s was for: and this must be
understood as world-involving, since organisms are
fundamentally environment-interactive instruments. The
explanation of O's behavior goes beyond mere mechanisms, as
his behavioral episodes are interpreted to be goal-directed.
Causal mechanisms are at work, to be sure, but, on this
view, they turn out to be explanatorily inadequate, since
they are just bedrock, so to speak: necessary elements in
the process of producing behavior - hence explaining it but not sufficient; true descriptions but not explanatory
ones. On this view, it is no surprise that there is a risk
to content on a causal criterion of explanation, since a
causal mechanism can never in itself reveal what it is for.
The basic form of psychological explanation on the
teleological account thus denies, in an important sense,
that explanations are causal, as long as causal explanations
are interpreted as descriptions of the workings of the
causal machinery involved. McGinn summarizes the point
(1989, 152-153):
The explanatory property - namely, a
state with a certain content - is just
not a 'mechanistic' property, any more
than functional properties in general
are. Reasons are not causally
explanatory qua reasons, though reasons
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may in fact be causes. The causal
mechanisms are in the head (literally),
but reasons themselves are not in the
head, since their contents are not. But
in the same way the property of having
the function of pumping blood to the
muscles is not in the heart, since it
involves a relation between the organ
that is the heart and the muscles; the
mechanism of that function, however, is
right there in the heart. Functional
properties of this kind are not causally
explanatory either - if this means that
they figure in the mechanisms that bring
about the effects. We might more
perspicuously say: explanation by
reasons is not a species of mechanistic
explanation, i.e. an account of the
causal mechanisms whose operation led to
the behavior being explained.
As we have already suggested, this sort of view is by
no means uncontroversial; but adjudication of it and the
other options for a solution to the problem of content's
explanatory role is not part of our project here. Rather, we
would only draw attention to the way in which this view - at
least in principle - undermines the usual explanatory
problem thought to arise when content is extrinsically
individuated. It is not the case - so this view suggests that extrinsic individuation necessarily interferes with the
explanatory doings of content with respect to behavior. On
the contrary, what could be more explanatorily relevant to
an organism's transactions than citing the function of the
implicated mental state? When we know what that state is
for, we can also know why the organism in possession of that
state did what it did: the explanation, roughly speaking,
just falls right out of the function. Functional taxonomy
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is, of course, firmly and genuinely extrinsic, and, by
denying that causal properties (though applicable) tell the
relevant explanatory story, the teleological determination
of content assures the compatibility of externalist
individuation and explanatory role. The
individuation/causation relation is thus, on this view,
reconsidered in favor of function rather than of mechanism;
with the nature of explanation itself following suit.

f. Rationalization; or the True Nature of Psychology
One line of resistance to the idea that content has no
explanatory role to play in psychology, as we saw above, is
to insist that there are ways of classifying explanatory
entities according to criteria other than the tracing of
their causal properties. This line of argument calls
attention to the fact that sciences quite often are not
solely concerned with identifying the causes of things, and
taxonomize accordingly along non-causal lines.
There is, however, another line of thought that
centers on the understanding of what we might call the true
nature of psychology. This view has it that it is quite
wrong to think that psychology is or ought to be interested
in causation. Belief-desire psychology, in particular, is
not a form of causal theory at all, rather, it is a
radically different kind of understanding which involves a
notion of rationalization. Explanation in psychology isn't
157

given by causes, but, for instance, by what the reasons were
for an agent's doings: why it seemed reasonable to him to do
what he did, given his beliefs and desires. And this is to
be understood entirely non-causally.
Such a view tends to go some way to undermine the
worries about the explanatory role of extrinsic content.
After all, as we have seen, these worries devolve on the
inadmissibility of content's playing a causally explanatory
role, given its remoteness from head-dependent causal
reticulations. Extrinsic content, as we have seen, is quite
literally not in a position to bear causal-explanatory
burdens. Should we deny, however, that there is such a
causal role for it to play, then the worries consequently
evaporate. None of the usual considerations could count
against wide (or wide*) content, since, on this view,
psychology is not in the business of giving causal
explanations.
Just to establish the atmosphere, we may take a brief
look at the issues that appear to be at work in
Wittgenstein's thought about psychology.
Wittgenstein's conception of psychology is being
fairly astringent. According to Budd (1989, ix-x):
Wittgenstein claimed that the science of
psychology is barren and confusion is
endemic in it. This is not due, he
maintained, to the fact that psychology
is a young science that is still
struggling to find appropriate ways to
investigate its subject matter. The kind
of confusion that reigns in psychology
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is, he believed, conceptual confusion:
psychologists are prone to unclarity
about everyday psychological concepts
and the sophisticated experimental
methods they employ fail to deal
satisfactorily with the problems
addressed, which are really of a
philosophical nature.
Those familiar with Wittgenstein's approach to
conceptual problems will recognize his trademark: what is
needed is therapy or remedy; with enough care, conceptual
difficulties will be recognized for the misconceptions that
they are. Wittgenstein is, of course, not alone among
philosophers in maintaining that lots of what goes on in
psychology is a waste of time.44
Where the contemporary philosopher of mind might,
however, want to part company with Wittgenstein is over his
conception of mental causation - such as it is. Wittgenstein
appears to find nothing troubling about the view that
psychological differences need not be based in physical
differences; and he seems to deny the idea that mental
events (like sensations) cause behavior. Budd notes (1989,
72) :
Now it is hard to understand how the
inherent suitability of sensations to
play a causal role in the production of
behavior could be accommodated by
Wittgenstein in any other way than by
regarding them as being physical events
in people's bodies . . . But whatever
the merits of the suggestion, it is
clear, I believe, that Wittgenstein
would not have accepted it.
This is borne out in Wittgenstein's clearly sceptical
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remarks concerning the possibility of there being a causal
connection between the physiological and the
psychological.45 Given this, the possibility of explaining
human behavior by reference to what happens to people's
bodies really seems a non-starter (1981,
#608;#609;#610;#613):
No supposition seems to me more natural
than that there is no process in the
brain correlated with associating or
with thinking; so that it would be
impossible to read off thought-processes
from brain-processes. I mean this: if I
talk or write, there is, I assume, a
system of impulses going out from my
brain and correlated with my spoken or
written thoughts. But why should the
system continue further in the direction
of the centre? Why should this order not
proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The
case would be like the following certain kinds of plants multiply by
seed, so that a seed always produces a
plant of the same kind as that from
which it was produced - but nothing in
the seed corresponds to the plant which
comes from it; so that it is impossible
to infer the properties or structure of
the plant from those of the seed that it
comes out of - this can only be done
from the history of the seed. So an
organism might come into being even out
of something guite amorphous, as it were
causelessly; and there is no reason why
this should not really hold for our
thoughts, and hence for our talking and
writing.
It is thus perfectly possible that certain
psychological phenomena cannot be
investigated physiologically, because
physiologically nothing corresponds to them.
The prejudice in favour of
psychophysical parallelism is a fruit of
primitive interpretation of our
concepts. For if one allows a causality
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between psychological phenomena which is
not mediated physiologically, one thinks
one is making a profession that there
exists a soul side by side with the
body, a ghostly soul-nature.
Why should there not be a natural law
connecting a starting and a finishing
state of a system, but not covering the
intermediary state? (Only one must not
think of causal efficacy.)
In short, the kind of conception of psychology
arguably exemplified in Wittgenstein is one in which a
causal role for mental states is simply not on the cards, at
least via mediation by physical states. Whatever the
independent plausibility or validity of this view, what
concerns us is merely this. The extrinsic individuation of
content, as we have taken pains to examine, has problematic
causal consequences for content's explanatory role. Deny
that psychology is a causal enterprise, however, and the
motivation for finding an alternative to the extrinsic
individuation of content for the sake of folk psychology is
undercut.
One thing we might pause to consider is that there is,
in fact, a plausible analysis of 'because' that might be
adapted to the idea that psychology is not a causal
undertaking. Suppose you want to know why a proposition p is
true. Someone says, "it's because it follows from
propositions q and r from a rule of inference I .' Now, this
use of 'because' is hardly causal; rather, it's logical.
Certainly nothing in any of this shows that the propositions
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involved couldn't have wide or wide* content. So there is a
precedent for a non-causal use of 'because,' and the
'because' of psychological explanation might best be thought
of as analogous. Maybe the most profitable emphasis
concerning the nature of psychological explanation could
center on the logical relations that hold between mental
states and action, with the resulting explanatory role of
mental descriptions being that of justifying these
relations.
Now there is a conception of psychological
explanation, associated with Davidson, that might be thought
to have something in common with the more radical
Wittgensteinian position, and which touches on the above
points. Although Davidson's position on the issue of causal
explanation is familiar, what is worth exploring are the
implications for such a view on the issues raised by
externalism and explanation. So let us briefly explore the
convergence of these lines of thought.
The Wittgensteinian position might be thought to be an
expression of the idea that there is some incompatibility
between something's having a normative or rationalizing role
at the same time as its being causal, a view, that, until
Davidson's work emerged on the scene, was not without its
defenders (see Evnine 1991, for discussion; also Davidson
1980). As we have seen, it is hardly the case that
explanation in mathematics, logic, or even fiction is not
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genuine explanation; but then it appears to have to be
conceded that explanation isn't always causal. Now the
objection that can be made to this is that the relation
between events - say, a mental event and a physical event is of such a nature as to impose unavoidable causal
considerations; but we know that while causal relations may
indeed hold of events, it does not follow from this that an
event causally explains another to which it bears a causal
relation.
Davidson, as is well-known, claims (1980, 3-19) that
rationalization is indeed a form of causal explanation
(p.3) :
. . . What is the relation between a
reason and an action when the reason
explains the action by giving the
agent's reason for doing what he did? We
may call such explanations
rationalizations, and say that the
reason rationalizes the action.
In this paper I want to defend the
ancient - and commonsense - position
that rationalization is a species of
causal explanation. The defense no doubt
requires some redeployment, but it does
not seem necessary to abandon the
position, as has been urged by many
recent writers.
Now, given that there is a certain amount of
controversy concerning exactly what, given his arguments,
Davidson is entitled to claim - quite apart from what it is
that he does claim - it is best to get the basics right.
Rationalization is giving the reasons for why somebody did
what she did - the beliefs and desires she had and for which
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she did what she did. The question is: is giving reasons a
form of causal explanation - is it a form of causal talk at
all?
Now - as we see in the quote from Davidson above Davidson's thesis is, apparently, that rationalization is
causal explanation. What complicates the situation is that
in his (1980) he argues primarily for the view that reasons
cause actions. And the trouble is, the latter does not
entail the former.
The entailment doesn't hold for the familiar reasons
that 'causation' is referentially transparent, but
'explanation' is referentially opaque. So, as is familiar,
it's possible for reasons to cause actions, but not be
explanatory under those descriptions: either at all, or more
moderately, explanatory under those descriptions but not
causally explanatory under those descriptions. There is
certainly logical room for the idea that reasons cause
actions, and that the property of being a reason, though
explanatory, is not causally explanatory, but, instead, has
a sui generis justifying explanatory role.
Now, Davidson tends to conflate the two points in
question (see Evnine 1991 for discussion); arguing that
reasons not only cause actions but are causally explanatory
of them. Certainly in (1980, 3-19) he takes it that if
reasons were causes, then it would follow that
rationalization is a species of causal explanation. And what
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further complicates matters is the appearance in Davidson's
later work of the notion of anomalous monism.
One of Davidson's fundamental claims is that the
mental is anomalous. Anomalism of the mental is the view
that states and events - beliefs, desires, perceptions,
sensations - are not covered by either psychophysical or
psychological laws; laws that purport to govern,
respectively, the relations between mental states and events
and physical states and events; and the relations between
mental states and events to one another.46
Davidson is unfazed by the seeming incompatibility. He
notes (1980, 207):
Mental events such as perceivings,
rememberings, decisions, and actions
resist capture in the nomological net of
physical theory. How can this fact be
reconciled with the causal role of
mental events in the physical world?
. . . I start from the assumption that
both the causal dependence, and the
anomalousness, of mental events are
undeniable facts. My aim is therefore to
explain, in the face of apparent
difficulties, how this can be.
The strategy Davidson employs is to dissolve the
supposed inconsistency of three principles: 1) that mental
events causally interact with physical events; 2) that
causality entails laws; and 3) that (p.208) "there are no
strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental
events can be predicated and explained (the Anomalism of the
Mental)."
The anomalism of the mental results from a number of
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things taken together. Briefly, mental events and physical
events do causally interact, and such a causal relation can
be captured by a true singular causal statement. Causal
relations are governed by causal laws. There are no strict
causal laws that hold between mental events (qua mental) and
physical events; or between mental events and other mental
events. So mental events need be thought of as having
physical descriptions under which they fall under causal
physical laws. But the mental - qua mental - is anomalous.
And this purports to make it possible for someone to be a
materialist without having to violate reasonable intuitions
concerning the distinction between mental and physical
properties.
Davidson has been criticized for being rather unclear
about the combination of the thesis of anomalous monism with
his claims that rationalization is a species of causal
explanation. In fact, many take it that Davidson is
compelled to have to give up the idea that rationalization
is a form of causal explanation (Evnine 1992) - in spite of
the fact that he himself is explicitly in the business of
defending just that connection.
We need to build up to this. Davidson (1980, 3-19), in
arguing against the traditional picture that denies that
rationalization is a species of causal explanation, argues
also against the view that tries to distinguish causal
explanation from rationalization on grounds that laws are
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involved essentially in ordinary causal explanations, but
not in rationalizations. Davidson points out that Hume's
doctrine that singular causal statements imply
generalizations is ambiguous, and that the weaker
interpretation fits both causal explanation and
rationalization. And given that Davidson quite explicitly is
taking himself to be giving a defense of rationalization as
a species of causal explanation, it is clear that he finds
in this line of argument support for the view that
rationalization is causal explanation.
But this means that Davidson thinks that causal
explanation involves laws. And putting this together with
his thesis of anomalous monism generates headaches. The
familiar criticism runs roughly as follows: if explanation
always involves laws, but (by anomalous monism) there are no
laws of psychology (of actions), then the psychological
explanations got by rationalizations cannot involve laws, so
rationalizing explanations are not causal explanations.
Such is a sketch of the background to the Davidsonian
position. The thing to consider now is the connection
between rationalization and causation in the explanation of
behavior.
A behavioral episode is particular event, and only
under certain descriptions can such an episode count as an
action. Such descriptions involve an intention; a reason for
the production and performance of the event in question.
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Standardly, actions are events intentional under a
description under which they are rationalized; and it is the
content of the mental states involved that give the reasons
for them. The question I want to focus on is how reasons are
related to the actions for which they are reasons. Davidson
(1980, 3-19) claims that apart from the relations between
content and the description of an action that make the
former a reason for the latter, a further, causal relation
need obtain so as to make a mental state the reason for an
action. So, when one says "I refused him because he was
ungentleman-like" the 'because' is meant, according to
Davidson, to be understood causally. Reasons are therefore
causes, and reason explanations are causal explanations.
As we have seen, this appears, on the face of it,
incompatible with Davidson's claims about the anomalism of
the mental - but, while Davidson denies that there are
strict psychophysical and psychological laws, he does not
deny that there exist psychophysical and psychological
generalizations. So a causal role for content (reasons) in
explanation is defended as a viable possibility.
Something in all in of this is worth taking a closer
look at, however. We know that not all descriptions of
events will be relevant to the explanations of those events.
Not all descriptions of actions, thus, will be relevant to
the explanations of those actions. Davidson's position
appears to overlook a certain possibility. What if the
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intentional description of an action isn't causally
explanatory?
That this might be so can be seen, preliminarily, in
the following way. Davidson's position is that there is a
causal relation (1980, 17): "what other relation could there
be other than causation?") between content and actions and
that citing the implicated mental state is to cite the cause
in question. But the question that arises is whether from
the fact that events have the property of being the (say)
belief that p, that it follows that they have a or the
causally relevant property. Certainly - and as we have
mentioned in our remarks above - it could easily be the case
that when you frame an explanation of an event you cite
something that is a cause; but it would not follow that you
cite that cause under a description that is a causally or
explanatorily relevant description.
The upshot of these remarks is that, in spite of
Davidson's assertions - and arguments - to the contrary,
rationalizing explanation need by no means be or be thought
to be causal explanation. A logically possible position is
one that claims that although mental states are causes and
enter into causal relations, it is not the case that mental
descriptions need purport to be causal descriptions - they
might instead purport to be rationalizing descriptions,
functioning rather in the same way as a description would in
the context of a mathematical or logical explanation. So,
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for instance, when we describe mental states in explanatory
contexts, it is certainly possible that we just might not be
interested in them as causes - though they happen to be
causes.
He who holds this position is in a position to agree
with mental causation, but would not have to agree that
mental explanation is causal. He could claim that it is true
that if one has a desire and one does something as a result
of it, than that desire caused one to do it - it caused one
to do it via the fact that something in one's brain tokenidentical with that desire caused one's body to move. But it
needn't follow that the explanation of such an intentional
action

- given by saying ''I did it because I desired to do

it" is a causal explanation. Certainly there's no entailment
between 'A caused B' and 'B because A.' The 'because' might
just as easily be interpreted non-causally.
This kind of view has - at least in principle - very
different consequences for the bearing of externalist
considerations on the future of folk psychology. Quite apart
from the independent merits or weaknessness of such a view,
it is clear that its proponents are under no obligation to
cave in to externalist pressures on content-based
psychology. On this position one could claim that all
causally relevant properties in cases of mental causation
are entirely internal to the agent; mental states
themselves, on the other hand, are completely external (that
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is, individuated relationally). Mental descriptions are
indeed explanatory - just not causally explanatory - so this
separation needn't be troublesome to content-based
psychology, as long as we think of its explanations as noncausal.
The Wittgensteinian position is a radical one: no
mental causation. The above position - as yet unnamed - is a
more moderate version of the same basic idea. On this view
we allow for mental causation, but given that we understand
the difference between causal relations and causal
explanations, we can concede that there is quite enough
logical room to deny that psychological explanation is
causal explanation. If it is non-causal rationalizing
explanation, then the pressure in the way of doing anything
to eliminate content is decreased.

10. Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined two related issues.
The formulation of externalism defended in chapter 1
requires a reconsideration of its consequences for contentbased psychology. We have seen that the distinction between
weak and strong externalism imposes a reevaluation of the
nature externalism's consequences for explanation. I have
argued that the relational or extrinsic individuation of
content poses a general problem for the supposition that
content plays a causal role in psychological explanation,
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quite independent of content's supervenience on internal
states or its failure to so supervene. I have urged a more
critical look at the real nature of the failure of
supervenience problem, claiming that it is but an instance
of the more widespread problem of content's extrinsicness,
and hence redundancy, in causally explanatory contexts. I
have distinguished the redundancy problem from other superficially similar - cases of redundancy, and argued that
objections to these fail to make the case against
the notion of causal redundancy that I argue is the basis of
the problem of content's explanatory role.
There are a number of responses to the initial
argument that extrinsic individuation and causal role do not
a compatible combination make. These I summarize and
consider in turn, indicating which have more plausibility
than the rest. I have avoided any outright partisanship,
preferring to consider the options from a more abstract
point of view. It turns out that the presuppositions at work
concerning the individuation/causation relation have the
result not only of distinguishing the alternatives for a
solution to the explanatory role problem in interesting
ways, but of shedding some light on the nature of contentbased psychology as an explanatory enterprise.
That externalism has consequences for psychological
explanation is an issue that is, at least in some sense,
been well-worked in the literature. In fact, one could
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easily come to the view, given recent and familiar emphases,
that externalism has consequences exclusively for
explanation and for the issues of self-knowledge and, more
generally, scepticism. What I argue in chapter 3, however,
is that externalism has further consequences. As we shall
see, both the nature of analytic truth and the notion of
•semantic innocence' are subject to redeployment from the
extrinsic individuation of content.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1.
Hume (1978).

The locus classicus for enquiries of this kind is

2. Useful but flawed. See Kitcher and Salmon (1989).
3.
Laws involving dispositions are notoriously
controversial. See W. Salmon (1992).
4.
There is a further issue, concerning the
distinction between strict and ceteris paribus laws, which
has received some attention in the literature (see, for
starters, the debate between Fodor and Schiffer, 1991). I
will be making some remarks about the status of special
sciences below, an issue that classically involves that of
hedged laws, but I do not anticipate becoming enmeshed in
this controversy.
5.
Wittgenstein (among others) seems to hold that
mental states can't cause anything. See below, section 11.
6.
A few clarificatory remarks about behavior and its
characterization are indicated: for an excellent
introduction to the issues, see Dretske (1988); and for
further details, Burge (1986, 10-15 is useful). What
explains behavior is relevant to the way it is described.
Say, for example, that one presupposes or defends a nonintentional account; an account that makes use of ordinary
physical descriptions. Given that non-intentional
explanandum, the odds are there will be no pressing
motivation to offer an intentional explanans, and vice
versa. Dretske puts it like this (1988, p.83):
. . . what we are trying to explain when
we advert to such content-bearing
entities as beliefs and desires, is not
the physical movements or changes that
are the normal product of behavior. What
we are trying to explain, causally or
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otherwise, is not why our limbs move but
why we move them.
Now, describing an event as a behavioral event is a
(weak) attempt at neutrality. This is because to describe an
event as an action presupposes intentionality, something
that we might want to avoid. Consider that one issue that
could conceivably arise with respect to externalism is this:
perhaps a non-intentional redescription of the behavioral
event in question might succeed in removing the
necessitating conditions for the problem of content in
explanation. If the behavior in question is described in
ways that are not externalist then it may not need
explanation under externalist descriptions of mental states,
which have such untoward explanatory consequences. If you
describe something as a reaching for a then it is likely
that you shall have to explain it in terms of having beliefs
about a. Describing the behavior as a mere reaching,
however, may avoid the problem entirely.
7. See also Stich (1978, 575-576).
8.
The more general the problem, of course, the more,
ultimately, we would have to consider abandoning either
externalism or propositional attitude psychology. Any views
I have about which one should go I reserve for another
paper.
9.
The locus classicus concerning narrow content is
Fodor (1987), and most anything of Fodor's from 1987-1992.
This notion has generated an industry: see the bibliography
to Loewer and Rey (1991).
10.
A claim at odds, of course, with the tenor of much
of the literature on the subject, which takes failure of
supervenience to constitute a general problem for the role
of semantic content in psychological explanation. This is
just a error, parallel to the original one concerning the
head-independence of meaning. Just as Putnam and many of his
commentators uncritically took his points to apply to all
content, so further work concerning content in explanation
perpetuated and compounded the original error by supposing
that all content fails to supervene, so that content-based
psychology in general was in hot water.
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11.
Note that adhering to a TE formulation of
externalism will interfere with a grasp of this point. As we
saw in chapter 1, 'non-supervenience' is but one way of
formulating the issue. Many commentators avail themselves of
the singular thought formulation: see chapter 1, section 9.
12.
McGinn argues (1989, chapter 2) that an
interesting parallel argument, in effect, has been given by
Field (1980). His argument that science ought to be done
without numbers can be understood along these lines: physics
is certainly replete with numerical references, but it is
scarcely credible that it is numbers that are driving the
causal mechanisms that are at work in, say, what happens to
water when it reaches 0° Celsius. Numbers are abstract, so
they have no causal powers, and, even if they did, they are
extrinsic to the entities whose doings they are employed to
characterize.
13. See Marcus (1971) for an interesting discussion.
It so happens that in Dretske's discussion of the
individuation of behavior (1988, chapter 1), he makes use of
a distinction between internal and external not entirely
devoid of quasi-essentialist points to illustrate his points
about systems, their behavior, and action (p.2):
A bee's stinging a child qualifies as
bee behavior, as something the bee does,
not simply because M (penetration of the
child's finger by the bee's stinger)
occurs. For this can happen without the
bee's doing anything - if, for example,
the child accidentally pokes its finger
with the stinger of a dead bee. This
would be a case of some external (to the
bee) event's causing M. To get bee
behavior, to have something the bee
does, the cause of M (stinger
penetration) must come from within the
bee . . . the difference between Clyde's
losing his job (something that happens
to him) and his quitting his job
(something he does) resides in the locus
- in Clyde or in his employer - of the
cause of termination . . . Despite its
apparent crudity, the simple contrast
between internally and externally
produced movement capture the basic idea
underlying our classification of
behavior. If we have a well-defined
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ordinary notion of behavior . . . it is,
with a few refinements, equivalent to
internally produced movement or change.
14.
An analogous point concerns the role of the truthconditions of a belief in explanation. It has seemed to some
that the truth of a belief is not part of its causal
potential, and we can understand this to mean - with no
violence to those views - that the truth of a belief is
extrinsic, not part of, the relevant causal machinery.
15.
In chapter 1 we noted an Anglo/American divide in
the literature concerning formulations of externalism;
predictably, the same divide reoccurs with respect to the
consequences of externalism for psychological explanation.
The contenders to take note of on this subject on the
British side subdivide as follows: Boer, Evans, McDowell,
Peacocke and McCulloch defend the view that, in their terms,
folk psychology (at Ceast as it involves singular thought)
is Russellian; Carruthers, Noonan, and Segal oppose it.
16.
His example makes use of singular rather than
general content: it involves the use of a demonstrative. The
kind of example in question, however, can be extended counterfactually - to the case of general content. It is
this extension that results in the widespread problem of
content1s explanatory role.
17.
William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349) urged what is
known as the principle of parsimony or economy as a
methodological principle in explanation: "what can be done
with fewer . . . is done in vain with more." Following this
advice is meant to result in the elimination of pseudoexplanatory entities.
18. And also, hopefully, to put an end to any further
insistence on the point that formulation of the problem of
content's explanatory role somehow essentially involves Twin
Earth or failures of supervenience.
19. See below for a close examination of what this
comes to.
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20.
See Strawson (1974) and Evans (1982) for an
extended treatment of this.
21.
Of course there is controversy concerning the
interpretation of counterfactuals with impossible
antecedents - which doesn't mean there aren't optimistic
views. See Goodman (1983) and Jackson (1991), for starters.
In any case, consider that if God exists, he exists
necessarily; nevertheless it is no violation of the laws of
logic or anything else to ponder the question "if God didn't
exist - though of course He does necessarily, then . . . "
22.
Leaving no stone unturned, consider the still more
extreme counterexample: Even if Descartes were wrong and you
didn't know that you existed, but you still believed it,
this would on the fact of it make no difference whatever to
your behavior. I am grateful to Colin McGinn for this point.
23.
Obviously, there are puzzles that arise with
respect to necessarily existing entities like the empty set
- these aren't relevant here. The fact that there is one
necessarily existing set doesn't mean that any claim to the
effect that if x is abstract then x exists necessarily is
true. The only point I'm making here is that there is no
legitimate inference from the fact that x is abstract to the
fact that x is a necessary existent.
24.
And surely it is unlikely that we want to rule out
an explanation like "It has puppies rather than kittens
because it's a dog," which is both perfectly good and
adverts to properties.
25.
I believe it is necessary to point out that the
abstractness of abstract universals (as an objection to
their role as properly externalistic entities) is really a
red herring: and it's one, I suspect, that an exaggerated
fidelity to TE formulations of externalism tends to support.
Any abstract objects you can have beliefs about aren't
anywhere (take numbers), but it just doesn't follow that
issues to do with externalism can't be formulated with
respect to them. As an exercise, compare what Frege would
say about mathematical expressions with what a direct
reference theorist would say.
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26.
The problem of generalizing between me and my
twin, however, is one that occurs only when she and I do not
share the putatively explanatory content-bearing state: but
as we have seen, this is a problem limited to two kinds of
mental state, and loses much of its threatening aspect - as
well as most of its allure - accordingly.
27.
This line of thought might be understood to fall
under a more general view, which goes as follows: on any
understanding of truth-conditions, an explanatory role
problem for content is generated; hence explanation must be
formulated with reference to the syntactic properties of
sentences or internal representations, properties that exist
in tandem with semantic ones. No assignment of truthconditions to propositional attitudes is required to account
for their explanatory role.
This kind of view, of course, stands as an objection to
an externalist account of truth-conditions, just one of a
host of views concerning the nature of truth-conditions
(consider: verification-conditions, truth-conditions as sets
of possible worlds, coherence-conditions, pragmatic-success
conditions). So something needs to be said about the
relation between externalism - in particular, weak
externalism - and truth conditions, in the light of this
kind of view. In particular, we have to consider the
question whether the claim that propositional attitudes are
externalistically individuated is equivalent to the claim
that they have truth-conditions. If this were so, there
would be nothing particularly unique or interesting about
the consequences of externalism for content in explanation it is the wider notion of truth-conditions that forms the
basis of the problem, on this view.
A few brief remarks will have to suffice. First: it is
clear that an assignment of truth-conditions does not entail
externalism, since such an assignment need not be made in
terms of worldly entities at all (consider an assignment of
truth-conditions in terms of images). Second: it is
plausible to suppose that there are explanatory role
problems for content generated uniquely by externalism, weak
and strong; such problems would be specific to externalism
and will not generalize to the problems raised by truthconditions for explanation (although there may be points of
contact). This line of thought is explored in this chapter.
28.
A more streamlined way of putting the same point:
even if the object or property didn't exist, the same
behavior might be manifested, so the object of a mental
state is irrelevant to producing the behavior. The external
object is not part of the causal machinery in operation.
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29.
The point to focus on here is merely that from the
fact that the claims at hand make use of the terms
'counterfactuality' and 'redundancy,' it shouldn't be
supposed that what's at issue is motivated in the same way,
or amounts to exactly the same thing.
30. See Fodor (1975).
31.
I do not wish to be taken to be defending syntax
over semantics in explanation here: in fact, I intend to shy
away from any adjudication of this and related issues. Here
I intend only to sketch the broad outlines of the various
orthodox positions concerning content's explanatory role in
order to situate the problem as I have formulated it more
generally.
32.
Lots of interesting issues proprietary to the
philosophy of science arise here: the putative distinction
between observational and theoretical terms and the notion
of a bridge law, to name but two. See Churchland (1986);
Hempel (1965); Kitcher and Salmon (1989); Nagel (1961); and
Putnam (1975f), for an introduction.
33. Fodor gives the general idea (1988, 9):
Even if psychology were
dispensable in principle, that
would be no argument for
dispensing with it. (Perhaps
geology is dispensable in
principle; every river is a
physical object, after all.
Would that be a reason for
supposing that rivers aren't a
natural kind? Or that
'meandering rivers erode
outside their banks is
untrue?')
Also useful is Salmon, M. (1989) for an overview of
the notion of explanation in the social sciences, a
discussion that proceeds by way of noting the difficulties
with a reductionist program. More specifically, the debate
between those who favor autonomy in psychology and those who
do not is well-represented in the literature: see, among
others, Fodor (1968 and 1975); Putnam (1975), Pylyshyn
(1984), and Churchland (1986), respectively.
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34.
It is particularly important, in fact, to
distinguish TRP from both of these, since it is not
immediately clear that these two views are so easy to
distinguish from each other. On the face of it, it certainly
does seem as if defenders of syntax are arguing in at least
the same terms as those who object to special sciences. The
syntacticians say: you've got two counterpart possible
explanations: one in terms of syntax and one in terms of
content. You don't lose any generalizations if you move to
the 'lower' level (in fact, as Stich has it, you gain some),
so the 'higher' level is explanatory excess to be
jettisoned. That these views can be distinguished is not an
issue I will to investigate here.
35.
I leave it to the reader, as an exercise, to match
the author with the view.
36.
There are no doubt a host of versions,
refinements, offshoots and tributaries associated with these
views, notice of which we shall have to forgo. For the
record, new directions have recently emerged: see Fodor
(forthcoming, 1994); McGinn (1991).
37.
Interestingly, Stich appears to consider the
possibility that one way to save belief/desire psychology is
to abandon the causal restraint on explanation in which
those attitudes are meant to figure. See (1978, 582).
38.
Stich has all kinds of reasons for thinking STM is
better than RTM at explaining what needs to be explained.
See McGinn (1989, 127-129) for a criticism of the view as a
whole.
39.
Fodor has recently come about and struck out into
different waters; see Fodor (forthcoming, 1994), where
narrow content is, in effect, repudiated.
40.
See Loewer and Rey (1991), for no end of
criticism, also Schiffer (in Villanueva, 1992). But see also
Fodor, (forthcoming, 1994) for the next, post-narrow content
stage.
41.
A few comments regarding so-called 'two-factor,'
'dual componency,' 'two-tiered,' or 'dual aspect' theories
of content are in order here. Some have argued that it is in
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principle implausible to propose a notion of hybrid or
divided content; this, I take it, is supposed to hold quite
independent of what notions go into the compilation of the
hybrid. I myself don't see that there is any in principle
objection to a hybrid notion of content, but that is a topic
for another project. For a glance at those who agree, see,
among others, Field (1981); Loar (1981); McGinn (1982). For
those against, see, among others, Lepore and Loewer (1987).
In fact, I am sceptical that any viable solution to the
explanatory role problem for content will be possible save
in the light of an acknowledgment that the semantic
properties of content are extrinsically individuated, but
that its causal properties will have to be accounted for in
other terms. Fodor, for one, explicitly claims that
externalism is most likely right for semantics; what he
resists is that this has any untoward repercussions for the
role of content .- the causal role of content - in
explanation. He notes (1991, 6):
Externalism is independent of
individualism because, whatever the
explanatory status of broad content, it
is not in dispute . . . that the content
of my twin's water thoughts differs from
the content of mine; or that 'water'
means something different in my mouth
and in his; or that these semantical
differences derive from differences in
our respective head/world relations.
Many of the proposed solutions to the explanatory role
problem make use of a hybrid notion of content, even if
implicitly, as we can see in the survey of the solutions in
this chapter. What is interesting is that in spite of many
protestations to the contrary, many of those who insist that
content can't be hybrid, and who insist that criteria of
individuation and causation stand or fall together (either
internalistically or externalistically) end up, it seems to
me, defending just such a hybrid notion of content. On
Fodor's own view, for instance, content is most naturally
and plausibly thought to be a hybrid: content is composed of
narrow and wide aspects, factors, tiers, components.
McDowell, for another, is explicitly dismissive of the idea
of a hybrid notion of content (1986, 3):
. . . meaning what one does by a
natural-kind word has been revealed to
be a composite . . . Something's being
the state of mind it is cannot be purely
a matter of how things are 'in the
head,' if meaning what one does by a
natural-kind word is an example . . .
182

[this] protects a form of the conception
that has come under pressure: it
incorporates a narrow psychological fact
in a composite picture of the problem
cases. Some version of this is often
represented as the only possible way of
accommodating Putnam's thesis. But there
is, as we have said, a choice . . . Need
there be a psychological state of that
kind even partly constituting one's
meaning what one does by a natural-kind
word?
What McDowell calls for is the notion of objectdependent thought with which we were occupied in chapter 1,
as the basis for a more general understanding of
externalism. McDowell thinks anything less than this
conception of content "fails to supply a satisfying account
of the mind's directedness towards the world" (p.166). The
trouble is, he makes the further point (p.3) that "no doubt
what is 'in the head' is causally relevant to states of
mind." And how this is supposed to square with his mono
content view is anybody's guess.
42.
See, for an introduction, Burge (1986); Egan
(1991); Fodor (1988); and Segal (1989). Recently Fodor
appears to have partly conceded that things other than
intrinsic causal mechanisms can be relevant to explanation see his (1994), forthcoming.
43.
For much discussion on these and related issues,
see Dennett (1989); Dretske (1988); Fodor (1990); and McGinn
(1989), among others. The bibliographies to these are
useful, too.
44. See Fodor (1986, chapter 8).
45.
Wittgenstein also appears to be somewhat sceptical
about there being a connection between physiological states
and processes and mental events, because - somewhat
alarmingly - he is not altogether sanguine about the
existence of physiological processes at all (1980, #1063):
Thinking in terms of physiological
processes is extremely dangerous in
connexion with the clarification of
conceptual problems in psychology.
Thinking in physiological hypotheses
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deludes us sometimes with false
difficulties, sometimes with false
solutions. The best prophylactic against
this is the thought that I don't know at
all whether the humans I am acquainted
with actually have a nervous system.
Not to mention that it is "imaginable that my skull
should turn out empty when it was operated on" (Wittgenstein
1969, #4).
46.
The claim that the mental should be anomalous, is,
I believe, Davidson's attempt to embrace materialism while
rejecting reductionism.
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CHAPTER 3
EXTERNALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR
SEMANTIC INNOCENCE AND ANALYTIC TRUTH

Leibniz . . . was always engaged in trying to construct such
a mathematical logic as we have now, or rather such a one as
Boole constructed, and he was always failing because of his
respect for Aristotle. Whenever he invented a really good
system, as he did several times, it always brought out that
such moods as Darapti are fallacious . . . but he could not
bring himself to believe that it was fallacious, so he began
again. That shows you that you should not have too much
respect for distinguished men.
Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

1. Introduction
In the philosophy of language (as well as in related
metaphysical inquiries) there is a long tradition of
distinguishing meaning and reference. Theories of meaning
and theories of truth; intension and extension; concept and
object; connotation and denotation - not only are these not
to be confused, but, depending on one's ideological
presuppositions, one is thought to be in better shape
theoretically than the other.1
This canonical ontological distinction is most
explicitly captured in Fregean semantics, where it is put to
work to solve an apparent puzzle concerning the semantics of
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expressions in intensional or so-called opaque contexts. It
is also clearly what is behind the common-sense distinction
between analytic and synthetic truth: the distinction, as it
is often and most simply described, between truth in virtue
of meaning alone and truth in virtue of meaning and the
world.
Externalism about meaning, as we are now in a position
to appreciate, reconfigures the distinction between meaning
and reference. No longer is it possible to viably posit a
conceptual realm, in some sense co-existing with and related
to that of the ordinary world of objects, but autonomous or
independent from that world. The world of reference now
permeates the realm of meaning.2
We have seen that this account of meaning has decided
repercussions for mental content and the explanation of
behavior. In this chapter we trace the consequences of
externalism for the semantics of expressions in intensional
contexts, and for an account of analytic truth. The issues
that concern us here are simply - the simplicity is slightly
deceptive - put. First: given, as externalism about meaning
demands, that the meaning of an expression is (at least in
part) its reference, a minute but interesting consequence
results for a Fregean account of the reference of
expressions in opaque contexts. Such an account has been
thought to violate 'semantic innocence'

(Davidson 1980), in

its claim that the reference of expressions in indirect
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discourse are the ordinary senses of those expressions: the
senses they bear when outside of those contexts. The
reference of an expression is an ambiguous thing, therefore,
on Frege's account.
What I claim here is that one - unnoticed consequence of externalism is to make it possible to
recapture semantic innocence for a Fregean account of
opacity. If meaning is determined by reference, then, when
an expression refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque
context, it - indirectly, perhaps - really preserves its
ordinary reference. Semantic externalism makes it possible
to deny that meaning, senses, intensions and the like are
corrupt and exotic creatures, reference to which is perilous
and unjustified by any properly hardheaded and virtuous
semantics.
Externalism has further repercussions for the question
of the nature of analytic truth. This is an issue of
monumental controversy, much of which we can very
fortunately set aside. What I am concerned with is this:
analytic truth has traditionally been conceived of as purely
conceptual truth with certain concomitant modal and
epistemic properties - purely conceptual in the sense of
independent of the world. As we know, externalism forbids
that kind of conceptual autonomy, so the question arises:
does externalism at last spell the end of analyticity? I
argue the contrary: not only is it possible to give a
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perfectly viable account of analytic truth from an
externalist perspective; externalism also forces us to
reconsider the very nature of analytic truth.
It is worth pointing out that both of these issues
lead, often ultra-precipitously, into unsavory, and tangled,
philosophical webs. Any number of presuppositions have to be
made

- and kept in mind -

to keep the scope of my remarks

from becoming unmanageable. I have indicated these
presuppositions, where appropriate.
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PART ONE
SEMANTIC INNOCENCE

1.

Introduction

Semantic innocence - the expression is due to Davidson
(1984, 93-108) - is a view about the reference of
expressions. It concerns, roughly speaking, not only the
idea that the reference of an expression ought not to be
ambiguous, but, in particular, that the reference of an
expression should not be thought sometimes to comprise an
intensional entity, and, the rest of the time, the mundane
and ordinary middle-sized world.
Fregean semantics has been accused, by Davidson, of
violating semantic innocence; indeed Fregean semantics is
perhaps a paradigm case of such violation. Frege's strategy
in accounting for the behavior of expressions in indirect
discourse is well known.

Frege maintains the principle that

the truth-value of a sentence must remain unchanged when one
of the expressions in the sentence is replaced with another
with which it is co-referential. Expressions in certain now
familiar contexts, however, appear to flout this principle.
When, for instance, an expression in the scope of a verb of
propositional attitude such as 'believe'is replaced with
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another whose reference is identical, the truth-value of the
sentence seems subject to variation. Thus, although
'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' co-refer, replacement of 'Clark
Kent' for 'Superman' in

(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman is a hero

apparently results in a variation of truth-value of that
sentence. Frege's solution was to conclude that expressions
occurring in opaque contexts do not have their ordinary
reference - rather, it is the ordinary sense of the
expressions that, in such cases, comes to serve as their
reference. Replacing 'Superman' with an expression that
expresses the same sense in the sentence ('the defender of
good from Krypton,' say), does not appear to have the same
effect on the truth-value of a sentence as does replacing
the term with one whose reference is the same but which has
another sense. Frege thus preserves the principle of
substitutivity; no variation in truth-value is held to occur
between two belief sentences whose embedded that-clauses
express the same sense.3

2. "Two Provinces so Fundamentally Distinct":
Meaning and Reference
Davidson's comment on the Fregean account is notorious
(1984, 93-108):
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Since Frege, philosophers have become
hardened to the idea that contentsentences in talk about propositional
attitudes may strangely refer to such
entities as intensions, propositions,
sentences, utterances, and inscriptions.
What is strange is not the entities
. . . but the notion that ordinary
words for planets, people, tables, and
hippopotami in indirect discourse may
give up these pedestrian references for
the exotica. If we could recover our
pre-Fregean semantic innocence, I think
it would seem to us plainly incredible
that the words 'The earth moves1,
uttered after the words 'Galileo said
that', mean anything different, or refer
to anything else, than is their wont
when they come in other environments.4
Davidson alludes here to a familiar distinction: that
between intensional entities and more mundane objects of
reference. This distinction may be understood as based on
another, one that Quine (1980, 130) has described as:
two provinces so fundamentally distinct
as not to deserve a joint appellation at
all. They may be called the theory of
meaning and the theory of reference.
The difference between the two theories is revealed in
the separate and distinct ontologies to which each permits
reference. The subject-matter of the theory of meaning
includes meaning, synonymy, and analyticity; that of the
theory of reference, instead, includes naming, truth and
extension.
Now, Davidson is right: it is difficult to accept that
expressions in opaque contexts are ambiguous in the way
Frege's account suggests. At the same time, we might suggest
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that the temptation to think of such a shift of reference as
particularly significant is strongest inasmuch as we think
of theories of meaning and reference as discriminated
according to tradition. Given that distinction, the
reference shift that expressions in a that-clause appear to
experience seems to be precisely a shift from entities
belonging to the theory of reference to those belonging to
the theory of meaning, these being disjoint provinces.
But we no longer tend to think so much of meaning and
mental content as - in themselves - harbingers of the
exotic. Familiar claims concerning extra-individual
environment, both particular and abstract, have taught us
that neither meaning nor mental content is isolated from the
world of pedestrian reference in quite the simple way
Davidson - in keeping with tradition - suggests. And if this
is so, there is another alternative to consider in our
account of the semantics of expressions in indirect
discourse. Semantic externalism offers just the antidote we
need to quash the temptation to separate meaning and
reference and to provide an alternative account.

3. Externalism and the reference of that-clauses:
exotica or the mundane?
We will consider expressions of the form 'x believes
that p , ' and argue that the determination to reject a
Fregean solution to the problem of the reference of
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expressions in an opaque context varies in intensity
relative to the perceived inextricability of the link
between meaning and the extra-individual environment. If the
link is perceived as negligible - if a theory of meaning is
internalist - then we can claim that the view that
expressions in indirect discourse take their ordinary sense
as reference will rest on a distinction with some
significance in that theory. Their non-standard behavior is
based, in that case, on a theory of meaning that holds that
the reference of a that-clause is determined essentially by
sub-cutaneous facts about an individual; on a theory of
meaning, that is, that carves a significant ontological
distinction between what serves as the sense of an
expression, and what its reference. This may well, with some
justice, stiffen the resolve of opponents to a Fregean
theory, given the deep referential ambiguity that is
necessarily visited on expressions on such an account.
If, on the other hand, the link is perceived as
essential - if, that is, what determines the meaning of
words and the reference of that-clauses is held to be the
extra-cranial environment - then we can argue that there
will be no in principle rejection of a view that takes the
reference of that-clauses to be their ordinary sense; for,
on such an externalist view, the semantic values of
expressions in a that-clause will be their ordinary
references after all, or something that involves them
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essentially.

There is nothing exotic about an expression's

taking either its denotation, or what McDowell (1984, pp.
283-294) has called its de re sense as reference in an
opaque context, for, on an externalist theory, the cleavage
between meaning and reference that Davidson appears to be
presupposing does not obtain.
Now, there is another context for which the same point
can be made: the context generated by the prefix It is
analytic that.

...

An examination of this context will

show that analytic sentences are another class of sentence
whose constituent expressions appear to invite the idea of a
shift to their ordinary sense as reference.
Suppose 'p* is the analytic truth 'All bachelors are
unmarried males,' and compare the truth-conditions of 'p'
with those of 'It is analytic that p.' What makes 'It is
analytic that p' true, on a Fregean account, are the senses
referred to by 'p''s constituent expressions, since, in this
case,

'p' is opaquely embedded. Yet what makes 'p' itself

analytically true are the senses expressed by its
constituent expressions - for 'p' is true, as we say, in
virtue of its meaning alone. The truth-conditions of 'p'
itself thus appear to involve the very entities relevant to
the truth of 'It is analytic that p'; the very entities
referred to by 'p' when 'p' is embedded in a that-clause.
This seems to correlate with the distinction we tend to
accept between the nature of analytic truth and that of
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synthetic truth. For what is it that distinguishes the truth
of 'p', above, from 'g', the synthetic truth 'All bachelors
are happy'? The truth-conditions of 'g' are a function of
the ordinary reference of the expression 'bachelor' and
whether or not the predicate 'happy' applies. But 'p' is
held to have a set of unique features5 that do not appear
accountable for unless 'p''s truth-conditions are specified
in terms of the senses of its constituent expressions. These
features appear to depend on 'p''s truth-value being
determined, as we say, independent of the world; in virtue,
that is, of 'p''s meaning, and that alone.
Thus it appears that both the prefix It is analytic
that.

. . .

and the prefix x believes that.

. . . have the

same influence on an embedded sentence; both, we may say,
are reference-shifting operators. This suggests that the
distinction we tend to accept between analytic and synthetic
truth seems to be yet another distinction supported by the
divide between meaning and reference described by Quine
above. And, if all this is right, then the same consequences
of externalism about meaning that we have claimed for belief
will hold for analytic truth. It would seem difficult to
deny that whatever is problematic about expressions shifting
their reference to exotica in belief contexts could be any
less so in the case of analytic contexts. So, although
analytic sentences are sentences with distinguishing
features of a particular kind, and, on the face of it, it
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does not appear possible that an account of their truthconditions could fail to include an account of their
constituent expressions' experiencing a shift of reference
to their ordinary senses, nevertheless, we cannot accept
reference to exotica for analytic sentences yet deny it for
belief sentences. If our objective is to recover semantic
innocence, it appears that we must expunge reference to
exotica from an account of the truth-conditions of analytic
sentences as well.
Let us consider what it is about internalist
theories of meaning that encourages an ambiguity-favoring
account of the semantics of expressions in the opaque
contents generated by x believes that. . . . and It is
analytic that.

. . ., and let us see whether externalism

about meaning does indeed deflate the "plainly incredible"
view that expressions shift their reference to exotica when
embedded in opaque contexts.
Belief, we are accustomed to saying, is a relation
between an individual and a proposition with constituent
structure. Different views assign different structures to
propositions, largely as a function of what entities are
accepted as relevant to an account of meaning and content.
Thus, for example, the semantic analysis of (1), above, will
vary, among other things, according to whether the relevant
relation is held to obtain between Lois and a proposition
whose constituents are the senses expressed by the singular
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term 'Superman' and the predicate 'hero'; or whether,
instead, Lois is held to be in the belief relation to a
proposition whose constituents are the very objects and
properties denoted by those expressions.
We are not entirely unaccustomed to discussing
analytic truth in these terms, and it is clear that similar
considerations will apply to analytic contexts as do to
belief contexts. In the context It is analytic that p,

'p'

also expresses a proposition with constituent structure. An
account of this structure will vary in just the same way as
do accounts of the constituent structure of a proposition in
a belief context.
The contribution made by the reference of expressions
is what is crucial to determining the truth-value of a
sentence formed by those expressions. Now, an internalist
about content must claim that it is internal facts about a
subject that essentially determine that subject's mental
states. Her belief about Superman's heroism is quite
independent of any environmental variations with respect to
Superman. The mental state enjoyed in belief is, as we have
said, commonly analyzed as a relation to a proposition. And
an internalist has to say that the expressions embedded in
the that-clause that expresses the proposition believed
express concepts that have their essential nature fixed in
isolation from the environment that contains the references
of those terms. In transparent contexts, this split between
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what words refer to and what they mean is not as evident as
it becomes in opaque contexts. The truth-value of a sentence
in a transparent context is a function partly of the meaning
of its words and partly of the properties of what those
words pick out. But the contribution to truth-value of the
ordinary reference of expressions is a liability in opaque
contexts; for there, although expressions co-refer,
substituting one for the other appears to affect truthvalue.
And, at least for the internalist, there is an
alternative. Denotation is only one aspect of expressions;
they also have meaning, which is independently determined.
Semantic internalism, operating as it does with a
comparatively loose connection between what determines the
meaning of expressions and what it is that those expressions
refer to, is

a theory of meaning where there exists the

theoretical option of invoking something other than the
ordinary reference of expressions to act as their reference
in opaque contexts - namely, their meaning, which has
distinct enough properties to offer a solution to a problem
generated in those contexts by their denotation.
No such theoretical option exists, however, for an
externalist about meaning, whose theory does not carve a
decisive individuative incision between meaning and the
world beyond the subject. But this implies that to hold that
the reference of expressions in opaque contexts is their
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sense is, in effect, for the externalist to meet Davidson's
plea. Expressions in indirect discourse ultimately take
nothing other than their ordinary reference as reference, if
the meaning of an expression is essentially determined by
what in the environment it refers to.

4. The Varieties of Externalism:
The Account Applied
Within the externalist camp theoretical commitment
varies.6 Theories of direct reference (TDR), one variety of
externalism, hold that the meaning of an expression is
identical to its denotation.7 Another variety employs,
instead, the idea of a de re sense. De re senses enmesh
particulars and properties, so to speak; they are not
bearers of them in such a way as to be intrinsically
independent of what they bear. What consequences could
follow from these types of view in holding that the
reference of an expression in an opaque context is its sense
- since sense is determined by reference?
To speak of expressions in opaque contexts as
referring to their senses is, on a TDR, to speak in a longwinded, perhaps partly ironic way - the fact remains that
the reference of expressions in those contexts is their
ordinary reference and nothing more.8 Further, the meaning
of the embedded sentence in (1) does not change, since both
•Superman' and 'Clark Kent' refer to the very same
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individual. These are terms with the same sense because
sense is exhausted by reference and they are terms with the
same reference.9
If the meaning of an expression is held instead to
consist in the de re sense it expresses, its reference in an
opaque context will be ultimately no less pedestrian. It is
true that, strictly speaking, the reference of an expression
in an embedded sentence is, on this view, a de re sense,
which is not identical to its ordinary reference. However and this is the key point - de re senses are essentially
determined by and not independent of the objects and
properties that are their bearers. If we think of these
senses as media through which ordinary reference is
preserved, then it is clear that, on such a view, it is the
ordinary reference of an expression that genuinely serves as
its reference or semantic value in an opaque context.
Crucially, a de re sense is not to be understood as an
entity unmoored from the world of pedestrian reference; and
it is precisely such unmoored entities that Davidson
repudiates as exotica. In these terms, then, we may say that
a Fregean account of (1) is innocent of reference to
exotica.
The apparent variation in truth-value between (1) and
(2)

is accounted for, standardly, by the claim that

expressions can share reference but differ in sense. A
particular individual is the reference of the terms in the
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embedded sentences in (1) and (2) and it is he who, on this
sort of view, determines the sense of those terms. Since a
de re sense is not identical with the reference of an
expression, however, it will not follow that two expressions
with the same reference have the same (de re) sense. The
troubles Lois generates by instantiating (1) and not (2), in
spite of the fact that she is held to be in the belief
relation to the very same singular proposition, are
explained by taking this into account.

5. Opacity, Belief and Analyticity
Now, given the analogy we have pressed between belief
contexts and analytic contexts, the same account must hold,
with no untoward consequences for analytic truth, for

(3) It is analytic that Hesperus is Hesperus.

But if 'Phosphorus' replaces the second occurrence of
'Hesperus' in (3), (3) seems, prima facie, to undergo the
familiar variation in truth-value. Suppose, however, that we
accept a TDR; if so, we do not seem to be able to deny that
it is also true that

(4) It is analytic that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

A TDR holds that meaning is identical to reference; on
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this view, there is no change in meaning between the
embedded sentences in (3) and (4). Further, since meaning is
identical to reference, neither (3) nor (4) is any less true
in virtue of meaning; although, again, to put it like this
is to speak in roundabout way. It is worth mentioning here,
that a sentence can be true in virtue of meaning in two
ways: in a purely semantic sense, where the analytic truth
of a sentence follows from the semantic values of the terms
in the sentence, which are assigned to terms by

semantic

rules alone; and in a more psychological sense, where
analytic sentences are held to be those sentences whose
terms can be substituted for one another salva veritate in a
belief context. Accepting (4) as true may grate less,
perhaps, if we think of the embedded sentence as
analytically true in the purely semantic sense. If instead
we characterize analytic truth in the more psychological
sense, then facts about the believer become relevant, and
the apparent variation in truth-value between (3) and (4)
can be explained by taking facts about the believer into
account.
If, on the other hand, the embedded expressions are
taken to refer to their de re senses, then, again, the key
point is that the expressions do not genuinely refer to
exotica, for, again, de re senses are not independent of the
objects and properties that are their bearers. De re senses
are, we may say, object-involving, if they are expressed by
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singular terms, and property-involving, if they are
expressed by predicates. Thus, in (3) and (4), the embedded
expressions refer to their object-involving de re senses.
This view does not, however, commit us to the truth of (4),
since we can allow, standardly, that two terms that share
reference need not share the same (de re) sense. Further, in

(5) It is analytic that bachelors are unmarried males

we say that the embedded expressions refer to their
property-involving de re senses: that is, the ordinary
reference of these expressions is what individuates the
senses they express; via the de re senses, thus, the
ordinary reference of these expressions is preserved in an
opaque context. Further, we can accept the truth of (5) in
the usual way: two expressions can share both reference and
sense.

6. Conclusion
The context generated by It is analytic that.

...

is

one for which it may seem as though semantic innocence is
the last thing we ought to want to recover. If expressions
in this context refer to their denotations or to their de re
senses, then, given our earlier comparison of the truthconditions of analytic sentences and those of sentences like
(5), the truth-conditions of analytic sentences will be
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specified, in the end, in terms of the world - just like
synthetic sentences. Externalism about meaning may indeed
block the theoretical option of invoking a realm of meaning
alone, distinguished by a unique set of properties, to serve
as what it is that the

truth-conditions for this class of

sentence will involve.

But, I would insist, it

is far from

clear that it follows from this that there is no analyticsynthetic distinction.
I have argued that the theoretical alternatives
offered by externalism

about meaning appear to

Davidson's plea against semantic corruption

in

meet
an accountof

the reference of expressions in indirect discourse. And I
have urged that our recuperation of pre-Fregean semantic
innocence cannot be half-hearted. What goes for one opaque
context must go for all opaque contexts. This suggests that
our recovery will be complete only when we overcome the idea
that analytic truth is an exotic kind of truth.
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PART TWO
ANALYTIC TRUTH

1. Externalism and Analyticity
Quine's scepticism regarding the notion of analytic
truth presupposes a - quite traditional - ontological
distinction between intensions, meanings, or concepts, and
the extra-semantic world. This is manifest in some
preliminary remarks of Quine's (1980, 21)i1
Kant's intent . . . can be restated
thus: a statement is analytic when it is
true by virtue of meanings and
independently of fact . . . Meaning, let
us remember, is not to be identified
with naming. Frege's example of 'Evening
Star' and 'Morning Star', and Russell's
of 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverly'
illustrate that terms can name the same
thing but differ in meaning . . . It is
indeed a commonplace in philosophy to
oppose intension (or meaning) to
extension, or, in a variant vocabulary,
connotation to denotation.
Quine's rejection of the notion of analyticity can be
understood as the claim that there is no reason to suppose
that a purely conceptual or linguistic element of truth can
be made sense of (1980, 36):
It is obvious that truth in general
depends on both language and
extralinguistic fact . . . thus one is
tempted to suppose in general that the
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truth of a statement is somehow
analyzable into a linguistic component
and a factual component. Given this
supposition, it next seems reasonable
that in some statements the factual
component should be null; and these are
the analytic statements. But for all its
apriori reasonableness, a boundary
between analytic and synthetic
statements simply has not been drawn
•

•

•

•

Recent developments in the theory of meaning seem to
add further support to Quine's rejection of the
analytic/synthetic distinction. Semantic externalism claims
that neither meaning nor mental content can be determined
independently of an individual's environment. Given
externalism, to say that a sentence is true in virtue of
meaning is to say, ultimately, that it is true in virtue of
reference. And if all sentences are true in virtue of the
world, it is difficult to see how we can even in principle
distinguish some sentences from others as true in virtue of
the world-independent, purely semantic entities that their
truth-conditions involve.2
I believe, however, that semantic externalism exposes
and challenges an uncritical assumption about the nature of
analytic truth, one grounded in the traditional distinction
between meaning and reference. According to this assumption,
analytic truth is some species of linguistic or 'purely
conceptual' truth. Quine is of course quite right to reject
a distinction between sentences whose truth-conditions
involve a linguistic or conceptual component alone, and
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those whose truth is settled with respect to the world. But,
as I will argue, it is far from clear that it follows from
this that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction.
What follows is an account of analytic truth from the
perspective of semantic externalism. The truth-conditions of
analytic sentences will not be distinguished from those of
synthetic sentences; all, sentences, given externalism, are
true in virtue of the world. It will emerge, however, that
the truth-conditions of an analytic sentence are to be
distinguished from what makes it analytic. This account is
one that will revoke the customary world-independence of
analytic sentences - but will not sacrifice their unique
modal and epistemic features.3
A programmatic proviso should be noted at the outset.
These remarks are not intended as an argument for
analyticity; such an argument is a project to be pursued
independently. Rather, the notion of analyticity as truthvalue in virtue of meaning alone is here presupposed,4 in
order to reveal an interesting consequence of semantic
externalism.

2. Truth-Conditions and Analyticity-Conditions:
A Distinction
As we have argued (see chapter 1), externalist claims
can be distinguished as either weak or strong. An account of
analytic truth given strong externalism would, obviously, be
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unnecessarily restrictive, since, arguably, only a limited
number of concepts are capable of strongly external
individuation. Accordingly we will develop an account of
analytic truth along the lines of weak externalism, and go
on to consider some objections.
Two questions must be carefully distinguished: first,
by reference to what are the truth-conditions of sentences
like

(1) Bachelors are happy

and

(2) Bachelors are unmarried males

to be given? What is it, that is, that determines the truth
value of those sentences? Second, what is it that makes (2)
analytic? In what terms, that is, are its analyticityconditions to be made?
With Frege, we will say that the constituent
expressions of a sentence have both sense and reference. We
take the reference of singular terms to be individual
particulars, and those of predicates to be properties
(parting company with Frege). Further, we take it that
properties are characterized by what we will call
'structural complexity,' to be defined shortly. Now, it is
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objects and properties that are meant to individuate the
senses of expressions given externalism about meaning. How
does this picture of meaning constrain an account of truth
in virtue of meaning alone?
The answer to the first guestion above need raise no
especial difficulties. If meaning is determined by
reference, then (1) and (2) have their truth-value fixed by
the reference of their constituent expressions.5 We can
focus on sentences like (2) for brevity. Such sentences are
composed of general terms whose reference, as we have said,
are properties. Now, given the characterization of a
property as a mind-and-language independent entity with
structural complexity of varying degree, we can begin to
construct an account of the features that contribute to the
semantic profile of those sentences we call analytic truths.

3. The Structural Complexity of Abstract Properties
First, we understand the structural complexity of a
property to comprise: 1) its identity with other properties;
2) its component structure - the simpler properties of which
it is composed; and 3) the relations it bears to other
properties. We take a property to have the structural
complexity it has necessarily,6 and to bear either
necessary or contingent relations to other properties in
virtue of that structure. Accordingly, we say that the
reference of the expression 'bachelor' in (2) - the property
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of being a bachelor - has structural complexity. One of the
properties with which it is identical is the property
denoted by the expression 'unmarried male.' Thus,

(2) is

true in virtue of the (improper) componential relation
between the reference of its constituent expressions.7 So
much for what makes (2) true - what is it that makes this
sentence an analytic truth?

4. Property-revealing sense
In order to answer this question, we need to build up
to a notion of property-revealing sense. The best way to
understand this notion is by way of McDowell's notion of a
de re sense.8 Segal gives an useful and elegant summary of
the idea (1989, 41-42):
From Russell comes the idea that certain
singular thoughts are object-dependent,
in the sense that the object of thought
(the object that the thought is about)
is itself a feature of the thought's
content . . . McDowell incorporates the
Russellian idea of object-dependence . .
. into a basically Fregean conception of
thoughts. A Fregean thought contains
only Fregean senses as constituents. A
Fregean sense is a mode of presentation
of an object of thought, a way in which
the object is presented in thought.
Since any given object may be presented
in different ways, a sense cannot be
identical with the object it presents.
The point of holding that thoughts are
made up of senses is, of course, to
explain how it is possible rationally to
hold conflicting attitudes towards the
same object . . . The synthesis of
Russellian and Fregean views is achieved
by allowing that Fregean senses may
themselves be object-dependent. The
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thought that Viola is male contains, in
subject position, a mode of presentation
of Viola. But that mode of presentation
itself owes its existence and identity
to Viola. That sense could not have
presented a different object, nor could
it have failed to present any object at
all. The object of thought thus figures
in the thought under a particular mode
of presentation.
Now, what we are claiming is this: while all senses
are individuated by extrinsic entities - properties,
according to weak externalism - it is not the case that all
senses will be such as to reveal the structural complexity
of the properties that individuate them. We will say,
accordingly, that while all senses are property-involving
(that is, de re, in McDowell's sense), not all senses are
property-revealing. Property-revealing senses manifest both
the (proper and improper) structural composition of the
properties that individuate them and the necessary or
contingent relations borne by those properties.9 And an
analytic sentence, we will say, is one whose constituent
terms express senses that reveal the necessary relations
borne by the properties denoted by the terms.
How is the property-revealing function of sense to be
understood? This is not so easy to say. Nevertheless, a
number of clarificatory remarks can be made.
First, the property-revealing character of the sense
of an expression is not a direct function of any syntactic
complexity in the expression itself. One cannot, that is,
distinguish the property-revealing sense of an expression by
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simply looking at the syntactic structure of that
expression. Any correlation there is a contingent one.
We can enlarge on this point by considering some
contrasting cases. First, take a predicate with, as it
happens, syntactic and semantic structural complexity:

'is

an unmarried male.1 Now compare the predicate 'is a
bachelor.' Here there is no obvious syntactic complexity,
but it would be difficult to deny its semantic complexity:
it has the same complex sense as the syntactically complex
'is an unmarried male.'
It is not the case, further, that the propertyrevealing function of a sense is a trivial one. Imagine a
case where an individual - perhaps a non-native speaker of a
language L - is aware that her community uses a certain
word, say,

'bachelor.' She herself begins to use this word,

but the descriptive content associated with the word by the
other speakers in the community is, for some reason, not
available to her. She would thus simply be using 'bachelor'
as a label or a name she has picked up from others without
knowing any descriptive information about its bearer.
Now, if we extend the claims of a theory of direct
reference - one variety of externalism - from singular terms
to predicates, it is clear that we may say that for such a
speaker,

the predicate 'bachelor' is property involving but

not property revealing. The predicate, in her idiolect, will
have sense; but not descriptive sense.10
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Thus, while it is true that it is on the semantic
complexity of terms that analytic relations depend, it is
clearly the case that not all terms will generate
analyticities in the case of particular speakers. It is not
sufficient that an expression has as its reference a
property with constituent structure which is taken to
individuate the sense of that expression in an essential
way; for a speaker may fail entirely to associate any
descriptive content to that expression.
Nor, further, is it the case that a term expresses a
property-revealing sense context-independently. Whether the
sense of an expression reveals the structural complexity of
the property that, on this view, individuates it, is a
matter of its relation to the other senses with which it co
occurs in a proposition. An expression has sense and
reference, and such reference has constituent structure, but
this will not necessarily be revealed by the sense of that
expression on its own (among other things, it would
difficult to see how there could be different senses
associated with the same expression if this were so).
Instead, we want to say that the structure of the properties
that individuate senses may be revealed in the relation of
one sense to another. The structural complexity of a
property, something that may remain hidden when one
considers an expression and its sense and reference in
isolation (consider 'water') may better emerge in the
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encounter of senses in a proposition.
Thus it is that the relation of senses to one another
will sometimes be such as to manifest the structural
complexity of the properties that individuate them, by
displaying a property's (proper or improper) relations to
another in virtue of its structure. It may help to consider
that while it is true, following Frege, that sense is the
mode of presentation of reference, it does not follow that a
mode of presentation will illuminate the structural features
of the reference of the expression, by which it is
individuated.
It may be useful, in this context, simply to think of
the distinction between property-revealing and propertyinvolving sense to be analogous to the distinction between
directly referring to an object and referring to it via a
description. A descriptive singular term obviously
contributes, in the act of reference, much more information
about the entity referred to than does a mere label.
So, given an externalist individuation relation, we
will say that senses sometimes mirror the structural
relations of the properties that individuate them - by
bearing those relations themselves. And, if all this is
plausible, we are now in a position to entertain an account
of analytic truth made in terms of property-revealing sense.
Property-revealing senses account for the modal
features that characterize analytic truth as follows. An
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analytic sentence is necessarily true in that 1) it is true
in virtue of the reference of its terms and 2) the objects
of reference of the terms of analytic sentences are, as we
have said, properties, which have the constituent structure
they have necessarily, and which bear a number of necessary
relations to one another as a result. So (2), above, is
necessarily true on the view we have sketched, in that what
it is to be an unmarried male is part of the necessary
structural complexity of what it is to be a bachelor. The
structural composition of the property of being a bachelor,
we may say, necessarily comprises the property of being an
unmarried male: the properties in this case are identical.
What may come as some surprise is that analytic sentences
will be, on this account, necessarily true de re.11
Property-revealing senses further account for the
unique epistemic features characteristic of analytic truths.
How is it that a sentence composed of terms that express
property-revealing senses is a sentence knowable a priori?
Recall that, given weak externalism, senses are individuated
by properties and their relations; all senses are propertyinvolving. For one class of sentence, however, the
properties referred to by the constituent terms of the
sentence will bear a (de re) necessary relation to one
another, and, as we have said, a necessary relation will be
borne by the senses individuated by those properties
themselves, if those senses are property-revealing. No other
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appeal will be needed to grasp the structure and the
relations characteristic of the properties that determine
the truth-value of the sentence. Grasp of the (propertyrevealing) senses is sufficient. Propositions whose
constituents are property-revealing senses are thus both
necessarily true and knowable a priori. The sentences that
express such propositions are analytic sentences.

5.

The Account Applied

The following examples serve to illustrate this
account of analytic truth:
(1) PH20 is partly oxygen.'

Here the properties

referred to by the terms bear a necessary componential
relation to one another: it is part of the structural
complexity of the property of being H20 that it is partly
composed of oxygen. The senses of these expressions reveal
this structural complexity by bearing a necessary relation
themselves. Grasp of the senses is sufficient for knowledge
of the truth of the proposition. The sentence is,
accordingly, an analytic truth: necessarily true and
knowable a priori.
(2)12 'A fortnight is a period of 14 days.' Here
the properties referred to by the terms bear a necessary
component relation to one another: the constituent structure
of the property of being a fortnight is such that being a
period of 14 days is a necessary (improper) part of it. The
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senses of these expressions mirror the necessary structural
complexity of the properties denoted by the expressions, and
grasp of these senses is, again, sufficient for the
knowledge of the truth of the proposition expressed by the
sentence. The sentence is, accordingly, an analytic truth.
(3) 'Water is partly oxygen.' The senses of the
expressions in this case are property-involving, but, while
the properties denoted by the expressions bear a necessary
relation to one another in virtue of their component
structure, the senses fail to capture it; they are not
property-revealing. The structural complexity of the
properties -

crucially, the necessary relations borne by

the properties - is not graspable by mere grasp of the
senses of the terms in this sentence. Accordingly, we say
that the sentence is a necessary but synthetic sentence.
(4) 'There are puddles of water on 73rd street.'
In this case, the senses of the expressions can be said to
property-revealing, in that they reveal that the constituent
structure of the properties referred to by the terms of this
sentence is such that they bear only a contingent relation
to one another. The senses mirror that contingent relation
themselves; but grasp of the senses alone is insufficient to
know the truth of the proposition. The sentence that
expresses the proposition made up of these senses is a
synthetic sentence, contingently true.
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6. Objections and Replies
We may now turn to some of the objections that might
be raised to the foregoing account of analytic truth from an
externalist perspective. We will be chiefly concerned with
replies to what seem to be three main lines of objection.

a. Externalism: Proper Formulations
The first sort of objection may be traced to a
possible misunderstanding concerning the nature of
externalism as a theory of content. It takes the form of
resisting what may seem to be the prima facie implausibility
of an account of analytic sentences whose truth-conditions
are made in the same terms as those of synthetic sentences.
This kind of objection goes more or less as follows: suppose
one takes Fregean senses to individuate mental states.
Fregean senses are not in the head; indeed, Frege was
adamant about their abstract nature. The view that takes
Fregean senses to individuate mental states is not thereby,
internalist, and - crucially - such a view preserves the
classic distinction between sentences true in virtue of
meaning alone and those true in virtue of meaning and the
world. Such a view, it is claimed, is externalist at less
cost (a related objection takes the favored individuative
entity to be a structured proposition; the gist is the
same).
Now I take it as obvious that it is an error to
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suppose that internalism is circumvented by mere appeal to
entities no one would claim are in the head to play the
relevant role in the determination of a mental state.
Something's being merely external to the head is
insufficient to generate any interesting externalism. To see
this, let us ask ourselves whether the following two
accounts of the content of a belief differ in any crucial
way.
One account specifies the content of

(7) Lois Lane believes that Superman is a hero

in terms of the belief relation holding between Lois and the
structured singular proposition whose constituents are the
individual particular Superman and the property of heroism.
The other specifies the content of (7) in terms of the
belief relation holding between Lois and the structured
proposition whose constituents are, instead, the modes of
presentation expressed by 'Superman' and by 'heroism,' where
these do not involve the reference essentially. It seems
obvious, in spite of the fact that both accounts specify
belief as a relation to a proposition - an abstract object,
one not in the head - that there is a difference in what it
is that bears the individuative burden. As the controversy
in the literature will attest, there is a critical
difference in what each view takes to be the constituent
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structure of the proposition, a difference that is essential
to the account - and to the theoretical slant of the account
- of the mental state in question. Clearly, it is
insufficient to employ a vehicle of individuation that is
not itself in the head in order to be able to claim that
one's theory is an externalist one: it is quite consistent
with internalism about meaning that a mental state is held
to be characterized in the grasp of an abstract proposition.
For suppose that one holds that the grasp of a proposition
depends solely on internal facts about the subject of the
mental state. Such a view would seem to be unarguably
internalist. In order for a theory of the individuation of
mental states to pass muster as externalist it is clear that
an account both of the component structure of the vehicles
of individuation, and of the role played by those vehicles
with respect to certain conditions of understanding that is
consistent with externalist requirements, must be supplied.

b. Mentalism about Properties Opposed
The second and third lines of objection are somewhat
related. One is a denial that an account of analytic truth
that claims that the truth-conditions of analytic sentences
are to be made in property-revealing terms could be properly
externalist, since properties are abstract objects, and as
such, are worId-independent. The other takes the form of the
familiar claim that the relevant notion of a property is,
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essentially, a semantic one. If this were so, it would
naturally rob much of the interest from our view, since it
would effectively collapse it into the standard view. If
properties really are just semantic entities, then claiming
that analytic sentences are true in virtue of necessary
relations between properties would seem to be nothing but a
verbal idiosyncracy.
To deny that properties are of an essentially semantic
nature is something of quite independent interest and
deserves minute attention. Nevertheless, a number of basic possibly familiar - remarks against a sense-property
identity theory can be profitably made here.13 These will
further aid in answering the objection against our account
of analytic truth as properly externalist. Briefly:
(i) It seems implausible that there is no distinction
between 'The carpet has the property of being red' and 'The
carpet has the sense of the word 'red.'' Objects instantiate
properties, they do not instantiate senses.
(ii) It appears to be in dispute, as Fregean exegesis
attests, whether or not senses depend on language, but it is
again implausible that properties do. If properties are not
distinguished from senses, some commentators are in the
position of defending the view that properties depend on
language. Surely, however, whether the carpet is red is a
state of affairs quite independent of our linguistic
faculty.
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(iii) On the usual criterion for distinguishing sense
from reference, one must consider whether there can be nonsynonymous terms that have the same reference. This
criterion applies no less to predicates than it does to
singular terms. Both 'water* and 'H20' are predicates with
the same reference, but they do not have the same sense.
(iv) Consider sentences that express identities between
properties. It would seem that to claim that properties are
senses would be to deny that there can be informative
identities of this kind. For instance, one standard way to
distinguish

(a) Water is water
from
(b) Water is H20

is on the grounds that (b) is a synthetic necessity. The
properties denoted by the terms are identical but the sense
of 'water' and that of 'H20' are not; hence, classically,
(b) is informative but (a) is trifling. Suppose now that one
holds that properties are senses.

In both sentences the

property denoted by the terms 'water' and 'H20' is the same.
If properties are senses then the sense of 'water' is
identical with the sense of 'H20'; not only that, the sense
of 'water' is identical with the propery of being H20, the
reference of both terms. The implausibility of such a view
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is shown, among other things, in that it surrenders the
informativeness of (b) - not a happy result.
(v)

Harking back for the moment to twin Earth, it seems

that a sense-property identity theorist is committed to the
following:
(1) that water is not H20. The fact that the sense
of 'water' and that of 'H20' are not the same sense would
render being water and being H20 different properties, if
properties are senses.
(2)
and twin

that water is XYZ. The communities of Earth

Earth associate the same concepts with the word

'water.' The sense of both terms is thus the same; and if
properties are senses, this would be sufficient to conclude,
in spite of the fact that 'water' on twin Earth refers to
XYZ, that water is XYZ.
(3)that H20 is XYZ. Both 'water' and 'watert'
have

the same sense. But 'watert' is a word we've coined to

translate what twin Earthians call 'water* so as to keep
things straight for ourselves. Crucially, what it is that we
are distinguishing is that 'water' and 'watert' do not have
the same reference. A sense-property identity theorist seems
hard pressed to account for this move.

c. Externalism and Abstracta
Now, while the foregoing considerations may help to
break down resistance to rethinking a sense-property
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identity theory, what is at issue, insofar as our account of
analytic truth is concerned, is to claim a role for
properties as entities of bona fide externalist
individuation. Denying that they are essentially semantic
entities is a start; but it might be further objected that
it is their status as abstract objects that disqualifies
them as the sort of individuative entities properly relevant
to an externalist theory.
A few demarcations can serve as an indication of the
line of argument we find compelling. First, we must find a
plausible way to claim that a property, in spite of being an
abstract object like a proposition or a Fregean sense, is
not thereby a denizen of what some (Barwise and Perry 1983,
4) have called a "third realm" of abstraction. We have
already noted that if one takes the relevant individuating
context to be simply what is not in the head, then senses
and abstract propositions per se will count as vehicles of
externalist individuation. And we have already seen that it
is imperative to give some account of the constituent
structure of these entities, for the theoretical character
of a theory of content depends in some measure on what it is
that is taken to constitute the grasp of a sense or the
component structure of a proposition. Now, properties belong
to the extra-cranial environment in this wide sense. Is it
possible to place them more locally?
A useful distinction to draw in order to achieve our
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ends is one that distinguishes entities that figure in an
account of mind, and whose characterization is intended to
satisfy the demands of a psychological explanation, from
entities that figure in an account of what we may call the
scientific world, and whose characterization is intended to
satisfy the demands of explanatory theories of this world.
While it is true, of course, that theories about the events
and state of affairs of the scientific world are expressed
as a set of propositions, it is not the case that it is
these abstracta that are the relevant objects of theories of
the head-independent environment. Theories of this
environment will take different objects from theories of
mind, say, where propositions and other abstracta will
figure as the relevant theoretical objects, as well as the
vehicles through which the theory is expressed.
If we reflect a moment on the innovative nature of
externalism as a theory of mind, the plausibility of such a
distinction makes itself felt. The claim that the content of
mind is shaped and

essentially constituted by a reality

distinct from, indifferent to, and independent of our bodily
limits is not a lackluster claim. To say that properties
individuate mental states might indeed fall rather flat as a
theoretical claim if it were to turn out that properties
are, for instance, essentially semantic entities with no
claim to any interesting membership in the context beyond
the cutaneous limits of a mind. It is in fact the essential
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distinction between heads on the one hand, and the events
and states of affairs

- the objects and properties that are

the context in which those heads navigate - that makes
externalism provocative as a theory of mind.14
The literature regarding properties and their role in
the explanation of what we have called the scientific
world15 has introduced the notion of a property's causal
role in explanatory theories of the world. Properties, on
this view, have causal properties themselves in virtue of
their necessary structural complexity. Thus, for example,
one way to explain the events and states of affairs of the
scientific world is to appeal to the causal laws that govern
that world in terms of necessary relations between
properties. Properties are understood to have causal powers
in virtue of their structure and the necessary relations
they bear to other properties in virtue of such structure.
Given this picture of the extra-cranial environment, it seem
clear that we can neither banish every abstract object to a
"third realm," effectively removing it from that context we
take as having an essential mind-individuative role; nor
need we accept that every abstract object is per se on a par
with every other as far as individuative theses of mind are
concerned.

7. Conclusion
Given externalism, analytic sentences are true in
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virtue of the world - true in virtue of the necessary
structure and relations borne by the properties that are the
reference of their terms - yet analytic all the same. A
natural correspondence theory of truth is preserved, with
the result that for analytic sentences, intension may be
said to determine truth-value, not just extension. Truthvalue is delivered through extension to intension; the world
is not cut out.
We have seen that the characteristic modal and
epistemic features of analytic sentences may be preserved by
appeal to the notion of a property-revealing sense. Although
their truth-conditions are made in the very same terms as
those of synthetic sentences - world-involving terms analytic sentences are distinguished by the way the senses
expressed by their constituent terms reveal the componential
structure and necessary relations borne by the properties by
which they are individuated. Grasp of these propertyrevealing senses is sufficient for knowledge of the truth of
these sentences: it is this feature that essentially
distinguishes analytic sentences from synthetic sentences,
both necessary and contingent.
In short, there is no opposition, on this view,
between 'true in virtue of meaning' and 'true in virtue of
the world' - the former is a special case of the latter.
Analytic sentences express necessary truths as always; the
difference is that the necessity is necessity de re.
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Analytic truths are knowable a priori, as always; the
difference is that what is grasped is not a truth about mind
but a truth about the world. This is of course how it should
be: analytic truth is, after all, truth in virtue of
meaning. Analytic truth is necessary truth about the world,
knowable a priori.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3, Part One
1. See Quine (1980, 130-138).
2.
To one degree or another, depending on what degree
of externalism one espouses. More on this below.
3.
In what follows we consider different accounts of
the constituent structure of a proposition to examine the
consequences of certain variations in the accounts. We
understand Frege, familiarly, to take the sense of a
sentence as the proposition it expresses: a proposition
whose constituent structure consists in the senses expressed
by the words in the sentence.
4.
Barwise and Perry (1981, 387-403) also employ this
particular segment to introduce their way of recovering
semantic innocence. Our treatment differs in that the
discussion is framed in terms of externalism about meaning
in general, and extended to the question of analytic truth.
5. It is held to be knowable a priori and necessarily
true.
6. Situation semantics is, of course, another variety.
7.
Salmon and Soames (1988) contains a number of
articles that are the best introduction to a semantic theory
of this kind.
8.
An objection might be raised here that a TDR meets
Davidson's challenge to exorcise appeal to intensional
entities in an account of the behavior of expressions in
indirect discourse only trivially, if at all. For how is it
possible to claim, as we wish to, that a Fregean theory need
not make an in principle commitment to an independent realm
of distinct semantic entities to serve as the reference of
expressions in opaque contexts, when a TDR does not support
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even the initial erection of the Fregean account? On a view
that holds that there is nothing more to the meaning of an
expression than its reference, it does not seem possible to
claim that expressions in a that-clause shift their
reference at all, let alone that the reference-shift they
experience amounts to nothing untoward when the dust has
settled. To meet this objection is not brief work; it
raises, among other things, the issue of iterated belief
contexts and I must defer elaboration to another paper.
Suffice it to say that from the fact that an expression
refers to nothing but its ordinary reference in and out of
an opaque context, it does not follow that the sense
expressed by the expression in and out of an opaque context
remains the same.
9.
A familiar complication that arises is, of course,
that Lois may instantiate (1) and not (2):
(2) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is a hero
This is something to be explained by any theory that takes
the meaning of an expression to be exhausted by its
reference; fortunately, it is not the ins and outs of Direct
Reference Semantics that concerns us here. The options are
considered and perfected in, among others, a number of the
papers in Salmon and Soames, 1988. The bibliography gives
further directions.

230

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3, Part Two
1. See also Quine (1980, 9;130).
2.
We are accustomed to thinking of the difference
between analytic and synthetic sentences as a distinction
between sentences whose truth-value is determined
independently of the world and those whose truth-value is
not. Now, we might understand 'true independent of the
world' to mean two things: either necessarily true - true
independent of the way things are in any world - or,
alternatively, true in virtue of entities whose nature is
distinct from the world. The former sense of 'true
independent of the world,' however, is insufficient for a
distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, for as
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975a, 215-71) have shown, we can
countenance some sentences as necessary but synthetic. And
the latter sense is thwarted by externalism about meaning.
Clearly, if we claim that meaning is neither independent of
nor isolated from the environment, it is doubtful that the
truth-value of a sentence can be held to be determined in
virtue of meaning alone, independently of how things stand
in the world.
3.
I have already acknowledged the controversy
surrounding analyticity and I do assume throughout that
analytic truths are necessary and knowable apriori. A brief
comment on a notorious counterexample to the necessity
condition might be useful, however. 'I am here now' would
appear to be known apriori yet be contingently true: I might
well have been somewhere else. Kaplan's distinction between
character and content is useful in taking the sting out of
this putative counterexample. As Kaplan puts it (1977, 712 ):
. . . a truth in the logic of
demonstratives, like 'I am here now'
need not be necessary . . . how can
something be both logically true and
thus certain, and contingent at the same
time? . . . in the case of indexicals
the answer is easy to see . . . the
bearers of logical truth and of
contingency are different entities . . .
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it is the character that is logically
true . . . but it is the content that is
contingent or necessary.
We might represent the distinction as a distinction of
scope; that is, from the fact that:
(1) Necessarily, every utterance of 'I am here now' is a
true utterance.
it does not follow that:
(2) Every utterance of 'I am here now1 is necessarily true.
4.
See Kripke (1980, 39) for the working definition,
and see Burge (1992, 9) for a useful exposition of the lack
of consensus concerning the characterization of analyticity.
5.
Familiar problems arise for an account of certain
kinds of expressions when reference is taken to determine
meaning: the problem of opacity is the most notorious. See
Salmon and Soames (1988) for a useful introduction to socalled direct reference semantics. See also chapter 3, part
one, where I argue that semantic innocence can be thought to
characterize Fregean semantics - in spite of appearances.
6.
Here I agree with Forbes (1989, 132). I should say
that it was my misfortune to have worked out this account
before I came across his book. I was no less elated (and
somewhat relieved) to discover support for it there. This is
not to say that I am confident that he would agree with
everything I have claimed in this paper.
7.
with respect
help to make
componential
to speak; to
the relation

A distinction between proper and improper subset
to the constituent structure of properties will
this clear. We can understand some of the
relations between properties to be improper, so
include the identity of properties as well as of proper parts of properties.

8.
See McDowell (1984, 283-94) for a profitable
comparison. McDowell argues there for what I would call
object-involving senses for singular terms. I extend the
idea to predicates, and claim that while all terms express
senses that are property-involving, some of those senses
will be property-revealing.
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9.
The structural composition of a property is not to
be confused with its essence.
10.
Evans (1982) and McDowell (1977, 1984) were the
first to suggest and defend a distinction between
descriptive (so-called Fregean) sense and an alternative, so
called de re sense. Briefly, the distinction turns on the
relation between sense and its bearer. Frege argued that the
sense of an expression could exist independently of the
reference of the expression. Evans and McDowell deny this,
defending a necessary relation between the existence and
identity conditions of the reference of an expression and
its sense.
11.
One thing I take to result from this view of
analyticity is the need for a reconsideration of the
familiar categories of the de dicto and the de re as they
apply to propositions. In particular, I believe that this
view of analyticity recommends abandoning entirely the
notion of the de dicto proposition. I pursue this in another
paper.
12.
I am grateful to Graeme Forbes for supplying me
with this and the following example. He did also include:
'Every number has a successor,' but I believe that this one
is possibly more controversial. One might argue that
mathematics is the sort of area where discoveries take
place, and that it is more akin to a discovery about the
nature of numbers that they in fact have successors, than
anything about the meaning of the word 'number.'
13.
There are others. See Putnam (1975b, 429-40).
Perhaps, in addition, the standard debate concerning
intension and extension has resulted in an unwarranted
conflation of the sense and reference of a predicate. Since
extension is not sufficient to fix the meaning of a
predicate, given non-synonymous predicates with the same
extension, intensions were invoked to satisfy the demand for
the meaning of a predicate - but intensions are commonly
held to be the property or attribute denoted by a predicate.
This may be a case were convenience sacrifices clarity - or
even truth.
14. See McGinn (1989, chapter 1) for more on this
point.
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15.
See, among others, Armstrong (1983, 1989), Dretske
(1977, 248-68), Shoemaker (1984, 206-33; 234-60), and
Tooley (1987) .
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